

EPIPHANY PHILOSOPHERS

CONFERENCE REPORT

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EDITORS' NOTE

All the papers in this volume originated out of short papers read to initiate discussions at a small conference of a group of philosophers and psychologists who are members of the Church of England, which met at 11 Millington Road, Cambridge in April 1951. The origin and subsequent history of the group is described in Mary T. Hoskyns' Preface (I in this volume). Most of the papers are reproduced here substantially in the form in which they were delivered at the conference; three of them - by R.B. Braithwaite (II.1), Dorothy Emmet (II.4), David Russell (VIII.2) - have been expanded out of the papers read; and two by Margaret Masterman (IV and VII.2) are substantially new works composed on themes which she developed in shorter form at the conference.

Interspersed among the papers in most of the sections will be found short reports or summaries of points raised in the discussions. Though most of these are given in conversational form, in no cases are they verbatim records of what was said. They are inserted partly because the points made seemed to be of interest and partly to convey the atmosphere in which the discussions took place.

At the opening of the conference Mary T. Hoskyns gave an address which is not reproduced here, though some of its substance is incorporated in her general Preface. The discussion which followed her address showed the very great difficulty many of the group found in seeing how integrity could be maintained within the ecclesiastical order of the Church of England. Free discussion is indeed possible and dissatisfaction can be expressed. But protests seem to stop at the expression without any impact being made on the system of church order itself. The so-called "apathy of the laity" is often the exasperated despair of people who feel that they can no longer go on within this system. [This feeling, which was so marked in the opening discussion, comes out in various places in this volume, notably in the discussions on the symposium "Is Democracy a Religious Idea?" (VI).] The subjects of the symposia had been planned with a view to exploring some of the points where tension arises most acutely. Though the papers were concerned mainly with certain enquiries in philosophy, psychology and biology, they were felt by most of those present to have a bearing not only on intellectual problems of faith but also on practical problems of order and worship. The more ecclesiastically-committed members came to appreciate this inter-relationship better as the conference went on, and this in itself made for greater harmony.

These papers are of course only samples of kinds of enquiry which might be opened up within the Church of England. It is not enough, however, merely to open up discussion and to criticize. The members of the group are also engaged on experiments and investigations with a view to finding out more about the facts of religious living. This should be the long-run objective of scientists and empirically-minded philosophers who take religion seriously.

11 Millington Road,
CAMBRIDGE.

R. B. BRAITHWAITE
DOROTHY M. EMMET

2 April, 1954.

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I. PREFACE

By Mary T. Hoskyns

It is a general assumption in the Church of England that no subject is barred from investigation and that completely free discussion is to be allowed. Yet while this may be so in principle, in practice opportunities for investigation and discussion are not part of the normal organization of the Church. It is also true that some questions tend to be looked on as in fact not needing discussion, while others, equally important, are avoided on the ground that discussion of them is likely to hurt the feelings of devout Christians. Moreover, in academic circles in particular, theological discussion goes on mainly within the idioms of people who have been brought up with the background of a classical education, and with reference to the history of the subject. There are few people of intellectual influence in the Church who have submitted problems to the discipline of a scientific and experimental approach. The present tendency is therefore to look on the scientific approach in a negative way, as something to be kept in its place, and something that needs supplementing by other kinds of thinking, rather than as a discipline which, by its very nature, might make a contribution of a fundamental and positive kind to the understanding of religion.

Yet the past tradition of the Church of England does not support an alienation from scientific and experimental interest. Bishops cooperate in the founding of the Royal Society in the Seventeenth Century, and in the development of the new empirical philosophy in the Eighteenth Century. In the Nineteenth Century, when the shock of evolutionary theories burst on the Church, there were a sufficient number of churchmen interested in science to keep the discussion open, so that "the conflict between religion and science" did not result in the deadlock which often ensued on the continent. And at least two eminent divines, Dr Whewell and Archbishop Whately, were themselves making contributions to the logic of the sciences.

Yet at present it seems to be widely true that the interest, approaches, and language of the scientific and religious worlds have drawn apart. Nor is there much conversation of a fruitful kind between theologians and those who are working with the predominantly empirical methods of contemporary philosophy. And the non-democratic methods of church government in the Church of England produce a stumbling block to the moral convictions of those who have learned in other forms of association to take for granted that they have a responsible share in the making of decisions.

A small group of philosophers and psychologists, who met for a conference at 11 Millington Road, Cambridge, in April, 1951, were drawn from

people acutely conscious of this atmosphere. They were a group who broadly accepted an empirical approach, by which is here meant the approach of one who takes science and scientific results seriously, and bases reasons for belief on the tests of action and experience rather than on either deductive argument or authority. There would probably have been a small conference on science, philosophy and religion in any case, but the particular form which it took, that of a research retreat, grew out of an association with the Community of the Epiphany, a Community of Anglican sisters in Truro. The founder of this Community, Bishop Wilkinson, had a special sympathy for the problems of those immersed in contemporary intellectual life, and a concern for this forms part of the rule of the order. The Community of the Epiphany allowed their novice mistress, Sister Emily, to be a contributing member of the conference (see VI.1), and supported it by prayer in their daily Offices, thereby greatly deepening its religious life. The Society of the Sacred Mission, Kelham, also gave this support, and sent their senior tutor, Father Victor Ranford who contributed a paper (VII.1). Kelham sends some of its members to read for degrees in Cambridge, and one of these, Father Matthew Shaw, who was reading for the Moral Sciences Tripos, also took part in the conference (see VI.4). The Bishop of Ely was told of the conference, and sent a letter of encouragement.

There are of course many societies and conferences for the discussion of religious problems, but broadly it would be fair to say that these either take the form of listening to a paper and joining in a discussion as an incident in a busy life, or the meeting may take the form of a religious retreat where religious education is given through addresses couched in a theological idiom. This conference made the experiment of embedding papers and discussions, conducted in the manner appropriate to free scientific and philosophical meetings, in a corporate religious life. Thus the conditions of membership were finally fixed as the following (a) that every member had to prepare a paper for one of the sessions, and to be prepared to take the chair at any other session if asked; and (b) that every member had to be a communicant member of the Church of England. The first condition was, and is, essential. The conference has given birth to a group where there are no passive members and efforts are made to do serious philosophy, psychology, logic and philosophy of science. This requires real effort; it requires training; it takes hours; and it is the main activity of the group.

The second condition was and is highly controversial. My view, which was the one which in the end prevailed, was that religious problems could best be discussed by people who were sharing in a common worship. It was adopted, however, as an experiment.

In accepting the presidency of this conference, I felt that there

was an analogy between this work on philosophy, science and religion, and the work on the Bible done by the higher critics of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, in which my husband was involved and to which he devoted his life.

That work had to be done by those who had trained themselves in the methods of the higher criticism; and the results (if any) could not be determined beforehand, but had to be arrived at by these critical methods. Now that historical and critical work on the Bible has been going on for a long time, Christians can claim that their religious books have been subjected to a thorough investigation of this nature. In the same way they should welcome investigation of our religious material with all the help which can be given by modern scientific and philosophical techniques. It is essential that this should be done by people prepared to go into sufficient detail. A notable illustration of how detailed investigations could be initiated by an unofficial group is shown by the activities of the small number of friends in Cambridge (which included Henry Sidgwick, subsequently Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy, and his wife) who founded the Society for Psychical Research in 1882. The analogy may seem presumptuous, and it is not offered in that spirit. I refer to it because it is the outstanding example of what can be done by an unofficial group of people prepared not simply to discuss in generalities intractable problems bearing on science, psychology and religion, but to make detailed investigations. To take an interest in the kind of material studied by the early S.P.R. was scientifically suspect in the eyes of many of their contemporaries. Now, however, after two generations, Professor H.H. Price can speak of the results of psychical research as in his view providing the main empirical argument against the materialist conception of human personality, which he thinks is generally assumed by the majority of Western educated opinion¹. There is however an important point to notice. Intellectual integrity seemed to demand of most of the early members of the S.P.R. that they should leave the Church in order to do their scientific and philosophical work. But the group which met at 11 Millington Road were concerned to ask whether there was a vocation of scientists and philosophers which ought to be pursued within the Church. As was said in a later discussion, the experimenter must also be the experimental animal. He must undertake the very difficult double role of exercising his freedom as an observer and experimenter, and also himself be practising a religious life.

It was because of this conviction and, as has been said, because of the help given by the Community of the Epiphany, that the conference took the particular form it did. The daily time table provided for two sessions of three hours each, and also for sung matins and evensong and

(1) cf. Some Aspects of the Conflict between Science and Religion (Eddington Memorial Lecture, Cambridge, November 1953).

for quiet before each session and after evensong. It should be said that the early sessions of the conference showed that there were considerable tensions under the surface; clerical assumptions of authority brought out anti-clerical reactions. It was not until we had a choir practice in which intransigent opponents in argument were found to be indispensable partners in the basses or altos, that these tensions began to resolve. The liberating effects of these choir practices was most noteworthy. Moreover, besides the singing, all members of the conference shared in responsibility for the daily offices (and some of the lay members acquired a new sympathy for the clergy who normally have to make these preparations)¹. To some members at the start, the holding

(1) A sample Chapel Bill (taken in fact from the second conference held in Newcastle) is appended, as it shows the pattern of an office as held at both conferences.

<u>EVENSONG</u>	Monday after Trinity 12. September 1.
<u>Start Sung</u>	O Lord, open thou our lips.
<u>Psalms</u>	6.7.8. (Day 1 p.5).
<u>1st Lesson</u>	Mary Hoskyns.
<u>Antiphon</u>	p.115 "He hath done all things well" (Margaret Braithwaite (Matthew Shaw
<u>Magnificat</u>	p.224 Tone 5,2.
<u>2nd Lesson</u>	Victor Ranford.
<u>Antiphon</u>	"Preserve us".
<u>Nunc Dimittis</u>	p.232 Tone 3,4.
<u>Prayers</u>	conducted by David Russell, beginning with "Our Father" and continuing straight on as in the Prayer Book.
<u>Collect</u>	Trinity 12.
<u>Hymn</u>	181, "Creator Spirit, by whose aid" (all 4 verses in harmony).

Books used:-

1. The Prayer Book as proposed in 1928, with the Revised Lectionary.
2. A Manual of Plainsong, by Briggs & Frere, revised and enlarged by J.H. Arnold.
3. The English Hymnal.
4. Book of Antiphons, for psalms and Magnificat, made by the Community of the Epiphany, Truro.
5. Book of Antiphons for the Nunc Dimittis.

of sung matins and evensong on each day had seemed a strange suggestion, but in fact no one cut an office. On the last morning a sung Eucharist was held by the conference in the parish church of St Mark's. The Vicar of St Mark's, who is a notable bird ethologist, was himself a member of the conference and contributed a paper (VIII.1).

There was yet another side to this conference. Those responsible for organizing it were troubled at the way conferences ignore family life and tend to separate husbands and wives, and take time away from the children's holidays, rather than provide a means of bringing families together. An attempt was therefore made at this one to rectify this. Wives and children were invited, and some of them came. During the afternoons members who were discussing at other times played with the children. Members of the families who were not involved in discussions helped on the domestic side, and everybody took turns in washing up and laying tables. These arrangements reduced the expenses to those incurred in providing the actual meals, the minimum of domestic help, railway fares, and a fee for the organist. All members of all the families came to the final sung Eucharist. In order to emphasise the family and corporate nature of the service, everybody sat in the choir stalls and had tune books. The youngest members took the collection. Two of these (aged 10 and 4) had acted as stewards to the conference, wearing stewards' badges.

Sustained intellectual activity can involve considerable strain, and anyone who has seen the members of an ordinary philosophy conference at its conclusion will have noticed how extremely exhausted they all are. There are two sides therefore to the practice of religion being asked of who came to the Millington Road conference. One reason, as has been said, was in order that those who study religion should do so from inside knowledge. But besides this, by submitting to a corporate rule of life during the conference, its members were given three things to enable them to stand up to the strain of the work done, viz. (1) quiet times and time for sleep. (2) An ordered domestic life in which everybody took part. (3) Liturgical offices. Singing, especially plainsong seems to have a recuperative power on those doing mental work. (It should however be said that those who did not sing or did not really like it were not so well satisfied. It was felt that means should be explored for giving a fuller feeling of participation to those who do not sing.)

One discovery members of the group made (to the surprise of some of them) was the mutual understanding which established itself between philosophers and scientists on the one hand and monks and nuns on the other. "Monks and nuns! You must have had to be very careful what you said," remarked an outside friend. But far from the presence of the professed religious cramping discussion, it greatly helped it. The

fact that the professed religious life is a wholehearted and rigorous one strikes a chord in those who need also to be pursuing their peculiar vocation in a wholehearted way. Moreover, behind the differences of language and theological outlook, psychologists and philosophers can see that religious communities have made certain experimental discoveries of which note needs to be taken. Sister Emily's paper to this conference (VI.1) afforded a notable illustration of this. It was read for her in her absence through illness at a stage of acute tension between the different elements in the conference, and the practical psychological wisdom it contained had the effect of suddenly bringing everyone together in a most remarkable and impressive way. The result of this contact of philosophers with the professed religious has been to stimulate a union of clear-cut worship and clear-cut philosophy, and not, as can sometime happen, to produce a kind of thinking which loses precision through trying to reach accommodation between different outlooks.

It is now nearly three years since the conference took place, and the production of this volume so long afterwards needs some justifying. The subjects discussed are proving of interest to a wider circle, and some of the papers opened up new lines of approach. So it was decided to collect together the papers and issue a limited number in this reproduced edition for private circulation. There is a certain advantage in the delay. It was uncertain at the time whether the group would continue, and in what form. It is now more possible to report on its further development.

Various people in touch with the British Broadcasting Corporation who had heard of the discussions and thought that they sounded interesting, pressed the group to broadcast. They were very reluctant to do so, but finally agreed, provided that the broadcasting was done anonymously as a group activity (since no one of them wished to make a private reputation as a broadcaster from these discussions), and provided that they were allowed to pool money so earned so as to finance further conferences. In the last two years members have met several times in conditions similar to those of the first retreat conference in order to prepare scripts for broadcasting. It has been found that the productiveness of these discussions has been greatly helped by keeping a period of silence after the Quaker manner before each one.

Common tribulation is said to promote solidarity. This has certainly been proved by the broadcasters, and notably by the first team, who spent an unforgettable day rewriting their script in Broadcasting House; a day in which they started the morning in the splendours of the Board Room, and ended in the evening in the cellar, having also been ejected mid-way down from a room which was needed for the more important purpose of a committee on televising the Test Match.

One other conference has been held in Newcastle-on-Tyne on the subject of Ritual. From the point of view of producing a script for broadcasting, this was unsuccessful, and this failure is instructive. Whereas the first conference and the Newcastle conference had used the current Anglican forms of worship, admittedly experimentally, it has become clear that in order to have anything constructive to say about ritual, the group must be free to practise within the current and traditional forms in certain ways suggested by their investigations. This for psychologists and anthropologists is as vital to their work as is freedom of discussion for philosophers. Knowing how great a variety of use there is already in the Anglican church, the group assumes that freedom to experiment is possible within the Anglican rite. The need for experiment was brought out by the discussions leading to a broadcast called "Empirical tests of a church" which followed up Sister Emily's conference paper (VI.1). It was suggested that a group forming a church should be seen to have three characteristics:-

- (a) There would be provision for "rational decision" procedures.
- (b) There would be provision for reconciliation procedures.
- (c) There would be provision for worship procedures.

It was suggested that all these are needed in a way of life which was governed by charity. The paper had also brought out how taking part accurately and publicly in the actions of the worship procedures can help people to overcome fears and can help engender a sense of responsibility, if they are also taking part in the rational decision procedures. But from these discussions, and also from their own observations, it was increasingly borne in on some of the more scientifically minded of the group that ritual is a most potent force which can have deep effects for evil as well as for good. A ritual in which most people, and especially women, are only passively engaged, can encourage feelings and habits of subservience, particularly when presence at the ritual is not linked with any responsible share in the making of rational decisions affecting the common life of which the ritual should form a part. It is also even possible that an exclusively one sex form of ritual may encourage homosexual tendencies. Some members of the group had to ask themselves whether they could go on taking part in sacraments unless the evil potentialities in ritual could be more fully faced.

An opportunity for looking further into the question of how ritual might help people to grow up in responsibility arose unexpectedly. At the beginning of Lent 1953 we had staying with us at Millington Road a friend, Father Barton¹. The weather was very bad, we had illness at

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- (1) Father Barton combined the qualifications of being a grandfather, of having studied mathematics, of being interested in science and of being an officer of the Community of the Epiphany.

home, and with the Bishop's permission Father Barton celebrated the Eucharist in the house. Faced with making the arrangements for this, we realised that we were the congregation, and we had the opportunity of discussing with him how the service should be conducted. Father Barton appreciated the feelings of some of us about certain features of ritual, and invited suggestions as to how these should be met. First, it was thought that the question of the more active participation in the ritual by those present besides the celebrant should be faced. So each member of the house congregation read one part of the service (the epistle and gospel, the invitation to confession, the comfortable words and the thanksgiving). The bread and wine was brought up from the body of the room. Since then the Eucharist has been celebrated by Father Barton in the house with the permission of the Bishop and the concurrence of the Vicar of the parish, on two further occasions at the close of conferences held to prepare broadcast scripts. In these an experiment has been made in the question of dress. Since all present were taking an active part in the service, there could be no question of there being only one server. The only traditional garment which seemed suitable for both men and women was the alb. The experiment was therefore tried of dressing both men and women in albs and so emphasizing that all were brought together on the same level. The result was not only that many hesitations and inhibitions were overcome, but also that all present felt themselves responsible for the conduct of the service, and, more important still, the principle of the priesthood of the whole body of the Church (as St Paul speaks of it) was made explicit for some of us for the first time¹.

- (1) Dr J.A.T. Robinson in his article on "The House Church and the Parish Church" (Theology, August 1950) writes "We have a wholly wrong, and unbiblical, idea of the house-Church if we define it as something which is a half-way stage to the parish Church. Rather, it is a vital cell within the Body itself which should be reflecting in microcosm the whole life and activity of the Community of the Holy Spirit - all that St Paul meant by describing it as 'the Church', the great Church, in the house." Experiments in house churches are being carried out in a parish in Leeds and also in a parish in Bristol. Dr Robinson's plea that at this level, i.e. the level of the church in the house, there should be great latitude of experiment in eucharistic worship is also endorsed by our group, though I think that Dr Robinson is thinking more of simplifying the language than the kind of experiment described above. In his letter published in Theology, August 1953, he also shows that the experience of the parish of Halcott, Leeds, leads to the suggestion that part-time priests become necessary as the numbers of house-churches increase. The question of church organization therefore arises, and there is clearly a need for experiment here also. In the case of a house-church which is the foundation of a vocational group, a democratic
- (continued on next page)

I think it will be appreciated that the main religious assumption of the group is that membership of the Christian Church involves the obligation of charity. The experiments described above may help us to find out what kinds of ritual practice can encourage the exercise of charity in certain specific ways. By taking a small group, the correspondence between the ritual and the common life, which is often lacking when the congregation is less closely knit, can be brought out.

I have given this account of some of the experience up to the present of one experimental group in the hopes that it may prove of interest to others. There are of course other groups thinking in their own ways about these and allied problems, and there is room for many more. The particular concern of this group, as I have tried to show, is to see whether work in philosophy and science can be done as a vocation within the church, and to explore a way in which a modern pattern of the contemplative aspect of academic life might come out. It may be said that philosophers are odd people, whose experiences are not relevant to anyone else. But it may also be that they are just ordinary people who are more articulate about certain difficulties in Church worship, life and government, which large numbers of people, who have bits of the scientist and philosopher in them, are also feeling. If this is so, then the Church of England should not allow its internal politics or the politics of ecumenical unity to hold it back from being prepared to be genuinely experimental. It should go into the councils of the Churches with its own distinctive contribution, the contribution of a tradition which can include within a common liturgical loyalty, free investigation and variety of life.

(continued from previous page)

organization is necessary. An organization more like that of the Society of Friends would seem to be suitable as a precedent; and the problem then presented would be how to combine the valuable elements of this without throwing over all possibility of liturgical worship. If lay initiative and responsibility are to be encouraged, and liturgical worship to be provided, I think probably it would be better to think in terms of "workmen-priests" (fellow-workers in a vocational group) than in terms of part-time priests

II. THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

1. By R.B. Braithwaite

The Problem for an Empiricist of the Nature of Religious Belief¹

The problem of religious belief as it presents itself to-day to those of us who think along the lines of the empirical tradition in philosophy - the tradition of British philosophy running from Locke through Hume and Mill and Bertrand Russell to contemporary "logical positivists" - is different in a very important respect from the problem as it appeared to our intellectual grandparents in that tradition. As it posed itself to Karl Pearson, Henry Sidgwick, W.K. Clifford, or to our more distant ancestors like Mill and Locke, the problem of religious belief was essentially that of finding a rational justification for belief in the existence of a personal God and in the other propositions of the Christian creeds. It was taken for granted that the statement, for example, that a personal God created the world had a perfectly straightforward meaning: the point at issue was whether or not it was reasonable to believe that this statement was true. Those who failed to find an adequate reason for such beliefs coined for themselves the name "agnostic" to express their position; while those who thought they had adequate reasons for believing that the propositions in question were false called themselves atheists. There was, however, no disagreement between theists, agnostics and atheists as to what they were disagreeing about - which was whether or not it was reasonable to hold that certain religious statements were true. And when William James argued for the "will to believe" against Clifford's demand for suspension of belief when we were ignorant, it did not occur to James that there could be any doubt as to what it was that should be willed to believe. What was lacking in the agnostics, he thought, was this will.

The development of the empiricism of Locke, Hume and Mill into the logical empiricism of Wittgenstein and of those influenced by him has radically changed the nature of the problem. The problem for a contemporary empiricist is no longer that of discussing the truth of religious statements universally agreed to be significant: it is that of discovering what, if anything, these statements signify. The problem as it presents itself to-day is well stated in the question set in

(1) This paper is reproduced not in the form in which it was read to the Conference but in a revised and slightly expanded form in which it was read to the Cambridge Theological Society on 8 May 1952.

a recent Cambridge examination: "What meaning can we attribute to statements about God, since God is ex hypothesi totally different from any object of ordinary experience?" Unless a meaning can be attributed to such statements the question of their truth or falsity does not arise. Similarly until a meaning is attributed there is nothing in the statement either to believe or to disbelieve - however strong the Jamesian will-to-believe may be.

The primary philosophical problem with regard to religious belief is thus the problem of the meaning of religious statements. What do such statements as "God created the world", "God is our Heavenly Father", "God was incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth", mean? [It is better to consider statements which say something about God rather than the mere statement that God exists, since the meaning of this statement must depend upon the meaning of the word "God" as this word appears in statements attributing properties or relationships to God.]

The meaning of a sentence, in the widest sense of meaning, is determined by the use of the sentence. If a sentence has a use it has, in a wide sense, a meaning. There is therefore some justification for the view that any one who uses the word "God" significantly in any context whatever is a theist. For to use a word significantly is to use it in such a way that it has some linguistic function. Let us examine what sorts of linguistic functions religious statements can have.

There are two possible methods of interpreting a religious statement according to which it will express a proposition which can be believed or disbelieved in a sense of belief which presents no special philosophic difficulty - no difficulty, that is, which is peculiar to belief in religious statements.

The first method is to interpret a religious statement as expressing a proposition which is logically necessary or formally true or a priori: that is, a proposition whose truth or falsity is independent of experience, e.g. $7 + 5 = 12$. Examples of statements with such logically necessary interpretations are that God is necessary being, and that it is logically necessary that a creature should have a creator. This form of interpretation is the dominant one in the intellectual tradition of Catholic Christianity: less so in the Anglican tradition which, by laying stress upon some form of the Argument from Design, makes propositions about God empirical hypotheses. I shall not discuss the logically necessary type of interpretation for two reasons.

(1) In common with many contemporary empiricists I hold that the characteristic feature of logically necessary propositions is that their truth depends, not upon any facts about the world, but upon the way in which we use language as a means of thought. The exact way in

which the use of language determines the truth of any particular logically necessary proposition is frequently very difficult to elucidate; but the difficulties in detail are not sufficient to make me doubt the general thesis - that logically necessary propositions give us no information about the world.

(2) But even if this thesis is false, there is a more general thesis - accepted by great numbers of philosophers of different schools since it was propounded by Hume and by Kant - which states that no propositions asserting existence can be deduced from logically necessary truths. The thesis holds that such a truth as $7 + 5 = 12$ is always of a hypothetical form, and that all that can be deduced from it is that, if a certain empirical proposition is true - e.g. that there exist twelve chairs in the room - then another empirical proposition is true - that both there exist seven chairs in the room and also there exist another five chairs in the room. So according to this more general thesis as well as according to the more special "linguistic" thesis about logically necessary propositions, to treat e.g. God is our Heavenly Father as a logically necessary proposition would not, in itself, give us any knowledge about the empirical world.

The second method of interpreting a religious statement as expressing a proposition - the commonest method among non-Catholic religious writers in Great Britain and America - is to treat a statement like "God is our Heavenly Father" as expressing an empirical hypothesis which is of similar nature to a scientific hypothesis. Now the essential characteristic of a scientific hypothesis is that from it (usually in conjunction with other scientific hypotheses) there can be deduced generalisations about the behaviour of observable things which can be tested by observation and experiment. It is not necessary that the concepts entering into the hypothesis should themselves be observable entities: indeed for the hypothesis to explain a large range of different sorts of facts (which is required of the hypotheses of modern physics) and for it to be possible to extend the hypothesis to explain ranges of facts which may be thought of in the future, it is essential that the hypothesis should make use of theoretical terms (e.g. electron, Schrödinger wave-function) which do not themselves correspond to observable things. The meaning of these theoretical terms is settled by the place which they occupy in the whole scientific system in which they occur. So it is not a valid criticism of the proposal to treat God as an empirical concept occurring in empirical propositions to say that He is not observable. No more is an electric field of force or a Schrödinger wave-function. There is nothing logically wrong in regarding God as our Heavenly Father as an explanatory hypothesis which is analogous to a hypothesis in physics or biology - nor ought such an interpretation to be criticised because metaphorical language ("Father") is used in the statement of the hypothesis, for the word "wave" as used

in quantum physics is also a metaphor.

The difficulty in regarding religious statements as scientific hypotheses is not a logical difficulty but a scientific difficulty. A hypothesis in science is put forward to explain a particular range of facts, and it is tested by reference to that range of facts. What range of facts would be explained by the statement "God is our Heavenly Father" if this statement is regarded as expressing a scientific hypothesis?

If the facts to be explained are facts about the physical world, God is our Heavenly Father would be a hypothesis in physics - perhaps a hypothesis, expressed in metaphorical language, asserting a temporally First Cause for the physical universe. But the majority of physicists to-day would make the same reply to the proposal to include God in a physical theory which was explaining the evolution of the physical universe as that made by Laplace to Napoleon: "Je n'ai pas besoin de cette hypothèse".

But if God is not required in physics he might occur in a useful explanatory hypothesis in biology - to explain, for example, the facts of biological evolution. Writers such as Shaw and Bergson have deified the Life Force or the élan vital, though for neither of these writers was the concept a purely scientific one. If biology were to make use of hypotheses which were expressed, in metaphorical language, by religious statements these statements would be given a biological-hypothesis interpretation. But few religious statements have been interpreted as biological hypotheses. They have frequently been taken as expressing important biological facts as in Flaubert's panorama of living creatures dissolving into the face of Christ at the end of his Tentation de Saint Antoine or in one reading of St Paul's "whole creation groaning and travailing in pain". But biological evolution accomplished by means of life-death cycles is a scientific fact to be explained, not itself a scientific hypothesis.

The situation is quite different with regard to the possibility of regarding many religious statements as explanatory hypotheses in psychology. We have learnt to recognise the psychological insight of mediaeval philosophers like Aquinas and of analysts of mysticism like Augustine Baker; and there is no doubt that a great deal of traditional Christian language - expressions such as "prevenient grace", "the old Adam", "the new man" - can be given meanings within statements expressing general hypotheses about the partial dissociation or, conversely, the integration of personality. Many religious statements - almost all of those which are concerned with God as immanent, or as an indwelling spirit - can, if one likes, be regarded as expressing, in a special sort of language, propositions which, if expressed in a different

language, would occur in books which librarians would classify under "psychology of personality" or "characterology". It is therefore possible to regard many Christian statements (not all: God as transcendent cannot easily be fitted in) as psychological hypotheses which profess to explain sets of facts about human behaviour. On this interpretation they are empirical scientific hypotheses whose truth or falsity is tested by their conformity with observed facts in the same way as other scientific hypotheses are tested.

There are, however, two serious difficulties to regarding religious statements in this scientific quasi-psychological way. The first difficulty may perhaps be overcome. It is that the Christian statements which can be interpreted quasi-psychologically are not - at present - knit together in a unified system which is capable, like other scientific systems, of being empirically testable as a whole. Separate statements can be taken as aphorisms expressing psychological truths; but they are not sufficiently integrated into a system for this to be regarded as a scientific theory. This defect might be remedied: a theologian who was prepared to treat the Christian dogmas as psychological hypotheses and to organise them into a system which could be tested in psychological laboratories or in psychiatrists' consulting rooms as well as in everyday life might succeed in producing a unified scientific theory. If this theory explained facts which were not explained by any other theory, it would be an important scientific achievement. If it only explained facts which had also been explained by another theory (e.g. by that of Freud), it would have to convince the learned world that it was superior as a scientific system.

But even if it were the case that some or all religious statements could with scientific as well as with logical propriety be regarded as hypotheses explanatory of particular facts of experience, there is what I take to be an insuperable objection to the proposal to treat the whole body of religious statements believed by any one believer as consisting entirely in a body of scientific beliefs. For to propose such an analysis would be to demoralize religion. Scientific beliefs are, by their nature, ethically neutral: they serve to enable the believer to understand and to predict the course of nature and, sometimes, to secure that nature shall do what he wants it to do. Meteorological knowledge, for example, may tell us when rain will fall, and in the future it may enable us to arrange when and where it will fall; but knowledge of meteorology alone will not enable us to secure that the rain will fall on "the just" rather than on "the unjust". To the extent that religious statements are regarded as scientific explanations, to that extent will they be ethically neutralized.

This same point can be made from another angle. If religious statements are scientific hypotheses, religious practices will be

practical applications of such hypotheses in order to effect practical ends. Liturgy will be related to dogma in the same way as, for example, chemical engineering is related to chemistry. But to treat, for example, the Eucharist as a piece of religious-engineering technique is to regard it as a piece of magic - where the word "magic" is used in the sense employed by anthropologists to describe ritual practices practised to secure some specific practical end. Though it may well be the case that, as a matter of history, the Christian Eucharist has a direct descent, by way of Jewish Temple worship, from primitive magical rituals, it would be grossly inadequate to describe it primarily in magical terms. I conclude therefore, that even though some religious statements may be regarded as scientific hypotheses which can be believed in the same way and supported (if the belief is justified) by similar reasons to that in which other scientific hypotheses are believed and supported, this scientific use cannot be the main part of the function of religious statement; and that we must therefore look for some sense of the statements other than that of expressing empirical propositions which can be straightforwardly believed or disbelieved.

Statements are used in discourse for many purposes distinct from that of considering or of communicating propositions. It may well be the case that - even if the religious statement is grammatically an indicative sentence - these non-cognitive functions have become the functions of the statement, the function of expressing a proposition having dwindled to vanishing point. Among the many non-cognitive functions of a statement there are two in particular which have claims to be considered in connection with our problem of giving meaning to religious statements.

The first of these non-cognitive functions is that of displaying an emotion or feeling. This "emotive" function, as I shall call it, of religious statements has been discussed a great deal recently in philosophic literature: generally speaking, it is the way in which atheists attempt to explain the function for religious believers of religious statements. This function is expressed impolitely by saying that religion serves as a drug or more politely by saying that the principal function of religion is to provide consolation. It is said for example that the main function, to a believer, of the statement that God is our Heavenly Father is to express his feeling that he is being looked after in the way in which a father looks after his children, and that, however black things may seem, he may rest assured that the Father will secure that all is really for the best. "God's in His Heaven; All's right with the world." On a more sophisticated level the sentiment in question may be said to be that of feeling at unity with the universe, and that the universe is not alien to one's hopes and desires - a feeling which Freud has called the "oceanic feeling" and to the existence

of which he, together with many philosophers of the idealist school at the end of the last century, attach great importance in their account of religion.

Explanations of religious statements as being primarily expressions of feelings have however rarely satisfied the religious people who use such statements. For those who practise any religion, and who are at all self-conscious about what they are doing in making religious statements, tend to agree that mere feeling is not enough, and that to enjoy sentiments of feeling safe or of being in the hands of a loving father without such sentiments having any important connection with the rest of life is not "true religion".

There is however a second non-cognitive function of religious statements which is, I think, far more relevant to the discovery of what is the essential nature of these statements than is their merely emotive function. This function of religious statements is what I will call their "directive" function of proclaiming policies of behaviour. On the view that this directive function is the primary function of a religious statement, in the making of such a statement the asserter will be proclaiming, to himself and to others, that he intends and proposes to follow a certain policy of action, to live according to a certain way of life. [When religious assertions are made publicly there may be the additional optative: Would that you also should have an intention to do likewise!] According to this account the principal function to a person of his asserting that God is our Heavenly Father is to express his intention to treat all men as his brothers (together, perhaps, with the hope that others will have a similar intention). The criterion of the validity of the statement for him will be whether in fact he has that intention: he will be insincere if he makes the assertion without having the intention. [The criteria for his in fact having the intention are very complicated; but the criteria are all in terms of his possible behaviour under different circumstances - how, for example, he would behave if he met a man set upon by thieves on the road to Jericho.] On this view the difference between asserting a religious statement and not asserting it is a difference in policy of behaviour: the asserter will have a policy of behaving in a way different from that given by his policies of behaviour had he not been prepared to make the assertion. In the case in which the man comes to make a religious assertion which he was not prepared to make before he will at that point be undergoing a conversion of life.

That the way of life led by the believer is highly relevant to the sincerity of his religious belief has been emphasized by all the moral religions, and above all, perhaps, by Christianity. "By their fruits shall ye know them." In my view the proclamation of a policy for a way of living is by far the most important element in the "meaning" of a

religious statement. And to regard making a religious statement as being primarily the expression of an intention to follow a certain behaviour policy has the philosophic advantage that it permits an asserter of the statement to say that he "believes" the statement with only a slight stretch in the straightforward sense of belief. For in the straightforward sense of belief, to believe an empirical proposition involves having a certain policy of behaviour - the policy of acting on suitable occasions in a way which would be appropriate if the proposition were to be true and inappropriate if the proposition were to be false. Similarly to assert a religious statement will involve acting in appropriate ways on suitable occasions - though what these ways are cannot be specified in terms of the proposition believed, since there is no proposition believed. Because of this common feature of involvement in behaviour I think that it is not wholly improper to call religious statements used, in the way I have explained, to proclaim or advertise behaviour policies by the name of beliefs - although, as a philosopher by vocation, I am not willing to use this word myself.

My principal thesis is therefore that this advertisement of intentions to follow behaviour policies is the most fundamental feature of religious statements. Religion is a way of life, and to assert the fundamental statements of a religion is to proclaim that religion's way of life. But there is a very serious difficulty in stopping at this point. For the criticism can properly be offered that my thesis, after insisting rightly enough on treating religious statements from a moral standpoint, has made them identical with moral statements. Moral statements, a critic may well agree, proclaim policies of behaviour: religious statements do this - but they do something more.

The difficulty may be put in this form. How does my analysis of religious statements enable me to distinguish a policy statement made by a Christian from a statement proclaiming the same policy made e.g. by a Buddhist? For, if religious statements merely express intended behaviour patterns, to each different religious statement there must correspond a different behaviour pattern. Indeed the criterion for the difference of two religious statements will have to be a difference in their associated behaviour patterns, if the function of a religious statement is merely that of proposing a behaviour pattern. To take an example: the most important statement of the Christian religion, as I understand it, is the assertion that God is love. It may reasonably be maintained, I think, that the essential import of such a statement is to propose a way of life which I will call "agapeistic". And as to whether a person is following such a way of life there are, it seems to me, empirical criteria - vague, perhaps, but definitely empirical - many of which will be found in

I Corinthians 13. But a Buddhist may well say that the import of many of his religious statements is also to recommend the same way of life. In which case the intention to practise the agapeistic policy for living cannot serve to distinguish Christianity from Buddhism.

I therefore suggest that my first thesis - that the principal function of fundamental religious statements is to proclaim a design for living - should be supplemented by a second thesis - namely, that the set of fundamental statements of a religion will also include statements expressing stories. By a story I mean in this context a straightforwardly empirical proposition which is considered without being believed (and which may be disbelieved). [Other words which might be used to express what I mean by story are myth, allegory, fable, tale: I have chosen the word "story" as having the fewest misleading associations.] It is the association of thinking of one set of stories rather than another (even if the stories are disbelieved) with the behaviour policy in question which makes the religious statements e.g. Christian ones rather than Buddhist ones.

The relation between considering a religious story and having the intention of following a certain policy for living is a psychological one. It is an empirical psychological fact that many people find that they are better able to carry out a behaviour policy which is contrary to their natural inclinations if this policy is associated in their minds with thinking of certain stories. And in many people this psychological link is not appreciably weakened by the fact that the story associated with the behaviour policy is not believed but is only entertained in thought in the same sort of way as that in which statements about fictitious characters in a novel are not believed but are only entertained in thought. This is illustrated by the enormous moral influence that has been exerted by such novels as The Pilgrim's Progress and The Brothers Karamazov. And in the realm of Christian dogmatics, I suspect that there are a great many present-day Christians who do not believe a word of Anselm's ransom theory of the Atonement who nevertheless do sometimes think of the Atonement in terms of a story of an actual man A offering himself in the place of another actual man B who is in the power of a third man C, and who would take this way of thinking, which they agree to be purely mythical, as being of assistance in their following the Christian way of life. To quote the 1938 report on Doctrine in the Church of England, "statements affirming particular facts may be found to have value as pictorial expressions of spiritual truths even though the supposed facts themselves did not actually happen."

But I am not here as a psychologist of religion; and it is not my duty to consider to what extent belief in, as opposed to consideration of, the Christian religious stories promotes Christian behaviour

policies. But I may perhaps say that in my opinion the recent insistence, in some quarters, upon the necessity for a definite affirmation of religious dogma is the most effective means of preventing the conversion of an increasingly scientifically-minded England to the agapeistic way of life.

To return to philosophizing. The fact that a Christian associates his policy for living with a different set of stories from that with which a Buddhist associates what may be an identical policy for living, will serve to distinguish their religious statements even if the policies are identical - and even if both or neither are psychologically effective in promoting that policy.

It is important to realize that this second thesis of mine - of the thought of a story being involved in the functioning of religious statements is by no means identical with the famous "As if" theory of Vaihinger. According to Vaihinger a religious believer acts as if he were believing a religious proposition while in fact he does not believe it. In the ordinary sense of pretend, he only pretends to believe a religious proposition. But on my view the asserter of a religious statement is not acting as if he believed the story involved in it: he is not pretending at all. What determines his action is the policy for living which it is the main function of the religious statement to proclaim, the function of the story which he is entertaining in thought being at most that of psychologically assisting him in carrying through his policy for living. There is no pretence since his action is appropriate to the policy for living and would usually be quite inappropriate to belief in the story which he is thinking about at the same time.

My subsidiary second thesis allows a place for an intellectual element involved in religious assertions, but this element is not one of belief. And that the propositions concerned are required to be entertained in thought merely has many advantages.

(1) It permits the stories to be of any kind whatever - provided, of course, that they are about empirical concepts. God can be thought of as making the world in the literal manners portrayed by painters, the Trinity can be thought of in terms of relationships between three people - as in the poems of John of the Cross. There need be none of the talk of "symbolic truth" which is such a stumbling-block to empirically minded philosophers.

(2) Since the stories are neither believed nor acted upon their logical consistency is a matter of no moment to the religious believer (unless he happens to be an intellectual by vocation). In the case of a set of ordinary empirical beliefs, which are testable by experience,

inconsistency is disastrous, for it will be impossible to arrange actions which are appropriate to each of two inconsistent beliefs. The needs of practical life require therefore that the set of beliefs should be purged of inconsistency - however much a man might relish a fusion of opposites. The case is quite different for the stories involved in religious statements: since these are neither believed nor acted upon their inconsistency has no effect upon behaviour. Indeed they may fulfil their function of forming associations which assist a particular religious behaviour-policy better if they contain inconsistent strands of thought than if they were to be logically consistent. The Christian set of stories, for example, contains both a pantheistic sub-set of stories where everything is a part of God and a dualist Manichaeic sub-set of stories well represented by Ignatius Loyola's phantasy of a battle between the forces of righteousness under the banner of Christ and the forces of darkness. Similarly the Marxist religion's set of stories contains both a sub-set about an inevitable perfect society and a sub-set about a class war. In the case of both Christianity and of Marxism the former sub-set of stories provides confidence and courage, the latter sub-set spurs to action.

And a great merit of the behaviour-policy-plus-story view of religious statements put forward in this paper is that it explains the fact, which surprises the external observer, that there is a great deal of fellow-feeling between people who adopt the same policy however different may be the stories which they associate with the policy and the names ("Christian" or "Buddhist") by which they call themselves, and the converse fact of the acute antagonisms between people who call themselves by the same name (e.g. "Christian") and make use of the same or similar stories but who adopt and advocate fundamentally different and frequently opposing behaviour policies. Such people feel, and rightly feel, that they are not holding the same religion. And this is the point to bring my paper to a conclusion by emphasizing that my second thesis - of the part played in religious belief by the entertaining of religious stories - is entirely subsidiary to my first and principal thesis - that the essence of religious statements made sincerely is their directive function in proclaiming a way of life. By their effects shall ye know them.

[Note. In the paper read to the conference the word "myth" was used instead of the word "story" to denote a proposition considered in association with a religious behaviour policy. The comments on Braithwaite's use of the word "myth" made in the following paper and discussion were responsible for his preferring the word "story" in the Theological Society paper reproduced above.]

2. By Susan Curtis Bennett

The Problem of Religious Belief

In discussing this question of religious belief, I shall begin by examining some of the concepts which arise in the previous paper. I shall endeavour to show that Braithwaite has called our attention to six conceptions of religious belief. Each of these I shall comment on and try to discuss the last two in more detail.

The first aspect I shall call the historical approach to the problem. As Braithwaite has said, the problem has shifted from being one of whether the reasons for belief are sufficient to a consideration of the propositions which state the belief. With the advent of linguistic philosophy, the emphasis has been transferred to a thorough examination of the meanings of all statements, and statements expressing religious belief have not been exempt. However, as I see it, the results have not been altogether unfavourable to religion. Indeed, criticism has been levelled against Wittgenstein, whom Braithwaite has quoted as being the apostle of this new school, for introducing religion into philosophy. But for the most part, the religious aspect of Wittgenstein's work has been neglected. The logical positivists in particular have developed his ideas about the Frege-Russell logic and ignored his distinction between what in language "can be said" and "what can only be shown". Further investigation into this aspect of his theory might have revealed the possibilities that lie in it for a new method of stating religious beliefs - namely, by examining to what extent religious statements resemble and differ from scientific statements.

Against this approach to the problem is set the current theological view, which maintains that theology is a subject set apart from "ordinary" knowledge, since it is concerned with revelation, which is not accessible to scientific investigation. This depends, however, on what we mean by revelation. Some theologians hold the view that, in revelation, truths are made known to the mind which cannot be disputed, since they have a Divine origin. I think, however, that we have to take into account the fact that, if there be such a thing as Divine revelation, it is imparted to human beings through human faculties, and is therefore always liable to be fallible. Further, as William Temple pointed out, revelation, as we understand it, does not consist in communicating propositions but in awareness of personality (Nature, Man and God, 1934). It may also be noted that, when we talk of revelation, we are usually referring to particular acts of God, such as the Incarnation. I suggest, though, that a truer picture is to think of the whole of nature as a revelation of God, and these particular acts

as examples of his response to an emergency. If this be so, it follows that revelation is more accessible to investigation than at first appears to be the case: indeed, it may then be said that science is concerned with examining revelation.

If, however, there is a danger in adopting the view that religious knowledge is removed from ordinary knowledge, there is also a danger in adopting the view mentioned by Braithwaite - that religion is solely an emotional experience; such a faith ceases to touch and influence the sources of action - the will, which cannot have as its stimulus the emotions, which wax and wane according to moods. I also agree with Braithwaite in thinking that religion defined solely as an ethical code will not do. Religious belief will obviously influence action fundamentally, but it seems rather to be a question of that which causes action, namely the set of beliefs which a person has, and it is these which operate the will.

This brings me to the fifth aspect. Braithwaite states that religious statements are a "mythology", as if this were derogatory to them. But surely this seems to depend on what we mean by "mythology"? There can, I think, be good myths and bad myths. Most myths have come to us from a certain stage of development in thought - the pre-scientific era. But I think myths are aetiologically, that is to say, they were used to explain certain observed phenomena. This may be shown by the fact that similar myths are often found in different countries; for example, we find that many mythologists express the conception of evolution; according to some Australian myths, man was evolved from lizards; in America, from beavers, apes and other beasts. It is also noticeable how many myths and fairy tales contain the idea of the birth of man as taking place in water or marshes (for an example of a fairy tale see Hans Anderson's "The Marsh King's Daughter"). Pindar mentions Egyptian and Libyan legends of this description. This conception is found too often for it not to be supposed that it is in some way connected with man's ideas about evolution.

This would suggest, I think, that many myths have their origin in reality, and are primitive ways of expressing observations made concerning the nature of the world and of man. This theory is opposed by that of Freud's, who held that myths are a product of the race mind. But surely the theory which led to the Kon-Tiki expedition, for example, may be quoted as a theory, largely supported by mythology, which turned out to be true?

Another example is discussed by Launcelot Hogben and Marie Neurath in "From Cave Painting to Comic Strip", in relation to totemism, which exists all over the world. Its essential characteristic is given by Freud in "Totem and Taboo". He quotes as an example the

Australian tribes, which are divided into smaller clans, each taking the name of its totem, which, as a rule, is an animal, and stands in a particular relation to the whole clan as its tutelary spirit and protector. The members of a totem are therefore under a sacred obligation not to kill their totem and to abstain from eating its meat. Any violation of these prohibitions is automatically punished. From time to time festivals are held at which the members of a totem represent or imitate, in ceremonial dances, the movements and characteristics of their totem. This sheds some light on the discovery of cave paintings, which show men wearing animal masks, which were emblems of the tribe, or the tribe surname. This purpose persists in the totems still in use, in heraldry for example. As well as acting as a signature, the masks were used to imitate animals. Since the pioneer work of Fraser in "The Golden Bough" modern classical scholars, such as G. Thomson, have found many traces of this pattern of clans in the civilisations of the Mediterranean. We now see that centaurs and mermaids are not purely mythical animals - no more than are dryads.

It may further be remarked that we cannot call ourselves free from mythological notions to-day. One recent speaker in the Third Programme (Stephen Toulmin on "Twentieth Century Scientific Myths") has put forward the theory that scientific myths have replaced theological ones, for people now turn to science rather than to theology, in the hope that the former will be able to help them to find a philosophy of life. Toulmin uses "myth" in a different sense from that in which I have suggested, - i.e. as in some way expressing reality, - he suggests that "scientific myths" are a result of people reading more into scientific theories than the scientists who composed them intended (perhaps these may be taken as "bad myths"). Fred Hoyle, he says, "is said to have composed his concluding, unscientific post-script because he was amazed at the comfort the devout had been obtaining from his earlier talks". Another example he quotes is the "myth of the Running-Down Universe", though this could hardly have been expected to produce comfort. However, I think that what he says shows that we cannot afford to be superior about myths to-day, and that we may hold mythological ideas, which we do not recognise as such, because they are different in form from the old myths.

Braithwaite also discusses religion treated as science. I think we may ask here, what do we mean by "scientific" and, in particular, what do we mean by "psychological" concepts? This topic will, I know, be dealt with in a later paper, but I should like to say here that I think that a change has come over scientific thinking and scientists are beginning to talk in terms of "systems" rather than "a system". I am largely in agreement with what Braithwaite has said, but I feel unclear as to what he means by "psychological". I think that we may be moving towards a stage when we will talk about "psychologies" just

just as logicians are talking about "logics". In which case, would it not be easier to disconnect religious statements from psychological statements and to conceive them as constituting a separate scientific system? If that be so I think that it may be that something of value can be said about the transcendence of God.

3. Summary of Discussion

- R.H. Thouless (To Braithwaite) Why is a myth a thing to be disbelieved?
- R.B. Braithwaite Myths are not necessarily to be disbelieved, but in my own case the myth is usually disbelieved.
- R.H.T. You said, "thoroughly disbelieved". Why "thoroughly"?
- Mary T. Hoskyns Myths have to be believed in order to produce a change in your life.
- R.B.B. Compares myth with novel. He regards novels as containing a deep knowledge of psychology and are important in his life. There is "suspension of belief" during the reading of a novel. This suspension does not detract from its influence and effects.
- E.A. Armstrong Is this view of myth anthropologically unsound? In the anthropological sense of myth, myth accompanies and completes a ritual pattern. In this usage belief is not very important. Myths are only helpful in a given cultural system.
- R.B.B. Agrees that his feelings about myth and novels are dependent on environment, etc.
- M. Masterman Disagrees with R.B.B.'s view of myth and supports that of Susan Curtis Bennett that myth is a pre-scientific vehicle of fact. Example, myth verified in the Kon-Tiki Expedition.
- Michael Argyle This is possibly not a good example. The Kon-Tiki Expedition did not conclusively establish the hypothesis that the ancestors of the Easter Islands came from America, which is still questionable.

- M.M. Of course the success of the Expedition is not a proof of the truth of the hypothesis - as Heyerdahl admits in the book. It is (a) a disproof of the impossibility of the hypothesis and (b) evidence in favour of several sub-hypotheses, e.g. seaworthiness of balsa wood rafts, best conditions for marine observation, etc.
- E.A.A. Is not belief itself a form of motivation?
- R.B.B. I was making a distinction between policy and belief. My view is that you have your policy accompanied by overtones of myths.
- M.M. To go back to myths. An alternative to believing or disbelieving a myth is to interpret a myth. Religious growth often exhibits long periods of "suspension of belief" followed by a sudden illumination as to "what the myth really means". Thereafter you do not take it at its face value, e.g. as a fairy tale, neither do you disbelieve it. You suddenly see what is at the back of it; how it is to be taken; what its essential truth is.
- M.A. Yes, but how do you come to interpret the myth? Do you try it out somehow? If so, how?
- M.M. You try different interpretations out to see whether over the long run they ring true. Survival is the test.
- David Russell How subjective are these interpretations? Are you suggesting that good myths are those whereby different people find help? If so, is it the same help?
- M.M. I don't know. I am only describing the process whereby people come to say, "Ah, now I see the heart of the matter."
- M.A. How then can you decide between contradictory myths?
- R.B.B. One can disbelieve them all! All except one must be disbelieved if they contradict each other. Take for example the myths which taken together result in the contradiction "God is omnipotent and good". If you believe the myths, it is impossible to resolve this contradiction.

- D.R. If everyone throughout had disbelieved all the myths the Church would never have started.
- R.B.B. The early Christians believed them literally, but we know better.
- M.M. Disagreed. The early Christians were almost as sophisticated as we are in making a distinction between myth and its interpretation, e.g. St Paul. It was the early mediaevalists who were so literalist.

The strong point of Braithwaite's paper was that he explained the usefulness of mutually inconsistent beliefs and also the connection between use of the myth and action. For example, an instance of a change of policy took place as a result of someone in a position of religious authority moving from a Holy Spirit myth in which nothing was contrasted with the Holy Spirit and therefore everything was his will to a second Holy Spirit myth in which the Holy Spirit was contrasted with the devil as a source of action and therefore the action which under the first myth had ex hypothesi to be accepted, under the second myth was suddenly seen as something to be resisted.

- E. A. A. Does not the co-existence of inconsistent myths in one culture pattern show tension? Is not this tension in itself valuable as a source of force which produces action and something we should not try to resolve by conflating the myths?
- David Mayer I think there might be some point in distinguishing between policy in general and religious policy.
- R.B.B. Perhaps for example a selfish policy might be taken as a non-religious policy.
- M.T.H. In the case of the life of Christ there was first a historical sequence of events, which was then universalised as a myth. The first problem is historical; the myth question must be considered later.
- Victor Ranford I don't think one can helpfully talk of the events of the life of Christ as a myth.

- E. A. A. I want to emphasize that myth is a technical term in anthropology - something accompanying a ritual and inseparable from it.
- D. M. Emmet Yes, but in this case the historical sequence of events is bound up with the ritual; the historical sequence of events is being used as a myth.
- R. B. B. We might say "associated propositions" instead of "myth". Then it would be clear that these might or again might not be historical. Or we might use the word "allegory".
- D. M. E. No. "Allegory" is too precise a word. Its meaning is too clear.
- M. A. With regard to the interpretation of a myth or these associated propositions: might they not be descriptions of religious experience?
- M. M. The central importance of religious experience is not the felt experience; consequently there is danger in placing emphasis on any description of the felt experience. The authorities agree that there is a cognitive content in basic religious experiences, e.g. Kepler's sudden illumination that the principle of interconnection of the planetary system was not the circle but the ellipse, after which he fell on his knees and praised God.
- E. A. A. Kepler's was not a religious experience.
- Several people Of course it was, why not?
- M. M. And there is Newton.
- R. B. B. Gave more examples of sudden mathematical intuitions. You get the answer right. That is the experience, the intuition. Then you praise God.
- M. A. Yes, but you must be a trained mathematician in order to get the answer to the question you asked, and that is the difficulty about the cognitions of the mystics. The nature and content of the cognitions depend on the previous training of the person concerned.

4. By Dorothy Emmet

The Problem of Philosophical Theism

In this paper I want to say something about the view that religious belief can be justified by reference to a philosophical doctrine of theism, indicating some of the difficulties which some of us engaged in philosophy at present are likely to find here. The paper may seem mainly negative, but it is intended not as a last word, but to clear the ground - or should I say my own mind? - of the problems in one kind of approach before trying to develop another.

It has been said that it has not been possible to talk theistic language properly since the thirteenth century: that is to say, theistic language fitted into the Scholastic system of philosophy, but people who do not think in these terms have never really since then been able to make theism an integral part of their philosophy. Is this true, and if so, why?

Nowadays the difficulties come to a head when theistic philosophers are pressed to say what can be meant by the assertion "God exists". Before trying to see what kind of an assertion this could be, it may help if we first give some general consideration to what is meant by existential assertions¹.

As a first suggestion, we may say that anything exists of which we can say "There is a". Russell's Theory of Descriptions puts this by saying that there is a value of a variable which satisfies a propositional function: in his notation $(\exists x).fx$. So "Tables exist" becomes "For some values of x, 'x is tabular' is true". "The President of the United States exists" becomes "There is an x such that x is President of the United States and nothing else is". The advantage of this is that the determinate phrase becomes the predicate, and the subject a variable, and it is asserted that some or no values satisfy it. We thus avoid the appearance of referring to a non-existent entity (with the metaphysical difficulties this suggests) when we say, for instance, "The King of France does not exist". This becomes "For

(1) By an "existential assertion" I am here meaning simply a statement to the effect that anything exists. This has nothing to do with the fashionable philosophy known as "Existentialism". "Existentialism" has many forms; broadly, they all maintain that human beings can only realise the kind of existence which is distinctively human by making individual decisions for which no sufficient reason can be given.

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Mind, July, 1950.

no values of x is ' x is King of France' true". By making the predicate a descriptive phrase we also avoid a grammatical form of words which makes it look as though "exists" was a property of a subject, a property like "is red" or "is square". The Theory of Descriptions is thus a logical device to avoid the appearance of talking about fictitious entities such as a non-existent King of France, or about existence as though it were a predicate. But it still leaves us with the problem of knowing in what contexts we can assert that there is an x which satisfies the propositional function, and what we mean by them. For while the Theory of Descriptions would cover ordinary existential assertions, like "Tables exist" or "The President of the United States exists", it would also cover assertions such as "There is a prime number between 7 and 12". If we are to admit that abstract entities such as prime numbers exist, we may become, in Professor Quine's phrase "entangled in Plato's beard"¹. Do we want this, and to admit the corollary that there are different kinds of existence? Quine tries to meet this by putting forward the view that "to exist" simply means to be the value of a variable, e.g. "Dogs exist" means "Something is x where x is canine". Variables are bound by quantifiers, which correspond to words like Something, Everything, Nothing. But, as Quine says, this still leaves us with the problem of what he calls "ontology". What kinds of things are we to admit as possible ranges of variables? A realm of universals? Or numbers? Or, as would-be nominalists would say, only individual things which can be indicated empirically? How "inflationary" or "deflationary" is our policy to be?² Quine holds that our policy in ontology can be a matter of choice according to our interests and purposes at any time.

I do not feel happy at leaving the matter there. If we are going to admit different types of existents I think we shall have to ask whether "exists" is being used unambiguously throughout, and whether there may not be what I shall call a "strong" sense of "exists" as well as the weak sense in which it might be applied to whatever can be the value of a variable. Let us make a list of possible candidates for existence:

Tables exist
 I exist
 Sense data exist
 The British Constitution exists
 Electrons exist
 Prime numbers exist
 God exists

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- (1) "On what There is". Review of Metaphysics. Vol.II, no.5.
 Reprinted as an Appendix to Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol.XXV.
 (2) I borrow these terms from Mr Isaiah Berlin. See his paper in Mind, July, 1950.

If we want to apply Occam's razor, the methodological recommendation of economy, entia non multiplicanda praeter necessitatem ("entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity") we shall try to reduce as many kinds as possible to a basic kind. In Phenomenalist methods of reduction we shall take sense data as basic (since they are direct experiences and so epistemologically prior), and instead of admitting a number of kinds of inferred entities not directly experienced, we shall try to reduce these others to logical constructions out of sense experiences. That means that they become short-hand ways of talking about collections of sense data, and in principle we could avoid talking about the constructed "entity" and translate back into a long-hand language of actual and possible sense data, so that in principle it would be possible to avoid speaking of non-experienced entities. But there are cracks in this at first sight attractive structure. If we try to translate "The table exists" into a group of statements about actual and hypothetical sensory experiences, we find that there would be an infinite number of these. Physical object statements have what Dr Waismann has called an "open texture"¹; they cannot be exhaustively rendered in any finite set of sense datum statements. Moreover, if the logical construction out of sense data is offered as in some sense "the meaning" of the physical object statement, and not just as an alternative way of talking which may be preferable for some purposes (e.g. epistemologically), we may feel we are being cheated. For instance, a categorical statement in the physical object language about something not at present observed is turned into hypotheticals in the sense datum language; can "There is notepaper shut up in my drawer" be adequately rendered by hypotheticals to the effect that if you were to open the drawer you would have such and such experiences? As Professor Wisdom pointed out² if snakes out in the prison quad are logical constructions out of reflections seen in mirrors by prisoners in their cells, this is at least using "logical construction" in a different, and less wholeheartedly satisfying sense from the one in which it is used when we say that the Average Plumber is a logical construction out of all the individual plumbers. We may say that the Average Plumber earns £10 a week, but we do not feel seriously tempted to say the Average Plumber exists³, since we can translate what is said about him back into statements about individual plumbers, and the statement that he earns £10 a week into a sum about their individual earnings. But we are tempted to go on saying the notepaper in my drawer and the snakes out in the quad exist, and

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- (1) See his paper Verifiability. Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. XIX.
 (2) Cf. J. Wisdom. Mind. October, 1948.
 (3) But I note an advertisement in a Sunday newspaper: "The average man is a myth, invented by statisticians, but the better than average man really exists, and he demands better than average clothes..." (This does not merely say "Some men are better than average".)

attempts to reduce these to statements about individual experiences do not satisfy in the same way. Instead therefore of suggesting that anything alleged to exist which cannot be directly experienced should be presented as a logical construction from what can be directly experienced, it seems more plausible to say that we can have other languages besides the sense datum language, a physical object language (about things like tables), a personalist language (about "I" and "you"), a mathematical language (with prime numbers), a political language (with the British Constitution) and possibly a theological language. But the empiricist contention would be that the sense datum language is epistemologically prior, in that evidence should be related in the end to observation. The criterion for "exists" might then be that the term for whatever is alleged to exist functions in a language in such a way that with its help it is possible to draw deductions as to observations. Hence we could say "Tables exist" because the physical object language with the word "table" in it can be connected with observations. "Electrons exist" could mean that theories of wide range which have experimentally verified consequences include the concept of electrons. "I exist" - presumably because I have introspective evidence of carrying out activities like thinking (Cogito ergo sum: a very special kind of existential assertion. this). "Sense data exist" - they are the referents of the language of observations. "The British Constitution exists"; this would mean, I take it, that certain ways of thinking and acting in accordance with precedent are sanctions of political behaviour in this country. "Prime numbers exist" could mean "prime numbers are elements in the logico-deductive system of mathematics", but to allow this usage is to allow a meaning of "exists" which has no reference to observations.

What happens if we apply any of these suggested ways of handling the meaning of "exists" to "God exists"?

(a) On the Theory of Descriptions, this would become something like "There is an x such that x is divine", and on a monotheistic interpretation it might be said "There is an x such that x is divine and nothing else is".

(b) On the logical construction view, God might be a construction out of particular experiences, a short-hand way of mentioning what could be described in terms of experiences, perhaps religious experiences.

(c) On the analogy of "Prime Numbers exist" (if this expression is allowed) "God exists" would find its place within an a priori system.

(d) On the modified empiricist view, the nearest analogy might be with "electrons exist". That is to say, neither God nor electrons would be observable entities, but it might be held both are indirectly verified in that theories of wide range can be most economically stated in terms of them. So Dr Tennant says¹ that God and the electron have the same logical status, since they "are equally ideal positings, and verifications of both follow lines essentially identical". But here we must go carefully. Is it the case that they have the same logical status? If so, it would be necessary to show that experimental consequences follow when the God concept is introduced in the religious language which would not follow otherwise, just as experimental consequences can be deduced by introducing theories about electrons into physics. Moreover, it is possible that all that is strictly necessary for physical theory is that the structure of nature should be as if there were electrons, but these may be theoretical constructs and not real entities. Can we say that all we need to be able to say is that religious experience is as if there were a God, who may equally for this purpose be a theoretical construct? Whatever might be said for this view, I think few people would feel happy about putting it forward as a legitimate interpretation of "God exists". They would say that this shows that there is a use for the God concept, but that this is not all they mean if they say "God exists". The same difficulty would, I think, be felt about (c) giving "God exists" a place in an a priori system on analogy with "prime numbers exist" (unless the Ontological Argument were acceptable, of which more anon).

It looks therefore as though we were asking in the case of "God exists", and also probably in the case of "I exist", for a stronger sense of "exists" than the weak sense of a term functioning in a language even when this is in such a way that with its help observable consequences can be drawn. We want to say something which is, I think, probably metaphysical and realist: e.g. that "to exist" does not simply mean to be a term functioning in a certain way in a language, or to be the value of a variable, but for a thing to exist it should be something in itself, which makes a difference to other things. The difference may be as trivial as you like, but that which makes no difference to anything anywhere can hardly be said to exist. One would like to accept the suggestion in Plato's Sophist², that the definition of being is the power of acting and being acted upon. This may seem too "strong", if it is taken to mean some particular dynamic, or still more, animistic view that everything that is exercises some sort of activity. But it need mean no more than, to use a phrase of Whitehead's, "the denial of vacuous actuality"³. If anything exists,

(1) Philosophical Theology. Vol.I, p.313. Cf. Vol.II, p.45.

(2) Sophist, 248.

(3) Whitehead indeed uses this phrase to mean there is no existent devoid of some subjective experience. This goes a good deal further than I wish to go.

it should be possible to say that it makes a difference to other things, and is something in itself to which other things can make a difference¹.

It might be said that surely something like this is only common sense, and that in comparison the other suggestions we have considered are highly artificial. But the difficulty is that when we start asking what is meant by "making a difference", we seem driven to citing observable evidence, and so get brought back to something like the empirical-linguistic theory. But here I think we must dig our toes in and say we must distinguish between what we mean by evidence for existing and the fact of existing.

For "Tables exist", "I exist", "You exist", we shall want to maintain this strong sense of existence; electrons may be properly interpreted in a strong realist sense too, but if not, and if they are "as if" constructs, we shall not be unduly disturbed. What about "God exists"? The tradition of natural theology and philosophical theism has maintained both that meaning can be given to the expression "God exists" in a strong sense, namely, of being someone in himself who acts (there is less unanimity as to whether he can be said to be acted upon), and also that there is evidence for the truth of this assertion. We shall examine this by looking at the classical arguments by which people have tried to substantiate these claims, and shall have to see whether there are particular logical difficulties which arise over "God exists" which do not arise in the case of any of the paradigms for saying that something exists which we have considered, and if so, what conclusions we can draw from this.

These difficulties fall into two main groups.

(a) "Verificationist" difficulties. These are brought out by Wisdom in his article Gods (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1944-5), and Flew and Nowell Smith in University, No.1. In the case of any significant assertion that something is the case, it should be possible to specify some conditions which would be different if it were not the case. But those who maintain God exists may be prepared to go on saying this is true whatever happens. Professor Popper has illustrated this for the allied assertion "God is good" by saying that if a believer is run over by a tram he may say "How good of God that I wasn't hurt"; and if his leg is broken, "How good of God that I didn't break my back", and if he does break his back, "How good of God that I

(1) "Real" I take either to be a synonym for "exists" or to be used for emphasis as an intensifier ("Really exists"), or to have the connotation of "genuine", and even sometimes of "important".

was not killed"; and if he is killed (I don't remember Popper saying this, but we might go on), his relations and friends may collect at his funeral and thank God for delivering him from the miseries of this world. But can an assertion that something is true whatever happens be a significant assertion?

(b) "Perfectionist" difficulties. These have been raised by J.N. Findlay in Mind, April 1948 and July 1949, and in University No.2. Findlay applies something like the Ontological Argument in reverse. The notion of God is that of the perfect being. But if "perfect" means the sum total of all excellences, He cannot exist. For everything that exists must be subject to limitation; it can only exemplify one way of being excellent at the cost of excluding others. There might therefore be different things perfect after their kinds but not something which is just "perfect".

These two kinds of difficulty bring out the point that it is impossible to talk about God as "an existent being", taking particular empirical beings as our paradigms for what is meant by existent. This came out already in the old classical theistic arguments. In the Ontological Argument, St Anselm argued against the Fool who says in his heart "There is no God", that if the fool has an idea of God, he must acknowledge that God exists, since the idea of God is of a perfect being, and a being which did not exist would not be perfect, for not to exist would be a deficiency. A monk Gaunilo of Tours took up the cudgels in a book called "A reply to Anselm's argument on behalf of the Fool", and said that on this score if we have an idea of the most delightful possible island such an island must exist, for otherwise it would be deficient. Anselm, answering "not the Fool" (who, he says with charming courtesy, Gaunilo manifestly is not) "but the Catholic Christian", says that the superlative perfect refers to "that than which nothing greater can be conceived", and to that alone, and if Gaunilo can show that his most delightful island is this, he will give it to him never to be lost again. This, whatever we think of the logic of the Ontological Argument (and most philosophers are agreed that it is fallacious to treat "existence" as if it were a predicate which could be part of the definition of a subject), at any rate shows that the idea of perfection is being treated as a very special idea. An attempt is being made to make it mean more than a general term for the possibility of anything being supremely good after its kind.

The thought that there may be something in this may account for the appeal of Descartes' version of the argument (the version in the Third as distinct from the straight Anselmian version in the Fifth Meditation) to some people who would say that the older attempt at a formal a priori proof was invalid. Descartes' version fastens on our finding that we have the idea of infinite perfection. Whence did we

get it? Not just from our own minds, or those of our parents who educated us, since we are limited, finite, and are not adequate to produce from our own resources the idea of infinite perfection, which is not just a notion reached by cancelling particular imperfections in our limited ideas. It must therefore have been produced in us by a cause adequate to itself, an infinite perfect being. I shall not here go into this argument, but simply say that I believe that Kant has seen what is interesting in it when he passes from showing that existence is not a characterising predicate to considering the place of the idea of Perfection as a regulative ideal in our thinking.¹ We are always aware of our thinking as incomplete and limited, and we reach out after an ideal of completion. Such an ideal to Kant is something which can never be reached because of limitations inherent in our knowledge (which knowledge to Kant must depend on sense perception), but it plays a necessary part in our thinking in making us aware of the limitations in our knowledge. But this regulative ideal of perfection can only be described in formal terms. (As Descartes saw, we do not reach it by merely cancelling limitations of particular finite ideas, but this may not mean that it is caused in us by a perfect being. It may simply mean that we cannot specify its content.) For instance we might say (though this is not Kant's way of putting it), that ideal knowledge would mean intellectual satisfaction, in the sense of having complete grounds for every assertion so that there both was, and we could see that there was, nothing more to be said. But we cannot specify the content of this intellectual satisfaction, as though it were an idea which could be thought. It acts as a regulative ideal, guiding our thinking to seek fuller comprehension, and making us aware that we always fall short of it.

But can you pass from perfection as a regulative ideal, which may well perform an essential role in our thinking, to saying that "a perfect being exists"? This looks like (in another apt phrase of Whitehead's) "paying metaphysical compliments" to a regulative ideal. There are two ways in which this regulative ideal has been thought of as real. One is the way of Hegelian Absolute Idealism, where the Absolute is said to be the complete unity of thought and reality. It has been said that this is what the Ontological Argument is really about.² But this is not a theistic notion, and can only be made to appear such by introducing other considerations about "values", the legitimacy of which procedure is open to question. It might mean that the truth would be an adequate conception of all that there is; but this again is a formal description, not a theistic proof. The other

(1) Cf. *Transcendental Dialectic* A619.

(2) By for instance, C.C.J. Webb and R.G. Collingwood, Essay on Philosophic Method, p.127.

way is to say that the regulative ideal can be identified with a Perfect Being, which is distinguishable from the whole of reality. This would be in line with the original Ontological Argument. But this raises the problems which have been pointed out by J.A. Findlay, who argues that from the idea of a Perfect Being, we can see that such a Being could not exist.¹ Findlay holds that the logic of the development of the religious attitude of mind is to seek absolute perfection as the only finally worthy object of worship. Let us suppose such an object exists. Then all worshipful excellences would have to be included in it. But existence is always a limitation on possibility. To be an existent is to realise some possibilities and to exclude others. So to worship an existent being would be to set up one particular instance of some worshipful properties. And Findlay says that while this might answer to non-absolute gods such as Apollo, it is not what is meant by the idea of a single absolute God. So he concludes that the very logic which leads to the idea of God must also lead beyond, so that we must say that God cannot exist. This does not mean that as a regulative ideal, the idea of perfection may not be a focus imaginarius for thought² and for a religious attitude, as for instance in a Platonic or Neo-Platonic Idea of the Good beyond Being. But is the compossibility of all perfections in one being what those who speak of an absolute being are committed to asserting? (Whether what else may be intended can be made intelligible is another matter.) It may be indeed questioned whether this is what is being said in, for instance, the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God, to which we shall now turn.

The Cosmological Argument brings out that the word "existence" when used of God is being used with a meaning different from its use when we speak of the existence of anything else. The Cosmological Argument is more alive at the present time than the Ontological; it is the main argument in Thomist forms of philosophical theism. This argument proceeds by saying that the world exists, and might not have done so. Or it is sufficient to say that some things exist - tables and chairs and dogs and cats and you and me - and this is empirically obvious. Yet it would have been perfectly possible for them not to have existed without contradiction. So they must depend on some being of which it would not make sense to say that it exists but might not have done, which is put by saying it exists necessarily. So the Cosmological Argument claims to escape the "verificationist" difficulty

- (1) It might be said that if you cannot deduce the existence of an object from an idea, can you deduce its non-existence? Yes, if the idea can be shown to be self-contradictory.
- (2) Cf. Kant. On the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason, in the Transcendental Dialectic (A644) for this use of the term focus imaginarius.

which we noted above, by arguing that we can know that God exists not if certain things in the world are as they are and would be different if He did not, but if any particular things whatsoever exist. These "contingent" things are said only to be able to exist by depending on something which exists "necessarily".

There are two main difficulties here. First, "contingent" and "necessary" are usually understood as applying to propositions. Or we use the word "necessarily" in deductive inferences where a conclusion is said to follow necessarily from its premises. What can be meant by saying something "exists necessarily"? This leads to the other difficulty, which is concerned with the legitimate use of expressions based on analogy. We have here to be able to say that God does not exist in the way in which empirical things do, but in another way which is a different but nevertheless a legitimate meaning of "exists". What meaning can we give to non-empirical existential propositions? Mascall says (in Theology for March, 1950) that "positivists" (a term he uses very widely to cover almost all contemporary philosophers) find a difficulty here because they confine "exists" to expressions where we can say "There is a so-and-so". He says "exists" may also mean "exercises activity". Does this mean more than "act"? We can speak of "exercising pressure", which means a particular kind of action, pressing, or of exercising a dog, because a dog is a particular object. But does "exercising activity" mean more than "acting" without specifying what kind of action? It may be meant to translate Actus Purus (the Scholastic term for Aristotle's energeia aneu dunameos) but this, in its Scholastic sense, does not mean "acting"; rather it means not acting, but just existing as actuality complete in itself, whereas acting, as well as being acted upon, is only possible where there is some potentiality to be fulfilled, and so some change in the agent. But this is just what the notion of Actus Purus is intended to exclude. Thus, if this is what is meant by God (and it seems to be what is intended in saying "Necessary Being"), it becomes difficult to see what can be meant by "acts". If however we speak of "God acting" in the highly realistic sense of the Biblical Yahweh, we are then left with a conception of a particular mighty being over against other beings, but with, as far as I can see, no answer then to the difficulties which then arise about the logic of the idea of absolute perfection. Note too that there is a difficulty in thinking of an activity which is an absolute degree of activity, existing in its own right, and not as an abstraction from the particular activities of a particular existent, similar to the difficulty there is in thinking of an absolute existent. Dr Austin Farrer has made a sustained attempt to do this in his Finite and Infinite. He writes "But activity-as-such has no common distinguishable characteristic: it has, as it were, to realise itself differently in every modification. Where, then, does it realise itself? Surely it can somewhere just 'be itself'. This

would be its absolute mode. And since its modifications do not arise by addition of characters to it, its absolute mode cannot be its lowest, but must be its highest possible, from which all others arise by limitation or reduction." But, he continues, "Such a 'proof' is, of course, pure dialectic, and obtains its force from the application of concealed analogies, which have been chosen for the very reason that they lead in this direction - or, to put it less scandalously, for the reason that they bring out the nature of that relation which we claim obscurely to apprehend."¹ While agreeing that what has been quoted from the former paragraph is "pure dialectic", we might go further, and ask whether it does not involve a category mistake to say that, because there are a number of ways of being active in doing some particular thing, which implies the limitation of not being able to do others at the same time, therefore there must somewhere be an instance of just being active in general without doing anything in particular, and so without any limitations. But by "absolute activity", it may be said, is meant not this, but the perfect form of activity. Does not this bring us back into the perfectionist difficulties? What is a perfect form of activity which is not to be thought of as realizing a specific excellence? And if the character of an activity without limitations is to be interpreted, as Farrer does, as goodness on analogy with our own interior scale of valuable activity, we must have some reason independent of the analogy for holding that this is an appropriate way of thinking of it rather than, say, on analogy with the physical conception of "free energy". And I think that similar difficulties would arise if we try to make sense of the Scholastic phrase ipse esse subsistens for absolute Being.

Note that the Cosmological Argument if it can make sense, might avoid the difficulty about a perfect being having to realise all possible excellences at once. For the notion here is of God as specialising in one excellence, namely that of existing in a way which is a kind of existence plus called "necessary existence". The Thomist view that God's essence and existence are one seems to mean that anything said about His "Attributes" must become another way of saying that He is². But what meaning can we give to "necessary existence"? The Scholastics said that it is the existence of one qui non aliquo modo est sed est, who does not exist in a particular way, but just exists. And they went on to say that God is not ens, a particular being, but esse, simply Being. Can anything be made of this? It brings out, I think, the dilemma in all the theistic proofs. Those who think in terms of them are driven to speaking of God as though He

(1) Finite and Infinite, p.33.

(2) Of course this would mean that existential statements about God could not be put in terms of the Theory of Descriptions since there would be no descriptive condition which the quantified variable satisfied.

were a being among other beings, only greater and grander, while at the same time they are carried on to see that He cannot be. For any way of talking about God as a being over against others must make God something less than absolute, and so is defeated logically by the intention underlying the idea itself, and probably also for the same reason religiously. Hence a question put in the form "Is there a God?" is bound to suffer shipwreck. Against such ways of talking there is a purgative value in atheism. Paul Tillich (himself a philosophical theologian) has spoken of "the half-blasphemous and mythological concept of the existence of God" ("existence", he thinks, must mean the existence of a particular being), and adds "To such a concept atheism is the right religious and theological reply. Genuine religion without an element of atheism cannot be imagined."¹ Tillich goes on to approve the Scholastic distinction, "not ens, but esse". But if this is not merely a verbal distinction, it suggests something more like pantheism of a Spinozistic kind than classical theism. (The fact that theistic language, when pressed, gets driven to this, suggests that pantheism in some sense may be an attempt to say something important.) Tillich speaks of God as the "ground" or "power of being" in everything that is. "Ground" suggests the principle or premise of an argument. "Power" cannot just be a principle (principles are abstractions and not operative except in so far as people think in terms of them). Is it a drive immanent in everything that is? I think Tillich wants to mean more than this, but the difficulty of explaining how these expressions are being used illustrates the problem of this kind of analogical usage. What are we to say about the method by which arguments about something not understood are presented in analogies? In using analogy for the purpose of argument, you need to be able to say not only negatively "Of course I don't mean it like this", but also at some point "Here I do mean something in a positive sense which I can defend", and the defence for the analogy must itself be outside the use of the analogy. Otherwise we have only an imaginative exercise. This may have its value, but it must not be presented as though it were argument. The difficulty about the terms applied to God in natural theology is that when pressed they go into a regress in which we are always having to say "No, it isn't like this (not like 'I exist', or 'I act')" without at any point being able to say "But it is like this". So they undergo what A.G. Flew has called "the death by a thousand qualifications"². (St Thomas thought he could pin down his analogies on the notion of Cause, and the need for the effect to resemble its cause, but post-Kantians are bound to raise questions

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- (1) "Two types of Philosophy of Religion", Union Theological Seminary Review, May, 1946. Simone Weil has spoken, for different reasons, of the purgative value of atheism in the contemporary religious and intellectual situation, in La Pesanteur et la Grace.
 - (2) Cf. University, Vol. I, no. 1. Theology and Verification.

here.) If you say "God is our Father", you then say this does not mean He begets us, but that He is cause of our existence - not of course "cause" in the sense that lighting a match is the cause of a conflagration, but in the sense of ground of why anything exists - not of course "ground" in the sense of the ground of an argument or opinion, but of an existent on which other kinds of existent depend - not of course "existent" in the sense of empirical existents, but of necessary existent - not "necessary" in the sense of logical entailment, but...." But what? At each point we are being given not explanation, but the restatement of a problem. For at each stage the term introduced as "explanatory" can only be indicated by an analogy, and an analogy in which the positive point of resemblance is never clearly stated. Oh! it may be said, but this is because in the nature of the case it cannot be. We are trying to indicate a unique kind of dependence, the relation of creature to creator, and this cannot be defined in terms of anything else. So what about the defence raised by Dr Farrer, that, although we cannot define the positive points of resemblance which control the selection of analogies, yet there is a control in selecting some and not others because they get nearer to illustrating "a relation which we claim obscurely to apprehend"?

What, then, do we apprehend? What sides of our experience does the Cosmological Argument draw attention to? I think that it draws attention to various results which follow when we realise that we are finite, both in the sense of being the particular beings we are, and not something else, and of being limited not only by some particular limitations which we can remove, but in some way in principle always. We then experience ourselves and the world as something not just taken for granted. There is the philosophical shock of thinking that you are you. Kim has this experience:

"He tried to think of the lama - to wonder why he had tumbled into a brook - but the bigness of the world, seen between the forecourt gates, swept linked thought aside. Then he looked upon the trees and the broad fields, with the thatched huts hidden among crops - looked with strange eyes unable to take up the size and proportion and use of things - stared for a still half hour. All that while he felt, though he could not put into words, that his soul was out of gear with its surroundings - a cog-wheel unconnected with any machinery, just like the idle cog-wheel of a cheap Behera sugar-crusher laid by in a corner. The breezes fanned over him, the parrots shrieked at him, the noises of the populated house behind - squabbles, orders and reproofs - hit on dead ears.

"I am Kim, I am Kim. And what is Kim? He did not want to cry - he had never felt less like crying in his life - but of a sudden easy stupid tears trickled down his nose, and with an almost audible click he felt the wheels of his being lock up anew on the world without. Things that rode meaningless on the eyeball an instant before slid into proper proportion. Roads were meant to be walked upon, houses to be lived in, cattle to be driven, fields to be tilled, and men and women to be talked to. They were all real and true - solidly planted upon the feet, perfectly comprehensible - clay of his clay, neither more nor less. He shook himself like a dog with a flea in his ear, and rambled out of the gate."

We can dissociate ourselves from utilitarian common sense and feel a surprised shock in the mere fact that we exist. And we can feel a like surprise that anything should exist. Coleridge has something to say here, and notice that he describes this kind of shock as a numinous experience.

"Hast thou ever raised thy mind to the consideration of existence, in and by itself, as the mere act of existing? Hast thou ever said to thyself thoughtfully, It is! Heedless in that moment, whether it were a man before thee or a flower, or a grain of sand, - without reference, in short, to this or that particular mode or form of existence? If thou hast indeed attained to this, thou wilt have felt the presence of a mystery, which must have filled thy spirit with awe and wonder. The very words, - There is nothing! or - There was a time, when there was nothing! are self-contradictory.¹ There is that within us which repels the proposition with as full and instantaneous a light, as if it bore evidence against the fact in the right of its own eternity. Not to be then, is impossible: to be, incomprehensible. If thou hast mastered this intuition of absolute existence, thou wilt have learnt likewise, that it was this, and no other, which in the earlier ages seized the nobler minds, the elect among men, with a sort of sacred horror. This it was that first caused them to feel within themselves a something ineffably greater than their own nature...."²

(1) I am not clear why Coleridge says this second proposition is self-contradictory.

(2) The Friend. III. 192.

Chesterton has many passages which convey a similar experience. In one he relates it to another non-utilitarian form of experience, the appreciation of nonsense.¹ "If nonsense is really to be the religion of the future, it must have its own version of the Cosmos to offer; the world must not only be the tragic, romantic and religious, it must be nonsensical also. And here we fancy nonsense will in a very unexpected way, come to the aid of the spiritual view of things. Religion has for centuries been trying to make men exult in the 'wonders' of creation, but it has forgotten that a thing cannot be completely wonderful so long as it remains sensible. So long as we regard a tree as an obvious thing, naturally and reasonably created for a giraffe to eat, we cannot properly wonder at it. It is when we consider it as a prodigious wave of the living soil sprawling up to the skies for no reason in particular that we take off our hats, to the astonishment of the park keeper." Wittgenstein has also said something of this kind; "Not what the world is but that the world is the mystical."²

The Cosmological Argument need not be a "proof" based on the (as I believe) logically unworkable distinction of "contingent" and "necessary being". Our thinking, we have said, needs as a regulative idea something like what Kant calls the idea of the Unconditional - an idea of what would give a complete intellectual satisfaction, which we cannot reach (since whatever we can say leaves more to be said) but the thought of which prevents us from complacently setting up our partial thought as absolute. Moreover our experience of ourselves and other people and things as finite arouses cosmological wonder. Religion might be described, though not exhaustively (to paraphrase Whitehead), as "what the individual does with his finiteness". He may do various things. He may try to lose his finiteness through identifying himself with his social group (hence the strong communal side of religion). He may try to get rid of the discomfort by closing the "open" gap in our thinking by a pseudo-explanation, I cannot help thinking that in so far as God is set up as a "Father figure" along Freudian lines, to give security (all uses of the Father symbol need not be interpreted thus), we have such a bogus attempt to close the gap: as indeed may other personalist ways of speaking of God as "a being" over against the world, and invoking the notion of creation as an explanation. Or people may try to get rid of the discomforting thought of finiteness over against mystery by forgetting it. We then have in the trivially minded just some kind of hedonism, and in the less trivial, hybris, pride and self-sufficiency, which the Greeks saw as the irreligious attitude par excellence and which is why they felt a special apprehensive awe at the spectacle of the strong and successful man who

(1) "A Defence of Nonsense" in Essays and Short Stories (Everyman), p. 126.

(2) Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus 6.43.

forgets that all things mortal are insecure (like the rich man in the Gospel who plans for the future, pulling down his barns and building greater, never thinking that that night his soul might be required of him).

I have not said anything about the third of the classical arguments, the Teleological. It might be shown that, although it is very difficult to treat this as a proof of the existence of a Designer, it brings out the fact that religious people seem driven to talk in teleological terms. We need to see whether there are ways of talking about growth and purposiveness which make sense, since religious language seems to be trying to express something about a kind of development. (I only put this forward here as a suggestion which needs further exploration.)

As a suggestion at the end of this paper, I should like to say (very diffidently) that perhaps the main difficulties of philosophical theism are largely due to people's attempt to think of God as a being alongside other beings while at the same time from the logic of this idea itself He cannot be. Tentatively, in conclusion I should like to suggest that the trinitarian language, whatever it meant, at any rate was a way of saying the "God" must mean something more complex than the word appears to do in the classical philosophical theism which says that an entity called God exists.¹ There is obviously more that needs thinking out concerning the meanings which could be given to "existence" in different contexts, and also about the verificationist difficulties. But I think we can say that the difficulties to which I have called attention cannot be answered so long as God is thought as a being over and above others. And I am not clear about how other senses should be handled. As an interim policy, I should suggest starting from a fresh examination of religious language and behaviour and trying to see with fresher eyes what sorts of assertions it seems to indicate. The logical enquiry needs to go on, but we also need to get a new purchase on the empirical data. The philosophical discussion has got too far away from the empirical material. Yet this means for those of us who have come to think this, that if we are trying to do the philosophy of religion we can no longer do it in the context of a well-marked intellectual tradition with its distinctive method. In the past there have been two main traditions and languages of this kind, (a) the Thomist language of Being and Essence and (b) the Idealist language of Value and Existence, and there were also

(1) (Note, added at editorial stage.) I am coming increasingly to see that analogies too readily drawn with traditional theological ideas are likely to cause confusion. So I should not want now to defend the Trinitarian analogy I suggested at the Conference. The discussion it provoked was instructive in this respect.

intellectualised forms of Christian theology which have generally been constructed with the help of (a) or (b). And those who, like F.R. Tennant, have written natural theology by speculative extensions from an empirical starting point have on the whole taken over from these other traditions the categories with the help of which they have done this. In this paper I have given some of the difficulties I find in the Thomist language. It would be possible to show similarly that there are difficulties in the Idealist method (as used, for instance, by A.E. Taylor) of arguing from Value to Existence, which has provided the main context for the Moral Argument for Theism. (Let me merely say that I agree broadly with the criticism of this method of argument made by Professor Laird in his Gifford Lectures, Mind and Deity.)

A postscript on where we go from here may be appropriate. Those of us who have reasons for not being able to think in terms of these intellectual traditions are likely to find ourselves at a loss to know what kind of enquiry the philosophy of religion should be, and what our criteria are. I believe that what we must try to do is to get a fresh start in looking at the data, and in trying to see whether some of the questions in which at present we seem to come up against logical impassés ought not to be being asked in a different form. To do this we shall probably need to develop our attempts at interpretation, and perhaps even speculative excursions, from a base of considering the data provided and the theoretical concepts used in one of the empirical methods of studying some aspect of religious symbolism and behaviour. It may be possible to work out from these towards wider correlations, or to find growing points within the subject which suggests lines of thought to be developed. A primarily lexicographical study of religious language, though it can be interesting, is not enough and by itself is likely to be unrealistic. The language must be studied in its use, otherwise we are likely to find ourselves trying to develop our study in a vacuum. The two main kinds of empirical enquiry which are appropriate are psychology, especially depth psychology (and we badly need more adequate work done in the psychology of religion) and anthropology. My own intention is to try to go into the data which contemporary social anthropologists can give us about the use of religious symbols and practices in different kinds of society, and to look (not uncritically) at some of the concepts anthropologists construct to interpret these. But that is something for a long-term programme ahead.

5. Points from Discussion

- E.A. Armstrong What does Emmet mean by her allusion to the Trinity?
- D.M. Emmet I mean something like this. The main point is that you are not just talking about an entity in a simple way, but are saying three things together at the same time, and if you leave any of them out you are not talking about God. There are plenty of analogies which people try to spin to this threefold pattern, and I think it may answer to something we want to say. When I am feeling a bit wild I start wondering whether what we want to say about knowledge isn't rather on this pattern. There must be something beyond all our language, an unknown ground, rather like the First Person. There is what is conveyed through the empirical world of nature and history, which could be rather like the Logos, the Second Person. And for the Third, there is the power which rises up in us to grow and understand. Perhaps one could say very dubiously that this is the Trinity doing its stuff in the character of knowledge; but I don't say this will do, or is what it really means.
- M. Masterman I am unhappy about Emmet's Trinity. It seemed to consist of three remarks about the nature of logical boundaries. Could not these remarks be made without reference to a Trinity?
- E.A.A. Emmet's Trinity helps to solve the difficulty as to what is meant by the three entities.
- R.B. Braithwaite Emmet's Trinity is an example of the disastrous effects of philosophers allowing themselves to slip into apologetics. If she had not wanted to believe in a Trinity, she would never have thought this up. It is just yet another instance of man's obsession, which the psychologists remark on, with the number three.
- M.T. Hoskyns Surely the Christian Trinity is a creative force.

From this point the discussion became somewhat disordered. Among the points subsequently made were:-

1. Suggestion by Masterman that the trinitarian concept might prove useful in correlating religions - e.g. Christianity with Buddhism.
2. Suggestion that you could not come to understand what the Christian Trinity meant without studying a great deal of Church history and that therefore philosophers ought to leave it alone.
3. Counter-suggestion by Braithwaite and others that this was a strong reason in the eyes of all scientists for abandoning it altogether. "What use is a concept which you cannot understand without examining centuries of Church history and which is of no use for purposes of verification."

Suggestion by Masterman that what was important to understanding the Trinity was not detailed knowledge of how the concept came to be produced but of what uses were made of it immediately afterwards: e.g. what is the difference between Trinitarianism and Arianism?

Michael Argyle,
Victor Ranford
and R.B.B.

This is quite irrelevant.

M.M.

It is not irrelevant (discussion here became heated).

D.M.E. and M.M.

Suggestion that discussion of the Trinity be postponed until later.

Philosophers however could not keep off the Trinity; probably because they rightly felt that the discussion was in a muddle and also that there was an unexplored disagreement between them (a) as to whether the Trinity was a concept that ought to be abandoned or kept, (b) as to what if it were kept its empirical usefulness and method of interpretation would turn out to be. Thouless had by this time gone home ill and it became late; various people brought forward various Trinities, amongst them Bernard Shaw's, and the discussion became so incoherent that a revulsion set in against future detailed discussion of the Trinity which lasted for the whole of the rest of the Conference and prevented the subject being raised even when later

papers mentioned it. The feeling, though this was not very fully expressed, was that the answer to this general question depended upon the answer to other prior questions, such as the conclusions reached as to the relations between metaphysical and scientific systems.

In the course of all this, however, a good point was made by Ranford to the effect that "God" (as transcendent) meant in all religions "what was beyond the boundary constituted by the totality of all knowledge" and therefore something like what Emmet had said, i.e. something that in Wittgenstein's sense of the words could be "shown" but not "said".

I see you mean by transcendent "God" a sort of arrow placed over the boundaries of all knowledge indicating "wherever you are you could go further along this road".

Ranford's interpretation of the second and third persons of the Trinity however were far more empirical and less epistemological than D. Emmet's. Gradually however a clear though unexpressed feeling prevailed that it was premature and unsuitable to the point of being irrelevant in a Symposium on "The Nature of Religious Belief" to become involved in detailed discussions of the Trinity.

III. METAPHYSICS AND SCIENCE

1. By David C. Mayer

During the past twenty years metaphysics has been on the defensive. It was not until this century that metaphysical and religious philosophy was forced to begin a struggle for existence, for in spite of two centuries of empiricism it was still fully possible to ignore the attacks. Hence Hegel, Bradley and McTaggart. Since the 1930's, however, when, for instance, in England Ayer launched his superb, though perhaps mistaken, onslaught, metaphysics and religion have had a hard time. Now the most usual method in this 'self defence' was to make a close examination of, for example, the 'principle of verification' itself - to make the attackers 'hoist with their own petard' as it were. In this paper I want to do differently and to show in defence of metaphysics and religious language that the three broad divisions of any language - common sense, metaphysical and scientific - have great general similarities, that all three have certain features in common, and hence in short, that what is good enough for common sense or science is also good enough for the religious metaphysician. I do not myself want to talk about any particular aspect of religion, but simply to assure myself that religious talk follows a very normal pattern - a pattern which may be discerned in all language. And hence I shall make extensive use of quotation from widely separated thinkers that certain features of similarity may become apparent; above all I want to bring together the relevant work of thinkers like Dorothy Emmet and Philipp Frank.

Now why is it that to-day the tendency in scientific circles is to sneer at common-sense, ridicule religious and metaphysical language and praise only scientific language? I suggest that it is because there is something about the way the scientist 'carries on' in his esoteric language, producing all the while, as it were, rabbits out of the bag, which makes us regard him qua scientist as a being apart - as someone who thinks differently, and talks differently. My first main object in this paper is to show that common-sense language and scientific are continuous.

First of all it is obvious that there is not a difference between them as there is between, say, English and French; we do not mean that translation from the one to the other is necessary, that the scientist has an equivalent term in his own language for each one used by the 'common man'. The distinction, then, is likely to be one in which the scientist is forced to use more words than the common man, or alternatively it may be that he has taken over an ordinary word and

understands by it something which is unrecognizable to people who only know it in the original sense, due to the contexts in which it is now used. As examples of the change: first, might be the use of a word like 'electromagnetic', and second of, say, 'energy' - a word in origin Greek, and once a useful word for describing an observable quality of vigorous action or speech.

Another example of changed meaning is the word 'world'. To the Babylonian slave 'the world' was flat, and to the aborigine no doubt it still is. The scientist, however, has taken this word, and used it so often in his own exploration of phenomena, that for him the world is 'round'. For him the term usually conjures up an image or picture of something which is spherical like an orange. But which is it? - is the world round or flat? We occasionally get reminded of the problem by noting the sincerity of the 'flat-earthers' or the incredulity of the child. The law of contradiction says it must be one or the other, and yet, if common-sense is right, we do seem to have a contradiction. (A similar sort of problem arises with the colour-blind man who claims that this table here is green, although once, let us suppose, when his sight was normal, he said it was brown. Is his statement not true?) The scientist who has observed the world's shadow on the moon during an eclipse says he has deduced from this, amongst other things, that the world is round - is his statement not true?

If we admit that both statements are true in that both statements are based on experience, must we say that the scientist and the common man are talking about different things? - or simply that they are talking about what is the same thing but are viewing it in different contexts - as it were, from different vantage points? A more common example of the same thing would be two observers viewing a penny from different angles. The one might say 'The penny is round' and the other 'No, the penny is elliptical'. Assuming, if I may, that the penny is in fact round, it is still perfectly correct for them to say different things about the penny, provided - and this is important - that the observer who says the penny is elliptical is not assumed to be using his powers of inference by which he might say instead: "From past experience of pennies, I know my judgement has usually been that they are round, so now I infer that this elliptical object is also more often described as round."

Now it is just such powers of 'inference' which the scientist is claiming must colour all our judgements about the external world. He is claiming that unless one consciously relates by generalising what one actually observes on one occasion with the other various observations usually connected with it, then one will make judgements about the external world which are valueless, being entirely subjective, and which cannot lead to co-ordinations which will help us to a knowledge of 'how things really are'.

Is this attitude reserved for the scientist or does he only carry the method farther than the common man? So far as I can see the latter is the case. The scientist is not a 'being apart'; he does in fact only take a common-sense practice farther than the 'common man' does himself. (In the case of observing pennies from different angles, it is part of common-sense to assume that something more can be said about this brown sense-datum, than to give a description of it as it appears to each observer on each separate occasion.)

Hence it seems to me impossible from the start to draw a line between common-sense language and that of science. If it be replied that we cannot draw a clear line showing where 'orange' ends and 'yellow' begins in the colour scale, but that we 'know' when something is 'orange' or when it is 'yellow', there can be no denial that this is the case. Yet this very example throws light on the point at issue, since just as orange and yellow do not differ in that they are both colours and both are objects of sense-perception, so neither do common-sense and scientific language differ in kind, though we may often be able to say 'I know this is only common-sense speaking on this subject.'

I have mentioned a fact which is of supreme importance to the whole question of empirical knowledge. This is that 'interpretation' and 'inference' are fundamental to all thought. I subscribe to the theory of the external world which is described by H. Dingle, I.T. Ramsey and others as the 'Continuum theory'. Until the 'Continuum' - the senseless jumble of sense-data which confronts us - begins to be interpreted, until various parts of it are differentiated, until 'things' come to be known as such, until man starts to behave as though there were organisms similar to his own animated also by minds, there can be no language, nor can there be knowledge as distinct from bestial experience. And in interpreting the continuum there is no finite number of facts which might arise as concepts of entities. This, I think, is where the positivists have been mistaken - they have tried to limit the number of facts which can be known. Were this number finite then the principle of verification would have been far simpler to apply. Russell, too, who would like to be able to say there are a number of tables in the world, is forced in his analyses to admit that 'tables' are simply logical constructions out of sense-data. We are forced, I think, to regard what can be known as something essentially fluid, as something which cannot be clearly defined by its very nature. What can be known - apart from the mere apprehension of the continuum - depends entirely how far we integrate, synthesize, differentiate, analyse, interpret or infer from what is presented to us.

It has to be admitted that common-sense language does present a roughly homogenous looking stage in this process of integration and

interpretation, presumably dependent on the more immediate needs of existence. It will be admitted, too, that science also has a body of language which reflects its rejection of the 'common-man's' penetration into the observed, but I will not allow that there is an important sense in which the two differ in kind.

To return to the 'flat-earth' problem, how many unexplained facts does it take before the 'common-man' finds it is 'common-sense' to say that the world is round? Is the mere fact of the earth's circular shadow on the moon during the eclipse enough? - or do we need more evidence, for instance the way a ship appears to pass below the level of the sea as it steams over the horizon? Or do we need in addition Drake's word for it? - that he kept going towards the setting sun until he reached his starting point? And yet, what about those people half way along his course who, if the world is round, ought to fall off! Would not even common-sense admit that the world is round, and find some other explanation of the apparent ability of the people at the antipodes to maintain their feet?

The common man is faced with a similar sort of position as regards 'motion'. There is nothing in himself to tell him that he is moving, that he is not keeping the same position; he can only be aware of his own movement by inferring it from his own relation to perceived objects which he seems to find in roughly the same position relative to himself at different times - another example of his interpretation of the 'continuum'. But what is he to say about motion when he thinks he himself is moving when in fact it is only the train at his side which is leaving the station? If he judges himself to be moving is he speaking the truth? In one sense, yes, though not in a useful one. Even common-sense, that is, for example the same man in a similar situation after recurrences of the event, will find himself bound to use further powers of inference, to judge that he only has the appearance of moving, but that it is the other train which is really doing so. If he is a sensible 'common-man' - if he is a more scientific sort of man - he will consider further the problem of making inferences based on explanations of unusual observations.

Since all this is so, what is the way out? What possible method is there of bringing back the unity which once existed?

I am going to suggest a remedy. But first, having already emphasized the continuity between common-sense and scientific language, I wish to show that there is this same continuity between common-sense and religious metaphysical language.

In many respects the theologian is in the same sort of position relative to common-sense as is the scientist. He is troubled in

exactly the same way by the difficulty of communicating what he knows and of stressing the universal importance of unusual or mystic experience. Thus he may find it as hard to explain what the Holy Spirit is to the brilliant scientist as to the more ordinary common man. Now this is again a question of language; it is a matter of concepts used in the attempt to communicate experiences of this or that.

The point is: common sense uses language, develops concepts out of necessity, mainly for the purpose of communication, while both the scientist and the theist are trying to say something about concepts which have been formed as a result of the integration and study of various experiences of an unusual nature.

Simplification will be one of the central factors in this process. For example (in science) James Jeans in "Physics and Philosophy" says: "When two hypotheses are possible we provisionally choose that which our minds acknowledge to be the simpler on the supposition that this is more likely to lead in the direction of the truth". The scientist is ever trying to find connections between 'minor theories' that they may be subsumed under a common major theory, by which the human mind may be able to concentrate on what is single and therefore in some respects simpler. It is easier for the child to see the differences and similarities between a St Bernard, a Collie and a Cocker Spaniel if it has first become aware of the concept of 'Dog'. Hence the importance of Universals. An example in science of this sort of simplification was the subsumption of the once separate theories of light and of magnetism under the more general 'electro-magnetic wave theory' which did justice to both, allowed simplicity of calculation, and made way for the later discovery of the waves used in radio whose existence was inferred from the 'general' character of electro-magnetic waves under which so many apparently diverse phenomena had already fallen so conveniently. Now what I want also to stress here is that this applies to the theist. The theist also prefers the simplified. The doctrine of the Trinity - of the 'Three-in-one' and 'One-in-three' is a big simplification - there is even an epigrammatical flavour to be detected. Thus in 'simplification' the concepts of ordinary language becomes distorted, so that in the metaphysical religious language they look very different.

Both scientist and theist, then, are trying to communicate and synthesise experiences which it is felt throw some light on the nature of reality, and in doing so both are liable to erect apparently meaningless entities. Now the notion of 'reality' is extremely important. The positivists, particularly Bridgman, are perfectly correct in saying that the concepts which the scientist uses, e.g. atoms, electrons and quanta "are only links to represent a connected system of science, they make it possible to derive logically the

immeasurable system of connected phenomena from a few abstract principles" (Mach) or to use Frank's words: "in a hypothesis one can only state a conjecture about future experiences, not about the 'real existence' of a thing corresponding to an assigned name" - and the positivists have done much in removing the erroneous ideas of other scientists and of common-sense, that here more fundamental parts of reality were to be found by the scientists. To quote Frank again: "If one had always known ... the fact that cognition arises simply through an assignment of symbol to object, it would never have occurred to one to ask whether it is possible to have a cognition of things 'as they really are' themselves."

Now this is the sort of attitude which the theist also must adopt. To imagine that when we speak of God we are conveying knowledge of 'reality' by the mere use of the symbol is quite erroneous. God is a concept which is quite meaningless save in its relation to our experiences or to the concepts historically obtained or otherwise, which name these experiences. But here I must again stress that this difficulty regarding the 'reality' of concepts is not limited to such a concept as God. It exists for the scientist as well as for the theist. It is present, though not always realized, whenever we use concepts.

To quote Kaufmann from the 'Methodology in the Social Sciences' "... no term can have physical significance unless its meaning is in some way related to perceptual material; ... there is no meaning either scientific or pre-scientific, that does not imply a 'mental construction'. What we mean when we say 'a stone is a real thing' is that under suitable conditions it can be decided by an observational test whether the proposition 'there is a stone' should be accepted. We can of course define 'real' in such a way that stones but not electrons will be real. This objection is met by making explicit the assumptions implicit in the direct observation of 'stones'. By 'stone' I imply an indefinite number of anticipations of future and past experiences of the sense data of stones, i.e. 'stones' are about the same (he means the same in kind) as regards reality as 'electrons'. To be sure, an electron is not immediately given in sensation, but neither is a stone ... (but) since no mental effort is involved (though perhaps it once was) in the observation of a stone, the structural complexity of the process remains unnoticed."

The positivists, then, in so far as they bear out the truth of Kaufmann's words, make it clear, at least to me, that in trying to describe experiences by the use of man-made concepts the scientist is in the same position as the theist. If it be agreed that we cannot know the real nature of anything which is outside us, yet it is true, and especially true in the field of science, that we can only integrate our experiences so as to allow the structural pattern which arises to

impinge on our minds, so as to give us some clue to the nature of the reality which lies behind the phenomenal world. (The part which 'can't be said'.)

It seems, then, that the integration of sense into concepts, is a basic form of human activity; it is practised by both scientist and theist alike as well as by the common man. All are equally in difficulty whether it be asked: 'Does matter exist?', 'Does the Divinity exist?' or 'Do electro-magnetic waves exist' - these are all the same sort of question.

But before closing, I want to leave the theist with a still freer hand by showing that, once again, it is not only in the purely conceptual field that one may compare the scientist and the theist. I refer of course to the whole question, which Dorothy Emmet stresses so much, of analogy, metaphor and picture, which are being dealt with during this conference by others far more capable of throwing light on this subject than I am. However, since I have concerned myself particularly with the scientist so far in this paper, a few words dealing with their use in science, particularly in physical science, may not be amiss.

To begin with a fair example of the logical positivists' view given in the article 'On Semantics and Physics' by E.H. Hutten. He is pointing out that the legitimacy of building up 'object-languages' in science depends on the words used in the object language being related to each other according to rules, but these are, he says, so complicated that the process of translating the scientific into a more straightforward empirical language is now extremely difficult even for the scientist himself since the empirical meaning of an object language, say in Physics, is "shown" by the semantic rules but does not state them explicitly."

Now Hutten feels the difficulty here, all the more so since he realises that there is a connection between the various sciences which makes them one whole body of knowledge. Development has gone far in the various branches, but now the relevance of each to each, e.g. of biology to chemistry in bio-chemistry, forces the scientist to acquaint himself with his brother students' field of study. For scientists to understand the whole of science was one object of the activity of the Vienna Circle with its Unity of Science Conferences, and this Epiphany Conference is obviously trying to do the same sort of thing over a still wider field with special reference to Theism.

Hutten's contribution to the problem is to re-estimate the value of the scientific 'model' which, he claims, fulfils a psychological desire, even of the scientist, to relate his theory to reality

(ordinary experience, he means) and at the same time, in Hutten's own words, "brings out the ineffable character of experience and suggests what it feels like to have the experience, by an analogy to the experience standardized in the model".

Like Lord Kelvin of the last century who said that he could not understand any theory unless it was expressed in terms of common mechanics which he could understand, Hutten advocates the greater use of models in science - he points out, for instance, that the planetary model of the atom, establishes the link to mechanics and thence we may pass to simple experience.

Now Philipp Frank, another person searching for a 'unity of science' is acutely conscious of the need to find links with common sense by means of ordinary language. In his own words: "To achieve such a short cut between the two has been the conscious or unconscious purpose of the metaphysical interpretations of science"; and he follows this up by saying "I submit that Analogy is the central concept in every kind of metaphysics." The important place given to analogy by Dorothy Emmet in her book Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, shows much better than I could how analogy plays its part in theism. What is interesting, I think, is to find the scientist admitting his use of analogy or of models in metaphysical science. I would suggest, rather tentatively, though I think this will be borne out in Margaret Masterman's paper, that common sense language is riddled, too, with analogy's brother - metaphor.

My conclusion is, then, that the metaphysical method is central to the whole of our thought and language whether it be that of common-sense, science or religious metaphysics, and that we need have no fear in using these seeming essentials - analogy, picture, model or metaphor.

One word of warning may, however, be given. Just as in science these are often changed, just as they are often short-lived, so the theist, too, must beware of allowing them more than utility in communicating or describing his knowledge of the truth; he must never make his tools into objects of worship.

2. By Margaret Masterman

My contribution to this symposium will be very short - just sufficient to justify my assisting Mayer in sustaining the discussion.

My title to participate in it at all derives from the fact that I made a plea for the re-comparison of metaphysical and scientific thinking and language in a recently published article entitled Linguistic Philosophy and Dogmatic Theology.¹ In this article I said:

A thorough re-examination should be undertaken of the whole question to what extent theological and metaphysical forms of thinking resemble scientific forms of thinking, and to what extent they do not.... [A considerable amount of thinking is going on about this, from which a consensus of opinion emerges to the effect that] metaphysical thinking, far from being "non-sense", is far more like scientific thinking than either Comte and the original Positivists, or Mach and Schlick and Carnap and the Vienna Circle, supposed. This conclusion has pressed itself increasingly on philosophic attention as philosophers' conceptions of science became more sophisticated. While science was thought of as, quite obviously, "organised common-sense", the analogies between scientific thinking and metaphysical thinking naturally became obscured. But now that it is clear that to quote Norman Campbell,² "science is not 'organised common-sense'; it is the most esoteric of all studies", generic resemblances [between metaphysical and scientific thinking] have begun to emerge on all sides.

It will be clear from this that I welcome Mayer's paper, which I take to be a first attempt to compare Dorothy Emmet's conception of metaphysical thinking (which is made from the point of view of a speculative philosopher) with Philipp Frank's re-examination of it (which is made from the point of view of an exact scientist) and to point out the relevance to the thought of both of these of Ernest Hutten's paper on Scientific Models (which is written from the point of view of a logician).

What I want to make here is the sort of contribution which will help this sort of comparative thinking to be carried further in

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- (1) Margaret Masterman, Linguistic Philosophy and Dogmatic Theology (Theology, March, 1951, pp.82-89).
 - (2) Norman Campbell, Principles of Electricity, People's Books, undated, p.29.

discussion. I will therefore confine myself to two points which seem to me to arise, one from Mayer's paper and the other from the discussion last night.

The first point is this: - Science is not organised common-sense; it is, to put the matter very roughly, higher-level common-sense. Mayer, in his paper, says several times that "science is continuous with common-sense". I do not know whether he means by this that science is something which might be called organised common-sense (as might be thought from what he says on page 50), or that science is something which could more appropriately be called "higher level common-sense" (as might be thought from what he says on page 51). If he means the first, I do not agree with him. If he means the second, I do, and I will try to make clear where, in my view, the difference between the two lies.

If we say that "science is organised common-sense", I think we may mean something like this. We assume that when we touch with our hands, or look with our eyes, that what we get by touching and looking are tactual and visual perceptions; nothing more. But these perceptions, for the most part, have certain characteristics: they are orderly, that is to say, when I look in front of me and see a complicated brownish configuration, which I will call a visual C-perception (to avoid bringing in the idea that it is a perception of a thing, a chair), if I close my eyes for a minute and open them again, I shall in all probability get another C-perception; that is, I shall see another complicated brownish configuration, very like the first. Secondly, the perceptions correlate. That is to say, if, having had two or three visual C-perceptions, I reach forward with my hand and give myself a tactual C-perception of smoothness and hardness, set in tactually perceived planes and curves, and if I subsequently act on the assumption that the visual C-perception and the tactual C-perception were caused by the same "thing", namely an object C, a chair, the expectations which I make, on this assumption, will be fulfilled. And this view, that "perceptual appearances are caused by things" is often called a common-sense view of the world, - though in fact it is not, since "perceptual appearance" is not a common-sense word, but a technical philosophical term. And the view that "science is just organised common-sense" can often be held to mean that just as appearances are caused by material things which somehow lie behind them, so in their turn, material things have been discovered by scientists to be caused by the movements of scientific entities, such as atoms and molecules which somehow lie behind these material things.

Now I do not think this is at all a satisfactory way to talk; nor, I am sure, does Mayer, nor would any physical scientist. I do not think you would find in any scientific book, however popular,

these two propositions, following straight upon one another: (1) perceptions are caused by things, (2) things are caused by molecules; and yet it is just these two propositions which you need to find, if science is to be, in any direct way, "organised common-sense". Now, what do we mean to say, when we assert that there is somehow a connection between science and common-sense? I think we mean to assert, not any causal relationship (perceptions are caused by things; things are caused by molecules) but a strong analogy between two forms of arguing; which is a quite different kind of assertion. We want to say firstly, that when we say that there are things, such as tables and chairs, we are explaining certain characteristics of perceptual appearances, such as their persistence, and orderliness, and correlatedness; and similarly when we say that a certain scientific theory is true, we are saying that it explains certain characteristics of a certain range of perceptual appearances (which are described in some field-worker's observational record, or laboratory diary, or in a collection of these). And certainly, these two kinds of explanation - the so-called common-sense type of explanation of appearances in terms of things, and the scientific type of explanation of particular descriptions in terms of general processes, are rather alike and in a good many ways. And the fact that there is, genuinely, an analogy between these two types of argument is the fact which I mean to refer to when I say that "science is higher-level common-sense argument". But this is not the same as saying that "science is organised common-sense"; which I take to mean that scientists are only continuing with the job of organising particular objects into general classes, which the common-sense thinker has already begun, and that they are continuing with this job which common-sense has begun, with the same subject-matter and in the same old common-sense way. It is the forms of argument in common-sense and science which are alike, not necessarily the statements which result from applying them.

This is my first point, and the object of it is to sophisticate our idea of the connection, which we all feel there is, between science and common-sense. My second point is that we must also sophisticate our idea of the connection which we feel that there is between scientific and religious thinking. Religious thinking, by which I now mean, any discussion of religious beliefs, is about the oldest form of thinking which there is; and religious beliefs - as contained, for instance in such a document as the Christian Athanasian Creed - constitute a very ancient type of belief, couched also, usually in a very ancient type of language.

Now, I think these very ancient statements, giving very ancient beliefs, probably ought to be considered as matrix-statements; statements, that is, which can be made to point towards a great many different kinds of argument, scientific, metaphysical, poetical, mythical,

historical, according as you take them.¹ For instance, the statement, "God is three and God is one" (from J.H. Newman's hymn - "Firmly I believe and truly God is three and God is one") might be taken to assert a very generalised type of scientific theory, queerly expressed. Or it might lay down a terminological rule - "In a religious terminology, which is to be about God, the number 'three' is to mean the same as the number 'one'." Or it might draw a metaphysical analogy. "I am going to bring before your minds a metaphysical picture of one thing made up of three parts - of something like a shamrock leaf." Or it might be a convenient way of asserting that in our culture, three different myths, the Jehovah myth, the Messianic myth, and the prophetic divine inspiration myth, have been coalesced to form one complex myth: the Christian Trinitarian myth. Or something else still.

Now, I know that here in this symposium we are not considering the relation between religious statements and scientific statements, but between metaphysical thinking and scientific thinking. Nevertheless, I think that nobody would deny that a great many very ancient statements, asserting religious beliefs, have been taken over by metaphysicians, and embodied in their metaphysics without being much changed. It seems to me likely, therefore, that many metaphysical statements will tend to be ambiguous in the same sort of way in which I have just contended that religious statements tend to be ambiguous, because they have been taken from more ancient religious statements, embodied in creeds and hymns, which were ambiguous in the kind of way which I have tried to define.

Now, if this is so - if there is any likelihood that this is so and if we are trying to compare and contrast metaphysical and scientific thinking, the moral is plain, and it is this: Start from the scientific end. Find out first, in some detail, what scientific thinking is, and then see in what ways and how strongly various features in metaphysical thinking remind you of corresponding features in scientific thinking - not the other way round.

A comparable moral can be drawn too from my first point, which was that the connection between scientific thinking and common-sense

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- (1) When I say that statements of religious belief are probably matrix-statements, I do not mean the same thing as Dorothy Emmet means when she says, in her Stanton Lectures, that religious statements (taken in isolation) can be taken to be either ascriptive statements, or hypothetical statements, or exclamations or indication statements, or all of these at once. I am here stating that religious statements can be taken as being insertible into various different types of thinking; scientific, metaphysical, poetic, mythical, etc. This is not the same thing.

thinking is not so simple or so close as at first sight it looks. Common-sense arguing is more difficult to become self-conscious about - to get hold of - than scientific arguing, partly because it is a far more ancient form of arguing to which we have become accustomed, and partly because it is far more vague. Therefore, in making any comparison of the two, consider scientific arguing first, not the forms of argument of common-sense.

So in any comparison of scientific thinking with any other forms of thinking - examine scientific thinking first.

3. By R.B. Braithwaite

Three Comments on David Mayer's Paper

In the first place I agree with Mayer in thinking that there is no discontinuity between common-sense thinking and scientific thinking: the latter grows out of the former in the quest for thinking that will both explain and predict.

Secondly, Mayer says that the questions "Does matter exist?", "Does the divinity exist?", "Do electromagnetic waves exist?" are all the same sort of question. The first and third do seem to me to be similar. The third can be translated into "Do hypotheses which are about the theoretical concepts electromagnetic waves, i.e. are expressed by sentences using the term 'electromagnetic wave', appear in the scientific deductive system which is regarded at the present day as the established system of physics?" and the answer to this question is "Yes", but of course the answer may be "No" sometime in the future. The first question may be translated into "Are properties about material objects, expressed by sentences containing material-object-words, part of our stock of common-sense knowledge?" to which the answer is "Yes, now and in the future unless our experience fundamentally changes." The second question may be also of this type - one to which an affirmative answer will be given if "the Divinity" is used to stand for a concept in a hypothesis whose function is explanatory or predicative of experience. But, as I said in my paper yesterday, I think a preferable account is one which makes theism not a scientific or near-scientific hypothesis but a mythology used to suggest a policy of behaviour.

Thirdly, with regard to the use of "models" in science. As I see it, the function of a model is to provide an alternative interpretation of the language system (calculus) which expresses the scientific deductive system which is in theory concerned. If this scientific deductive system includes hypotheses about theoretical concepts (e.g. electrons, electromagnetic waves) the sentences or formulae expressing these hypotheses will have no straightforward common-sense interpretation, and many scientists will find it therefore psychologically helpful to give these sentences an alternative interpretation in terms of common-sense objects like billiard balls. If an interpretation can be given in terms of such common-sense objects which satisfies all the top level laws of the scientific theory, it will provide a model for the theory, and it will be possible to do a great deal of thinking about the scientific theory (e.g. deducing consequences from top level laws) by thinking instead of the model. The advantage of thinking in terms of the model instead of the theory will be that the model is concrete and the mathematics of the deductions will be able to be thought of in visual and tactual and motor imagery instead of purely abstractly. The disadvantage is that one may suppose that certain features, true of the model, are also true of the theory, and one may forget the relation of the model to theory (as being a different interpretation of the same language-system) and thus tend to assimilate or even identify the theoretical concepts of the theory (e.g. electrons) with the corresponding concrete things (e.g. billiard balls) in the model.

The moral is: use models freely but never forget that they are models, not the theory itself. And preferably, use lots of different models in thinking about the same theory: there will then be less risk of identifying model with theory.

4. Points from discussion

- (1) (a) The Unity of Science movement did not intend to reduce all the sciences to one, and did not expect that all scientists should be able to understand and investigate the work done in other fields.

(b) Braithwaite pointed out that some physicists (e.g. De Broglie) admit they need to think in terms of some model or other, while other physicists (e.g. Dirac) claim to need no such representation - for them it is entirely a mathematical affair.

Mayer replied:

to (a) Perhaps there had been no attempt by the Unity of Science movement to unify science in these ways, yet it was clear from the writings of E. Hutten and P. Frank, both of whom had been associated with the Unity of Science movement, that they were concerned to eliminate problems arising from specialisation in various branches of science which made it impossible for (i) the common man, (ii) the scientist working in another field, to know what was going on elsewhere.

to (b) If models, pictures or representations were not always necessary to the scientist, they were in fact often used, and were essential, for some scientists.

- (2) The difference between speaking of science (a) as continuous with common sense, and (b) as "Organised Common Sense", was discussed.

It was generally agreed that (a) was right, and (b) was wrong.

- (3) The differences between (a) a scientific model, (b) a scientific representation, (c) a metaphor, were discussed.

With regard to (a) Braithwaite said that the relevant structure of a model can be completely given in mathematical terms.

(b) Masterman said that a representation, as used in the biological sciences, nearly always has more potentialities than those of the theory as expressed in words, and is therefore of more use to us than the theory.

(c) This freedom of "play" is even more marked in "metaphor". Metaphor is much more like a linguistically embryonic form of a total scientific theory.

IV. ANALYSIS OF A RELIGIOUS PARADOX

By Margaret Masterman

- 0.01 The main reason that this paper is set out aphoristically, so that it looks like a bad parody of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, or a degenerate version of the Analects of Confucius, is to save space. There is another reason; but that will only emerge as the paper goes on.
- 0.02 It is possible that I am like Confucius and Wittgenstein in this, that they also, like myself, needed to save space. There, however, the resemblance between myself and them ends.
- 0.11 An earlier version of the analogy given in this paper was corrected and checked, some months before his death, by the Professor of Chinese at Cambridge, Professor Gustav Haloun.
- 0.12 The desirability of trying to make this kind of analysis at all is discussed in my paper Theological and Scientific Terminologies (VII.3 in this volume).

1. The statement to be analysed is:-
- It is extraordinary that, in the Eucharistic mystery, Christ should be at once the Victim and the Sacrificer; the Worshipped and the Worshipper; the Offering and the Priest.
- We will call this statement "the statement A".
- 1.01 This statement is a shortened version of a statement from a book on the Christian Eucharist by G.P. Harton. It was first chosen for analysis because it was held up for ridicule by a logical iconoclast as being "quite obviously meaningless".
- 1.011 "'Extraordinary' indeed!" said this philosopher, sneering.
- 1.02 It did not occur to him that the phrase "It is extraordinary that" might have as part of its meaning "It is logically extraordinary that....". That it might be, for instance, an invitation to the reader to interpret the statement following in terms of an unusual rather than in terms of an ordinary logic.
- 1.1 Whether a statement is to be held as "ordinary" or "extraordinary" in a language depends entirely on what analogue you find for it, -

- 1.11 With what kinds of other statement it is matched.
- 1.12 The meanings of analogue and of match which are used here are shown more fully in my paper on Theological and Scientific Terminologies.
- 1.121 From what is said there it should be clear that by "A matches B", or "A is like B" I by no means mean "A is a copy of B". This is, alas, what philosophers always do mean when they discuss images, or when they discuss what they wrongly call "the picture theory of meaning".
- 1.1211 What they wrongly call "the picture theory of meaning" should be called "the photograph theory of meaning".
- 1.122 What I mean by "A matches B" is something far more like "A is a clue to B", or even "A gives a clue to something about B".

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2. The analogue with which the statement A would normally be matched (that is, if you leave out the preliminary phrase "it is extraordinary that") is of this form:

$$2.1 \quad (\exists x) \left((Eu_x \cdot I_{xc}) \cdot \left\{ I_{xc} \supset \left\{ [S_c - S_c] \cdot [W_c - W_c] \cdot [P_c - P_c] \right\} \right\} \right)$$

- 2.101 which is formally equivalent to:

$$(\exists x) \left[Eu_x \cdot I_{xc} \cdot (S_c - S_c) \cdot (W_c - W_c) \cdot (P_c - P_c) \right]$$

- 2.102 This (2.1) could be interpreted as:

"There is an entity x such that

- (1) x is a Eucharistic mystery and x includes Christ, and
- (2) the fact that x includes Christ implies that (a) Christ is both a Sacrificer and the opposite of a Sacrificer; (b) Christ is both a Worshipper and the opposite of a Worshipper; (c) Christ is both a Priest and the opposite of a Priest."

- 2.11 Once having matched the statement A with this analogue, it is then easy to point out that the analogue offends, at three points, against the Law of the Excluded Middle (not both 'p and not p': - (p.-)) and therefore that the analogue results in a contradiction.

2.12 What is, however, also very clear, is that it is not a good analogue.

2.2 An exceptionally tolerant logician might perhaps say: "Let us do our best with this all-but-intolerable statement. Let us assume that it asserts not three contradictions but three reflexive relations."

2.21 The new analogue will then run:

$$(\exists x) \left[(Eu_x \cdot I_{xc}) \cdot \left\{ I_{xc} \supset (S_{cc} \cdot W_{cc} \cdot P_{cc}) \right\} \right]$$

"There is an entity x such that

- (1) x is a Eucharistic mystery and x includes Christ, and
- (2) the fact that x includes Christ implies that (a) Christ sacrifices Christ; (b) Christ worships Christ; (c) Christ, as priest, eats Christ."

2.22 In other words: "In the Eucharistic mystery Christ is simultaneously self-sacrificing, narcissistic and a cannibal".

2.221 On reflexion, however, it can be seen that this is not a very good analogue either.

2.222 Either, therefore, the analysis must be given up: or we must look for a new kind of analogue.

2.223 A quite new kind of analogue.

3. The analogue which I propose is the following statement, the second half of which bears a strong analogy to the statement A, but which is in Classical Chinese instead of English.

3.01 It is not clear, however, that this matters, since it is often said that the original statements from which the other formal analogues were taken were statements in such languages as Greek and Latin; and it is not clear that Greek and Latin should be preferred as analogue-suggesting languages, to Chinese.

3.1 This new analogue runs:

是是非非謂之知
非是是非謂之愚

3.11 We will call this statement "the Statement B". As I hope to show, it can be taken as being of the form:

$$\left[\left[\left(\left[\left[\alpha \cdot \alpha' \right] \beta \cdot \beta' \right] \right) \left(\delta \left(\begin{array}{c} \ddot{\alpha} \\ \ddot{\beta} \end{array} \left(\begin{array}{c} \ddot{\epsilon} \\ \ddot{\zeta} \end{array} \right) \right) \right) \right] \right. \\ \left. \left(\left[\left[\beta \cdot \alpha' \right] \alpha \cdot \beta' \right] \right) \left(\delta \left(\begin{array}{c} \ddot{\delta} \\ \ddot{\zeta} \end{array} \left(\begin{array}{c} \ddot{\beta} \\ \ddot{\alpha} \end{array} \right) \right) \right) \right) \right]$$

3.12 We will call this statement "the statement B₁".
It is usually taken as having the rough English equivalent:
"To call the Right "Right" and the Wrong "Wrong" - this is Wisdom;
To call the Wrong "Right" and the Right "Wrong" - this is Stupidity."

We will call this statement "the statement B₂".

3.2 Clearly, however, if we are to see the analogy of B with A, we must first analyse the analogue.

3.201 And, the analogue being in this case a Chinese analogue, that we must go as far as we can with the analysis by formal inspection; i.e. without knowledge of Chinese.

3.21 From this we can see that the statement B is composed by using only six discrete sign-units:

是非謂之知愚

We will call these six signs "the elements of B".

3.22 Moreover, it seems likely, and is indeed the case, that these six elements are formally homogeneous. The only formal difference between them is one of complexity; which for our present purpose is irrelevant.

3.221 Thus 謂 is more complex than 之.

3.222 But this is not the same difference as that given by saying that 謂 has more strokes than 之.

- 3.3 Now, if it be granted that the statement B can be said to be "translated" by the statement B_2 , and if it also be allowed that the statement B is composed out of only six homogeneous elements, then it is clear that the rules of combination of these six elements will probably be worth our attention.
- 3.301 Even if sinologues searching for Latin and Greek analogues have not been explicitly aware of the existence of these quite different rules of combination,
- 3.302 yet it is still clear, from the logician's point of view, that they are there and that they are worth our attention.
- 3.3021 Since it is from the application of these rules that must result the marvellous compactness and elegance of the statement.
- 3.31 "Elements", in one sense, are "names".
- 3.311 Chinese logicians and grammarians gave hints of this, but these were ignored.
- 3.312 Sinologues such as Maspero and Demiéville have made protests against the ignoring, but who has heard?
- 3.313 Now, however, that Wittgenstein, speaking after his own death, has re-envisaged languages built of concepts,
- 3.3131 - which, in this sense and this sense only, are names.
- 3.314 It will be clear to all who are influenced by his authority that the Rules of the Statement B are indeed worthy of our attention,
- 3.315 since according to the unanimous consensus of Chinese grammarians
- 3.316 a Chinese statement is a "string of names".
- 3.32 It can be seen from formal inspection of B_2 that, if B_1 is taken as giving the form of B these rules will probably fall into four kinds, which we will name as follows:
- 3.321 The Rules of Normal Order, which govern the round brackets,
- 3.322 The Rules of Adjunction, which govern the square brackets,
- 3.323 The Rules of Mention, which govern the small, horned brackets,

- 3.324 And the Rules of Displacement From Normal Order, which govern the bars.
- 3.3241 It can further be guessed, from formal inspection of B_2 that, although these rules yield these powerful results, they are such that their application to a particular statement, can be indicated either by making fairly simple differences of pause, rhythm and stress in pronouncing the statement, or by calling on knowledge of easily recognisable linguistic habits.
- 3.32411 In other words, B_2 looks like an impressionistic rendering of an actual flow of monosyllabic speech, with its breaks, its pauses, its carefully patterned emphases, its final climax.
- 3.32412 This point is interesting; but we shall not return to it.
- 3.3242 It can further be inferred, from the names given to the rules, that it is important to be clear, in analysing a statement of this kind, what the statement would look like were all the elements in it to be placed in normal order; and also what it would mean, were all the elements in it to be placed in normal order.

Then, by examining the displacements from normal order, reasons for the changes from normal meaning can be found.

This point is vital and we shall return to it.

- 3.32421 Thus, the way to analyse the analogue B is first to put it into normal order and then to analyse its departures from normal order. Whereas the way to analyse the original statement A is merely to put it into a B-like form; and then leave the reader to work out the implications of this.
- 3.32422 Thus the analysis of B will take far more of our attention than the analysis of A; although this paper is about the analysis of A.
- 3.3243 Lastly - and this is my final word by way of preface - the principle to grasp in analysing this kind of statement is that any displaced element (that is, any barred element) must be thought of as tending to continue to function invisibly in its original position, as well as functioning in its new, visible position. Thus, an element with two bars may have to be thought of as being simultaneously in three places.

This fact in itself goes far to account for the compactness of the language, and of the statement B.

3.004 Now let us proceed to the analysis of B.

3.4 The Rule of Normal Order, in such a statement as B, reading from left to right, - and in so far as it is not interfered with by any other rule, - arranges elements in an order going from the more abstract to the more concrete; from the more general to the more specific; from the more universal to the more limited; and the normal order of elements is indicated by round brackets.

3.411 Very roughly: the ancient Chinese normal order gives a string of "adjectives" ending up with a "noun".

3.412 Thus:

三字經

3.4121 "Three Character Classic"

($\alpha(\beta(\gamma))$)

3.4122

3.4123 "the idea of γ limited, or qualified, by the idea of β , the whole that is, γ -qualified-by- β , further qualified by α ". (See, however, the note to 3.551.)

3.4124 We will call this example of normal order the statement C.

3.413 It is to be remarked in passing that in the statement C the labels "adjective" and "noun" no more apply in English than they do in Chinese.

3.4131 This point is interesting; but we shall not return to it.

3.414 We will call statements in normal order pictures.

3.41401 All ancient Chinese statements can be regarded as complications of or variants on this kind of combination in normal order

Some statements in other languages and ways of thinking can be regarded as complications of and variants on this kind of statement, that is of statements built up with this kind of normal order.

3.41402 Especially so-called "metaphysical" statements, and "paradoxes".

- 3.41403 These can, in this exact sense, be regarded as "pictures".
- 3.41404 It is the purpose of this paper to display this fact.
- 3.4141 Perhaps a more correct name for such statements would be titles, or headlines.
- 3.4142 But it is more natural to talk about "building up a picture" than of "building up a title" or headline.
- 3.415 When a picture is non-representational, or a poem esoteric, the title, taken as a whole, itself acts as a clue.
- 3.4151 A clue to the interpretation of the picture.
- 3.416 But the title is like the picture in this sense, that the picture (or poem, or map, or stained-glass window, or totemic pillar, or heraldic crest) is itself, in a far more complicated way, a complex of clues.
- 3.4161 Clues to the interpretation of a reality which is far more, indefinitely more, complicated and complex still.
- 3.41611 So that what we have, at each stage, are not copies, but clues; not photographs, but visual hints; not icons (in Peirce's sense) but signals.
- 3.41612 Clues are only copies when design wavers and the imagination fails.
- 3.41613 That the clue should be itself a likeness of that which it interprets - this undoubtedly constitutes an easy and pleasing method of interpretation.
- 3.41614 But not a normal or a necessary method of interpretation: logically speaking: merely a pleasing accident.
- 3.417 It might be thought that, on such vague criteria, it would be impossible to decide, in any given case, what ordering of the elements would constitute the normal order.
- 3.4171 Experience shows that this is not so. But since it is better to exemplify this than to assert it, let us return now to detailed consideration of the statement B.

3.5 The six elements 是, 非, 謂, 之, 知, 愚,

being themselves clues, each indicate the existence and boundaries of a range of meaning.

3.51 (Linguists' names for them are significs, or idea-centres, or keys.)

3.52 Here is a rough idea of the ranges of meaning of the six elements in the statement B, as given in Karlgren's Analytic Dictionary:

3.521 是 this, that, thus (hence used as copula, id est); is, are, etc.: (being so:) correct, right: affirm, yes.

3.522 非 reverse, contrary; wrong, evil; to blame, deny; not [said to be a symbol of contrariety; Karlgren thinks it is a variation of 飛, a flying bird].

[Co-signific in 罪, crime, sin: punishment, to blame -
[罟 caught for 非 a crime].]

3.523 謂 to address, speak, say: call, be called: say to oneself, think, imagine.

[from 言, words, and 胃 a stomach with contents (above) and a piece of flesh (below).]

3.524 之 this, these; him, her, it, them; genitive and attributive particle; to go to - [the seal 之 is a picture of some concrete object (a "growing plant", say the commentators)].

3.5241 [Creel and Haloun, however, think 之 is a picture of a foot on a line.]

3.5242 [This is the kind of misunderstanding which occurs with clues.]

3.525 知 know, understand, perceive, be wise, wisdom. ["to 知 speak so as to 中 hit the mark", says the scholastic commentator.]

3.526 愚 simple, stupid, doltish, ignorant [from a monkey, and 心 a 'mentalising' element, literally a heart].

- 3.53 Now, in order to produce an English statement from this material (a "literal rendering", if you like, of the Chinese), each of these "ranges of meaning", above, must be given a name.
- 3.5301 Thus we shall have a kind of Platonic language, or, speaking more strictly perhaps, an Augustinian language, consisting entirely of highly abstract ideas, or concepts, or names.
- 3.5302 But not, of course, a language consisting of what we call names.
- 3.5303 And not (sinologues please note) a kind of pidgin English.
- 3.5304 Pidgin English is unacceptable as a translation-medium for Chinese.
- 3.5305 Words in "pidgin" still have parts of speech.
- 3.54 Let us then make "names" for the six meaning-ranges given above: let these be, respectively:
- 3.541 Straight-and-right-foursquare-Positivity = R
- 3.542 Nasty-crooked-negative-Contrariety = W
- 3.543 Namery, or Appellation = N
- 3.5431 (the general idea of communicating by conjuring up a descriptive appellation or a name).
- 3.544 A very generalised operator, usually a class-forming-operator = C
- 3.5441 (The generalised idea of picking a particular set out from a total background: "notice these things!")
- 3.545 Intellectual-cum-spiritual-insight = I
- 3.546 Positively-apelike-stupidity-and-doltishness = D
- 3.55 Let us now put the first half of the statement B in normal order:
- 3.5501 Let us make a picture of a wise act of naming.

3.5502 To do this, and remembering both our limited stock of clues, and the rules of normal order;

Let us put our naming-symbol N on the right, as the thing we're talking about; and the symbol I on the left, as the general characteristic which we want N to have; leaving a space for more special characteristics in between:

3.551 Thus:

(I (N)))

3.5511 This brings out the point that, when you are dealing with clues, it is not a question of getting the clue which means exactly what you mean.

3.55111 But the clue (from the limited stock available) the meaning-range of which is least unlike what you mean.

3.5512 As also, originally, when hoisting code-flags at sea.

3.5513 As also (as poets know) when using any language.

3.55131 We say: "we are gods: we can say exactly what we mean."

3.55132 Whereas we are concept-bound and tongue-tied fools: from the stock available we can only choose the concepts which are least unlike what we mean.

3.552 We will fill in the space between I and N with a composite adjective which we shall later analyse.

3.5521 $[[R'R]W'W']$

"A Right-"Right"-calling, Wrong-"Wrong"-calling act-of-naming.

3.553 But now, we don't want just a single wise act of naming. W want a collection of wise right-"right"-wrong-"wrong" acts of naming, namely a wise language. Because Wisdom consists, as all know, in using a wise language.

3.5531 We therefore insert the class-forming-operator C, just before

the long adjective, thus:

$$(I(C([[R'R']W'W'](N))))$$

3.5532 We now have a picture, still in normal order, of a wise picked-out collection of right-"right" wrong-"wrong" acts of naming.

3.5533 i.e. a picture of a wise language.

3.56 We now feel, however, that the emphasis has gone wrong. Owing to the statement, as it becomes more precise, becoming also more elongated, the original force of the I-symbol is becoming lost.

3.561 We feel the I-symbol needs pointing out, freshening-up.

3.562 We therefore move it right over to the right,

3.563 So that the statement runs:

$$(C([[R'R']W'W'](N)))(I)$$

3.5631 "Collection of right-"right" wrong-"wrong" acts of naming: wise."

3.5632 "A collection of right-"right" wrong-"wrong" acts of naming is a wise one."

3.57 Thus we get our First Rule of Displacement: the Rule of Predicative Displacement:

3.571 An element which would have been on the left in normal order, and which is displaced right over to the right, gives the whole statement a predicative meaning:

$$(\alpha(\beta(\gamma))) \text{ is convertible with } ((\beta(\gamma))(\alpha))^{1}$$

(1) (August, 1953): Since the above was written, two sinologues have independently pointed out that if this rule is to correspond to a basic (continued on next page)

3.572 But, to keep the round brackets with an unambiguous function, i.e. as having and only having their original function, namely to indicate normal order wherever it occurs, we create a bar-sign, and state our rule:

$$(\alpha(\beta(\gamma))) \quad cv \quad (\beta(\gamma(\bar{\alpha})))$$

3.5721 $(C([[R'R']W'W'](N(I))))$

3.5722 It being always remembered that any displaced element tends to function invisibly in its old position as well as visibly in its new one,

3.57221 So that what we have here could be written as:

$$(\bar{I}(C([[R'R']W'W'](N(I))))))$$

"the wise collection of right-"right" wrong-"wrong" acts of naming is indeed wise."

3.57222 So that $(\beta(\gamma(\bar{\alpha}))) \quad cv \quad (\beta(\gamma(\alpha)))$

3.58 The patterning of the statement which we now have, however, is by no means yet sufficiently exact. The "C" notion, in particular, if left only in the position in which we now have it, might easily mean the activity of "going to".

3.5801 So that $(I(C(N)))$ might mean "the wise man goes to what he imagines", i.e. he retreats into the world of his own imagination.

3.581 To insure, therefore, that "C" is used to denote a class, we displace it, placing it between the long adjective and its noun;

(continued from previous page)

construction in the ancient Chinese language, it must be of the form: $(\alpha(\beta))$ cv $(\beta(\alpha))$. $(\alpha(\beta(\gamma)))$, as written in 3.551, would then have to be re-analysed throughout as $(\alpha(\{\beta\{\gamma\}\}))$, i.e. as a special case of $(\alpha(\beta)), \{\beta\{\gamma\}\}$ being replaceable by β . This does not affect the main argument; but, if this argument is to be used for sinological purposes, it alters the bracketting of all subsequent formulae which apply the predicative rule.

forming a complex element which now means "the class of right-"
"right" wrong-"wrong" namings".

3.5811 To do this we make use of the second rule of displacement:
the Rule of Class-Forming Displacement,

3.5812 Which says that, when, in ancient Chinese, the abstract
connective element 之 is displaced from normal order to form the
complex element, "qualification-barred-connective-noun", the com-
plex element is to be taken to mean "the class of all things
which possess the given qualification".

3.5813 So that, allowing for both the visible and invisible uses of
"C", we get:

$$(\text{C} \{ [[\text{R}'\text{R}'] \text{W}'\text{W}'] \{ \text{C}\{\text{N}\} \} \} (\text{I}))$$

i.e.

$$\{ \{ [[\text{R}'\text{R}'] \text{W}'\text{W}'] \{ \bar{\text{C}}\{\text{N}\} \} \} (\text{I}) \}$$

"the collection of the class of right-"right" wrong-"wrong"
namings is indeed a wise one".

3.58131 It being noted that, just as the invisible, normal-order
use of "I" introduced an "indeed" into the English meaning, so
the invisible, normal-order use of "C" still throws the whole
thing which is being talked about into the plural.

3.582 Here, however, we fall into a difficulty. When the long
adjective and the naming idea, N, were juxtaposed, the whole
double element could reasonably be taken to mean "right-"right"
wrong-"wrong" acts of naming",

3.5821 which really meant, "right-"right"-and-wrong-"wrong"-calling
acts-of-naming",

3.5822 so that the naming idea was actually used twice without any
displacement.

3.5823 Now, however, the naming idea is used twice in different
parts of the statement, namely, both inside the complex element
governed by 之 and outside.

3.5824 To avoid this, we must create a double use for the naming-element, "N", which is best done by creating a triple use for "C".

3.583 We thus make use of the Rule of Double Displacement, which says that when an abstract connective, like 之 or 而 is doubly displaced, it is put in the penultimate position in the statement, its function now being to replace the whole complex element which formerly it governed.

3.584 Thus we now get

i)
$$\left(\left\{ \left[\left[R'R' \right] W'W' \right] \left\{ \left[\left[N \right] \right\} \left(\left[\left[C \right] \left(\left[I \right] \right) \right) \right) \right\} \right)$$

ii) i.e.
$$\left(\left[\left[R'R' \right] W'W' \right] \left(N \left(\left[\left[C \right] \left(\left[I \right] \right) \right) \right) \right) \right)$$

iii) i.e.

$$\left(\left[\left[R'R' \right] W'W' \right] \left\{ \left[\left[R'R' \right] W'W' \right] \left\{ \left[\left[N \right] \right\} \right\} \left(\left[I \right] \right) \right)$$

iv) i.e. "to call the class of right-'right' wrong-'wrong' namings "right-right wrong-wrong namings" this is what is wise.

3.5841 Thus this displacement converts the original use of "N" into a verbal one; which conversion in its turn tends to convert the final phrase "this indeed is wise" to "this is what is wise" which, in its turn, tends to become the more abstract phrase "this is Wisdom".

3.5842 To see why this is so, however, we must analyse the long adjective.

3.59 Now what we have called "the long adjective" is a complex of two elements twice repeated, which mean "right-'right'-and-wrong-'wrong'" used adjectivally, though this meaning was often loosely given as "right-'right' wrong 'wrong'", used adjectivally.

3.591 So that here we have two things to account for: the "and", joining the two halves of the adjective, and the inverted commas.

3.5911 We will account for the "and" by using the First Rule of Adjunction,

3.59111 which says that when two evidently comparable elements α and β (in this case "R" and "W") follow one another and the most important, α (in this case "R"), is put first, the two shall be bracketted in square brackets going from right to left, the meaning of the two elements being " α and β ".

3.59112 Thus:

$$[[\alpha]\beta] = \text{"}\alpha \text{ and } \beta\text{"}$$
$$[[R]W] = \text{"R and W"}$$

and =

$$[[[1st\ half\ of\ \beta] \quad 2nd\ half\ of\ \beta]] =$$

"1st half of B states that so and so: and or whereas the 2nd half of B states that so and so."

3.5912 We will account for the inverted commas in the 1st half of B by making use of the First Rule of Mention,

3.59121 which says that if, in any statement, a succession of elements are each repeated, the second occurrence of the repeated element shall be regarded as being enclosed in horned brackets, ' ' ,

3.59122 these horned brackets being considered as having one of three meanings: "to treat as", "to call", "to consider"; the choice between these being determined (as we have seen in this case) by the context.

3.59123 Thus we have

$$[[\text{父}'\text{父}]\text{子}'\text{子}']$$

"to treat fathers as fathers and sons as sons" (Confucius).

3.59124 And thus we have here:

$[[R 'R']W 'W']$

"to call the Right "Right" and the Wrong "Wrong".

3.59125 And (cf. 3.563212, iv):

$([[R 'R']W 'W'] '[[R 'R']W 'W']')$

"to call the class of right-'right' and wrong 'wrong' namings
"the class of right-'right' and wrong 'wrong' namings".

3.5913 This rule, however, does not cover the use of horned
brackets in the 2nd half of B.

3.59131 To cover this we must use the Second Rule of Mention,

3.59132 which says that in the case of two statements joined by square
brackets, and the pattern in the second of which is otherwise the
same as that in the first, the meaning of horned brackets in the
second shall be presumed to be the same as the meaning of horned
brackets in the first, even though in the second case no element
is repeated twice,

3.591321 which is a special case of a far more general rule of parallelism,
which assimilates to one another the meanings of any statements
which can be joined by square brackets.

3.6 Now, with the help of these rules of Adjunction, Mention and
Displacement, we have turned our picture of a wise collection of
a special sort of act of naming into a statement to which the
rough English equivalent can be given: "to call the Right 'Right'
and the Wrong 'Wrong', - this is Wisdom",

3.61 Thus:

$([[R 'R']W 'W'] (N(\ddot{\ddot{}}(\ddot{\ddot{}})))$

3.62 And, mutatis mutandis, it can quite easily be shown that, by
making an analogous use of all the rules, and also by using the
Second Rule of Mention,

3.621 A picture of a foolish collection of a special sort of namings can be turned into a statement of which the rough English equivalent would be:

"to call the Wrong 'Right', and the Right 'Wrong' - this is Stupidity."

3.63 Thus:

$$([[R'W']W'R')(N(\ddot{C}(\ddot{I})))$$

3.64 Making a total of:

$$[[([R'R']W'W')(N(\ddot{C}(\ddot{I})))]$$

$$([[R'W']W'R')(N(\ddot{C}(\ddot{I})))$$

3.641 Which is an instance of the statement-form B_2 which we will call B_3 .

3.65 It remains to be shown that grammatical rules can be made for getting rid of the brackets,

3.651 So that the formal gulf can be bridged which separates B_3 from B.

3.652 This can be done provided the rules are purely grammatical, not partly logical, in form; and provided they are limited to the natural language of literary Chinese.

3.6521 We can say, for instance, "In literary Chinese, when the meaning-ranges of any two elements or statements show them to be obviously comparable, and when also the most important element comes first, then the elements and/or statements are to be considered as joined by "and"."

This gets rid of all the squared brackets.

3.6522 We can also say "When in any statement, in literary Chinese, any succession of elements is repeated, this shall produce the general relationships between the two occurrences "to call α 'α'"

or, "to treat α as α " or "to consider α as α ."

This gets rid of all the horned brackets.

- 3.6523 We can also say, "Any literary Chinese statement in which a more abstract, adjectival-seeming element comes right at the end, with a stress on it, especially when this occurs after a more particular noun-like element, which is less stressed, shall be held to be of the subject-predicate form. In such a case the abstract adjective shall be held to have been displaced from the left of the statement."

This gets rid of the predicative bar.

- 3.6524 We can also say, "When, in literary Chinese, 之 joins two elements which it separates, it shall be taken as (i) turning the element which it precedes into a class-name, and (ii) turning the element which it follows into an adjective qualifying this class-name, and (iii) shall be considered as having been displaced from the left of the statement, in which position it would have the meaning "this" or "these"."

This gets rid of the class-forming bar.

- 3.6525 We can also say, "When, in literary Chinese, 之 (and sometimes 而) is placed in the penultimate position in the statement, it shall be taken (i) as replacing the whole class-complex which it governed when it occurred with one bar, which complex must be placed right at the beginning of the statement, (ii) as turning the element which precedes it into a verb, of which it is the object, (iii) as having undergone a double displacement, the first from its normal-order position to the left of the statement into the class-forming position, the second from the class-forming-position into the penultimate position."

This gets rid of the second, or double bar.

- 3.6526 Finally, and more generally, we can say, "Any statement in literary Chinese to which no other rules seem to apply shall be taken as a statement in normal order; it shall be considered, that is, as a string of adjectives followed by a noun, and these adjectives shall be considered as being ordered from the more abstract to the more concrete, or the more general to the more specific, or the more universal to the more limited."

This gets rid of the round, normal-order brackets.

- 3.6527 And, quite finally, and also generally, we can say "In the case of any displaced element in literary Chinese, it tends to function in its normal-order position as well as in its displaced

one; and in the case of any doubly displaced element, it must be considered as functioning both in its original normal-order position, and in its position of first displacement, as well as in its position of second displacement."

3.7 These rules are most complicated to state, but comparatively easy to apply.

3.71 If I were writing this paper primarily for sinologues, I should try to show how they apply to many Chinese statements besides this one.

3.711 This is, to many classical Chinese statements. That is (speaking roughly) to statements in literary Chinese.

3.72 If I were writing this paper primarily for formal logicians, I should try to show how these rules could be more rigorously restated so as to be usable as rules of a formal calculus.

3.73 Since, however, I have been doing this whole long analysis only to provide the statement A with an analogue,

3.731 I will here content myself with saying that the concurrent application of all the bracket-removing rules which I have just given as applying in literary Chinese enables the statement-form B_2 to have as its instance the actual Classical Chinese statement \bar{B}_1 .

3.74

是是非非謂之知

非是是非謂之愚

3.741 So innocent-looking, so guileless and so simple,

3.742 And in reality, so wickedly complex,

3.743 Really so exact, in appearance so very vague,

3.744 Logically speaking, a Chinese joke.

4. Now let us, on this analogue, analyse the statement A,
- 4.001 For the suspicion strikes us: language may hold more than one such joke.
- 4.002 To analyse the statement A, we must first put it into a form in which it consists of elements,
- 4.003 And then use brackets to see what pattern these elements could reasonably be made to make.
- 4.1 The statement A is: "It is extraordinary that, in the Eucharistic mystery, Christ should be at once the Victim and the Sacrificer; the Worshipped and the Worshipper; the Offering and the Priest."
- 4.1 To get our elements, therefore, let us meditate upon it; and see what its general pattern of structure is.
- 4.11 In my view, the statement A gives a contrast: a contrast between what is ritually "ordinary" and what is ritually "extraordinary", as it says.
- 4.111 It contrasts a mixed-up, paradoxical state of affairs which can be considered as being established by a ceremonial mystery which is Eucharistic or Christian, with another, ritually much more normal state of affairs in another mystery which is not Eucharistic or Christian, and in which, as we would say, "everybody keeps their proper place".
- 4.2 Thus the statement A, like so many paradoxes in English, is an ellipsis.
- We will call the implied "picture" of the discreet, traditional ceremonial state of affairs A_1 ; and the actually given, revolutionary picture of the Christian, Eucharistic, ritually blended state of affairs, A_2 .
- 4.3 The compound statement, " A_1 and A_2 ", we will connect, as was done in the analogue, by squared brackets.
- 4.31 Thus:

$$[[A_1]A_2]$$

- 4.4 Further, we will replace the naming, appellation root-idea, N, in the analogue by a fire-wood-collecting-cum-collecting-up-into-bundles-cum-grouping-cum-classifying-cum-describing-by-classifying root-idea which we will call G.
- 4.41 For, though the two ideas are cognate, Harton does not primarily wish to say that Christ in the Eucharist is named "Sacrifice", "Sacrificer", "Worshipped", "Worshipper", "Offering", "Priest".
- 4.411 But that a new revolutionary kind of ritual grouping is made in the Christian Eucharist,
- 4.412 which (the statement being a general metaphysical one) reflects a new, revolutionary kind of grouping which has been created or discovered somehow in ultimate reality,
- 4.413 which change in reality, and in the Eucharist, should be "mirrored" in its turn, somehow, by a new, revolutionary type of society being founded in the world,
- 4.4131 With kings as servants; bishops as bell-hops; priests as pantry-boys; judges and police as fellow-prisoners and healers; women, slaves and primitives as colleagues; race-enemies as genuine brothers and sisters; the sick and the crippled as senior; and so on.
- 4.41311 (Don't worry: there is no danger at all of the thing occurring. Why, the very picture of it can only sensibly be made in a language with a logic like that of old Chinese.)
- 4.5 All this shows us, however, that we shall need three more elements: a ceremonial-cum-ritual element, C, a traditional, or neat and traditional ordering, II, and a Christian-mixing-and-crossing element, X.
- 4.51 This will make the structure of our compound statement (on the analogue):

$$A_1 = \left[\left[\left(\text{the traditional grouping} \right) \left(G \left(\frac{\cdot}{\cdot} \left(\left\{ \frac{\cdot}{\cdot} \left\{ \frac{\cdot}{\cdot} \left\{ C \right\} \right\} \right\} \right\} \right) \right) \right) \right] \right]$$

$$A_2 = \left(\left(\text{the revolutionary grouping} \right) \left(G \left(\frac{\cdot}{\cdot} \left(\left\{ \frac{\cdot}{\cdot} \left\{ \frac{\cdot}{\cdot} \left\{ X \right\} \right\} \right\} \right) \right) \right) \right)$$

- 4.52 Notice now that since the two unanalysed brackets will have to contain actual "pictures" of the two kinds of grouping, we shall now have no room for an element representing the Eucharist, or for an element representing the persona of Christ Himself, - as contrasted with X, which means, "crossed-over, revolutionary, mixed up".
- 4.53 The Chinese would solve this difficulty by embedding the compound statement $[[A_1] A_2]$ in a longer unit of discourse.
- 4.54 Thus:
 "The discreet grouping, this makes the traditional ceremony,
 "The mixed grouping, this makes the Christian ceremony,
 "The mixed grouping, this is Eucharistic,
 "The discreet grouping, this is non-Eucharistic,
 "The discreet grouping, this is not truly Christish,
 "The mixed grouping, this is truly Christish,
 Thus the Eucharistic grouping is truly Christish,
 Whereas the non-Eucharistic grouping is not truly Christish"
 and so on, and so on, until the speaker was satisfied that sufficient exactitude had been attained.
- 4.55 Thus the sing-song- chanting nature of ancient Chinese philosophy results from the philosopher's effort to get the pattern exact.
- 4.56 Just as the comparable chanting effect produced by this paper results from my making an analogous effect, in English, to get my thinking exact.
- 4.561 So that it turns out that the form this paper has taken is not only due to the need and desire for compactness,
- 4.562 But also so that the very form itself might "show" what the paper tries to "say".
- 4.6 It now only remains for us to "picture" the two groupings and list the elements; and then our task of analysing A will be achieved.
- 4.61 In order to "picture" the two groupings, we must re-examine the metaphors. If we do this, we shall become aware of a sharpening contrast.
- 4.62 This contrast already proceeds in the Chinese Normal Order; that is, from an ideal limit which is abstract and metaphorical towards another ideal limit which is concrete and plain.

- 4.621 Thus, though we have to recast our statement in some ways in order to achieve this analogue-analysis, in other ways we only bring essential features out.
- 4.622 When we find, in our analysing, that we unbury a Chineselike construction, this shows that our analysis is on the right track.
- 4.63 Thus (to proceed with the analysis of the metaphors), only by a considerable stretch of the imagination can the Eucharist be called a sacrifice,
- 4.631 Since if a close-up silent cinema-film were taken of the whole ceremony, the sense in which it is built upon a human-sacrificial rite would not be clear: it would have to be explained.
- 4.632 But it would be much more clear, even from the film, that it was an act of worship; and clearer still that it was a visible state of affairs in which a visible priest handled visible bread and wine.
- 4.633 Thus the contradictiousness - the paradoxicality - of the statement becomes stronger and stronger, as each more-concrete-and-literal pair of metaphors is pulled out from the last.
- 4.7 There are two final points to be made about our two groupings; and the first is that the "mixed" groups cohere more intimately than the "traditional" kind.
- 4.71 It seems as though we need, for each, a single composite concept: Sacrificey-cum-Sacrificerish; Worshippeeish-cum-Worshipperish; Offeringlike-cum-Priestlike.
- 4.72 It is further to be remarked that in each pair the lesser comes first: that is, the passive aspect, the less important, that which suffers and is small.
- 4.73 Here we find that we unbury another Chinese construction; one, moreover, which has not been mentioned so far.
- 4.731 This is given by the Second Rule of Adjunction; which says that, in any pair of elements in Chinese, α and β , which is joined by square brackets, when the smaller, or weaker, or less important element comes first, the pair, instead of meaning " α and β " shall mean " β -ish-and- α -ish", and shall be taken as a single composite whole.

- 4.732 Thus, our analogue turns out to have been not a true analogue, since it uses horned brackets, which are not used in the statement A, and does not make any use of this new rule, of which use is made in the statement A.
- 4.733 But in the very respect in which the analogy fails, the statement A comes out as truly Chineselike.
- 4.74 If, in analysis by general analogue, new analytic constructions are discovered in the analysandum which reveal the existence of new and particular analogies, that shows the analysis is on the right track.
- 4.741 It now only remains for us to list our elements and construct our groupings, and then we can straightforwardly write down - $[[A_1] A_2]$
- 4.8 We will construct our elements as follows: in the table that follows, and reading in the Chinese manner, we have on the right the sign for the new element, next to it its "literal" English translation, next to that again some indication of its meaning-range, and next to that again the original English word.
- 4.81 List of the elements in the Statement A
- | | | | |
|--------|----------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| 4.8101 | <u>Extraordinary</u> | unstatable in terms of ordinary logic:
logically extraordinary | (OMIT) |
| 4.811 | <u>Mystery</u> | basic ritual ceremony
conveying power | CEREMONIALITY C. |
| 4.812 | (IMPLIED) | traditional unmixd
ceremonial habits and
their consequences | TRADITIONALITY II |
| 4.813 | <u>Christ</u> | Source of Christian
power: focus of the
mystery; idea of cross-
ing and of mixing; and
therefore of originat-
ing, creating | CHRISTIFICATION-
CROSSERY X |
| 4.814 | <u>Is</u> | Conception of making faggots,
of binding together, of
grouping, of describing by
grouping together. | GROUPERY G |

4.815	<u>This</u>	Connective, class-connective, complex-replacement symbol	CLASSIFICATION	Z
4.816	<u>Victim</u>	instance of, and symbol of ritual sacrificial passivity	SACRIFICIAL-PASSIVITY	S-P
4.817	<u>Sacrificer</u>	instance of, and symbol of, ritual sacrificial activity	SACRIFICIAL-ACTIVITY	S-A
4.818	<u>Worshipped</u>	object of worship; centre of contemplative activity; immobile entity	WORSHIP-IMAGE	W-I
4.819	<u>Worshipper</u>	active element in worship: exterior of contemplative activity: kneeling or standing suppliant	WORSHIPPER-KNEELER	W-K
4.81901	<u>Offering</u>	killed and transmuted ritual material conveying power; possibility of this: something passive	RITUAL-OFFEREDNESS	R-O
4.81902	<u>Priest</u>	ritual agent conveying power: possibility of this.	RITUAL-MANAGER	R-M

4.9 With the aid of these elements, and with the rules of Normal Order and of Adjunction mentioned earlier in this paper, we can now construct the two groupings as follows:

4.91 The traditional grouping:

$$\left[\left[(S-A(W-K(R-M))) \right] (S-P(W-I(R-O))) \right]$$

4.92 The new, Christian grouping:

$$\left[\left[\left[(S-P)S-A \right] \left(\left[W-I \right] W-K \mid \left(\left[R-O \right] R-M \right) \right) \right] \right]$$

5. Now, we are at last in a position to give an alternative analysis to the statement A,

5.01 Alternative, that is, to that given in 2.1, which made it a contradiction, and to that given in 2.21, which made it ludicrous.

5.1 For, by inserting both the new and the traditional groupings, as given respectively in 4.92 and in 4.91 into the general sentential pattern given in 4.31 we get:

$$\left[\left(\left(\left(\left(S-A(W-K(R-M)) \right) \right) \right) \left(S-P(W-I(R-O)) \right) \right) \right) \left(G(\ddot{Z}(\text{IHC})) \right) \right]$$

5.2

$$\left(\left(\left[S-P \right] S-A \right) \left(\left(\left[W-I \right] W-K \right) \left(\left(\left[R-O \right] R-M \right) \right) \right) \right) \left(G(\ddot{Z}(\text{XIC})) \right) \right]$$

5.3 Which, whether you like it, or whether you don't like it,

5.4 Is quite undoubtedly an analysis of the statement A,

5.5 A pictorial analysis of the statement A,

5.6 Which itself pictures a picture of a religiously revolutionary state of affairs,

5.7 Since it pictures a Eucharistic Picture, danced in ritual, of such a state of affairs.

5.8 It is not possible to translate the new analysis, but we shall try to show it in English verbal imagery:

5.81 A sacrificer, worshipper, ritual-manager on the one side, and the sacrifice, the holy object, the ritual meal on the other: that is the traditional ceremonial state of affairs;

5.82 Whereas a ritual-sacrificer - with the pierced hands and feet of the sacrifice; a kneeling suppliant (kicked around like a dog) - in whom explodes Divinity; a ritual-manager - whose own body is broken and his blood shed; this is the Christian, though untranslatable, state of affairs. (Notice that in English it is impossible to give an analogue of the contrast between the two

rules of adjunction, since to get any parallelism at all between A_1 and A_2 the active elements in each must be put first.)

5.9 And you're quite right, that this should be so is logically extraordinary.

5.91 Extraordinary in just the way the world needs.

6. With answers to four criticisms, we will end.

6.1 In answer to the criticism: "this is not what the statement A means",
we might say

"Isn't this what the statement A is trying to mean? Isn't this what the statement A ought to mean?"

6.2 In answer to the criticism: "logically speaking, the analytic formal terminology which you have constructed with all those bars and brackets is quite useless. It could never be used for the construction of a logical calculus".

We might say, "It can be, and is being used for the construction of a logical calculus. Such logical calculi can be and are being made".

6.3 In answer to the criticism: "all you have done is construct sing-song. The whole thing sounds to me like a chant".

We might reply (parodying Wittgenstein),
"Many things can be chanted or sung, which can't be said".

6.4 In answer, finally, to the more general question: "Yes, but what kind of analysis are you doing, in doing all this?"

6.41 The reply is: "I am doing the same kind of analysis, that is analysis by analogue and taking full account of emphasis, that Wittgenstein did, and that John Wisdom does, and that J.L. Austin and Ryle do. The only difference is that I am operating in greater detail and with a longer and more complex unit of discourse."

That with this kind of analysis more subtle logical distinctions can be made than with the old kind of analysis, the contemporary philosophic world no longer needs to be told.

6.42

But that with the aid of this kind of analysis large-scale logical patterns can be discerned which require the creation of new types of formal logic, this the contemporary philosophic world does need to be told.

7.

That this kind of logic of emphasis, these ordering principles, are more or less fundamental and pervasive in all languages, of this there seems to me to be no doubt. See, for instance, the arrangement of the neums, below:

7.1

This arrangement of neums has survived translation from Latin into English; and could probably find its replica in an ordering in Chinese:

7.2

The musical notation consists of five staves. The first staff begins with a large circle (C-clef) and contains a series of neums (square notes on a four-line staff). Below the first staff is the Latin text: *Sapi-énti-a,* quae ex ore Altíssimi prodísti,*. The second staff continues the neums and is followed by the text: *at-tíngens a fine usque ad finem, fórtiter su-*. The third staff continues the neums and is followed by the text: *ávi-ter disponénsque ómni-a- ve-ni ad doc-*. The fourth staff continues the neums and is followed by the text: *éndum nos vi-am prudénti-ae.* The fifth staff contains the final neums and ends with a double bar line.

7.3

Many things can be sung, but not said.

V. THE CONCEPTS OF ROLE AND STATUS IN
RELIGIOUS GROUPS

1. By David Russell

Role-Taking

Of late years many psychologists have tended to renounce, or to supplement the attempt to explain human behaviour in terms drawn from other disciplines, terms such as reflex or instinct, and to talk about behaviour in terms drawn from behaviour itself. Among these notions borrowed from ordinary life is that of role-taking. It is clear that human activities are patterned in various ways, prescribed by the various societies in which we live. Formerly the notion of conditioning was the one usually employed to relate the pattern of society to the specific individual regularities of behaviour. But we may instead see society as a set of inter-dependent roles, flexible and spontaneous, not rigid and mechanical as in the earlier notion of society as a vast and complicated conditioning frame. From these roles the individual selects, under various influences and compulsions, those in terms of which he lives his social life and defines the varying situations in which he finds himself. These situations, particularly those involving the actions of other people, are seen as providing cues for the appropriate response, which is usually in turn itself a cue for the other actors. In the normal social situation the whole process is smoothly and continuously controlled by slight and subtle cues, nuances and inflections in terms of a total pattern understood by all the actors, as in a good play. The language is taken directly from the theatre and literature, not from mathematics.

Just because it comes from the theatre and not the laboratory, the language of role-taking has very different implications from that of conditioning. The general picture of a 'conditioned' society has been drawn in an exceptionally complete manner by George Orwell in that frightening book '1984'. In that society a deliberate attempt is made to narrow people's awareness, even in language. The ideal verbal response is 'Duckspeak', the language which is the logical development of the universal compulsory language 'Newspeak'. Newspeak is itself deprived of overtones and subtleties; Duckspeak is an automatic response in set doctrinal terms to any question, which thus is regarded as a mere stimulus. This is the classical method of conditioning; a simple stimulus is linked to a predetermined response, with any intervening mental response minimised or abolished. Complicated actions are broken down into simple elements, very much after the manner of the Ford assembly lines.

In point of fact animals in the conditioning frame tend to develop laboratory neuroses, and the workers on assembly lines show similar effects. I was told at the Ford works that at times a man will begin to howl like a wolf, and others take it up until hundreds are howling; an obvious temporary neurosis. Both instances, like many others, represent the protest of the individual or group against an intolerably distorted situation, distorted, that is, from the 'natural' situation, i.e. that situation which has been better described, in my view, in terms of role-taking than it has ever been described before. Here action is the response of the whole individual to the whole situation, as the Gestalt psychologists have said, but further and I think most importantly, it is a response to the context of the action, a context not immediately presented. Conditioning is most effective when awareness is at a minimum; sometimes awareness itself will destroy an established conditioned reflex. Role-taking, on the other hand, though the physical action may be so habitual as to require no conscious attention, is most effective when the action is seen and understood in terms of the preceding and subsequent actions and of the significance of the total situation. Hence a social ritual, which is often stylised into certain mannered roles, may expand and enrich the awareness of its participants. The very casualness of the initiated, in certain English social rituals, is based upon this very insight, in a secure context, where so much may be omitted because so much is understood.

The need to take account of this awareness of significance is what makes the term 'function' inadequate. A function is an action merely; insight is unnecessary. Our digestive functions go on normally without our being aware of them, until something goes wrong. Machines may be devised to perform functions, for a machine is action without insight. But the engineer cannot do without it.

'Profession' is another term we should consider here. Obviously a profession such as medicine or law provides social roles for its members and their clients. But it is too narrow a word in one sense; most of our roles are not professional ones; and it is too wide in another sense; there are many alternative specialist roles within each profession. A good deal of our common-sense knowledge about roles is embodied in the traditions, articulate or otherwise, of particular professions, but the word will not do as a basic term for social theory.

I would like to stress too that the pattern of behaviour we call a role has a beginning and an end, as the appropriate situation arises, develops and is resolved or terminates. There are strictly temporary roles, in childhood and adolescence. There are recurring roles, in maturity, jobs, professions, marital roles, and so on. But there are

no life-long roles; the term is meant to account for the constantly changing and yet coherent articulations of behaviour in ordinary life. Moreover the pattern of roles we call society is itself a temporary and changing affair; once the concept of role has been introduced there is no permanent and unchanging Society with a capital S. Sometimes the same set of people will, by a slight alteration of verbal behaviour, change their roles and become thereby a different society, even though a casual observer, looking at the group, might observe no change. This insight, long exploited in literature and lifemanship, can I think be systematised by the introduction of the concept of role into the technicalities of psychology.

I want now to illustrate the notion a little more fully by examples. A role has been defined as a pattern of expectancies; we act as others expect us to act and also we expect others to perform the correlative actions, but the expectancies are wider than the actions, as it were. As an example we may take the role of medical consultant, the successful taking of which requires more than a knowledge of medicine; it requires the adopting of the professional attitude and the appropriate response from the patient. If you are talking to a friend who is a doctor, and you suddenly consult him as a doctor, you can sometimes see the professional role descending on him like a mantle, especially if he is a German doctor, for the Germans, like the Japanese, take their roles very solemnly. At an operation there is an elaborate procedure like a drama, with the various parts carefully allocated, in what is justly called the operating theatre.

The doctor's role is a well defined one, like many others in society, and makes for a stable and assured personality, and for confident action. I was struck by the contrast with certain other roles when I was once a social service worker, and became a member of the local Rotary club. Now Rotary is organised deliberately in terms of roles, and it was interesting to see the members' reactions to a new and ill-defined one. With the doctor, the parson, the retail tradesman they knew what to expect and what to do. But this odd person who did odd things with odd committees was outside their scope and strictly incalculable. One saw a wary reticence in their eyes, like that of an actor who has forgotten his cue.

A role defines a situation and specifies some of the possible lines of action within it. We may illustrate this by reference to a situation where action is still unspecified because roles are not yet learned. The young child is in such a situation; it is born, obviously, into a family which is itself a patterned society, and it learns the socially approved actions gradually and reluctantly. We may indeed sympathise with this reluctance, for to learn a role in a given situation involves putting aside many other possible actions

which have their own attraction. Consider a baby with a plate of porridge. Now there are lots of things you can do with a plate of porridge; you can splash in it, or throw it at your father, or ladle some on to the carpet for the cat. We grown-ups simply don't consider these entrancing possibilities, but the child does. We have learned, that is to say we have forgotten. We have become narrow-minded with the passing of the years.

One of the best examples of the relevance of this concept of role to ordinary life is, of course, amateur dramatics. To put on an amateur show is usually a task calling for courage almost amounting to recklessness, considering the difficulties, rows, jealousies, exasperations and disappointments that are almost certain to be arranged for us by that hard-working and efficient legion of devils appointed by Satan to handle theatrical affairs. Amateur performances are rather like wars, chiefly enjoyable in retrospect. Yet when the last curtain falls the exhausted company and the distracted producer at once begin to ask, what shall we put on next? How can we explain this remarkable phenomenon, the triumph of little hope over much experience? Only, I think, by relating these stage roles to the life roles of the actors, and thinking of the former as a holiday from the latter, an enriching release of suppressed desires and possibilities, so that one returns to one's normal role with heightened sensibilities and a sharpened consciousness of oneself. Personally, I well remember the profound spiritual experience of first putting on pink tights, and putting off thereby the restraints and inhibitions of my customary role.

From this point of view one could predict that people will want to see themselves depicted on the stage, for the principle is the same; insight is increased by seeing oneself as others see us, either by stepping outside oneself and stepping back into oneself as it were, with a vivid contrast in mind, or by seeing others play the part of oneself. We find indeed that Tyneside comedies are most popular on Tyneside, and that if one goes to a cinema in the prairie towns of the Far West one is likely to see a cowboy film, in a cowboy audience.

The success of a professional theatre may seem a little harder to explain, for here we do not have the anguished rapture of actually going on the stage. Why, if everyone is taking roles all the time outside the theatre, should people pay good money to go into the theatre and see others merely pretending to do so? It is again a case of being taken as we say, out of ourselves, this time by an imaginative projection into the bright significant world behind the footlights; and again so that we may return with new eyes; sometimes taking with us aspects of that significance which affect our ordinary lives.

There are many other facets of ordinary life which can in my view be best described in these terms, though it is not of course suggested that this language is sufficient in itself, or that there are not other ways of describing behaviour which may sometimes be preferable. The advantage of this language is, I think, that it allows us to talk systematically about an already known element of significance in ordinary behaviour and to utilise the insights already gained in common experience. Perhaps we can by this means avoid the worst faults of merely anecdotal psychology while at the same time avoiding the distorting emphases of too great pre-occupation with the specialisms of the laboratory and the clinic.

But further analysis is of course required, and I want to offer for your criticism the following attempt. It seems to me that we must distinguish the following aspects in normal role situations. (Not all are of course normal or complete.)

(1) The Cue. This is the action of the other person, which initiates one's sequence of responses, and enables one to define the situation and the appropriate action.

(2) The pattern of expectancies which then springs more or less to mind. It is a pattern, not a list of precise actions, but a scheme waiting to be filled in according to the specific opportunities as further cues further define it. It is grasped as a gestalt, a core of meaning, as it were. A good actor can, by gait and gesture, communicate this to an audience and 'set' the character before he even begins to speak.

(3) The Response. The correlative action when the cue is taken up, which is in turn the cue for the other persons in the situation. We may note this especially when it is absent, when someone is, as we say, heavy in the hand; and conversational gambits fail to evoke any conversation.

(4) The activity of evaluating the situation; a continuous evaluation governing the whole sequence of activity, which without it is rigid, stereotyped and inefficient. It is this evaluating activity which involves the awareness of what is not present, of the context in terms of which the present significance emerges. The cultivation of the capacity to thus evaluating one's actions requires changing roles, to keep the insight fresh, and the advantage of what the Germans call the 'auslander' is that he is continually aware of the wider contexts of which the person wholly immersed in a pattern of roles may be unaware.

(5) There is also the judgement of oneself as acting well or ill in terms of the social norms implicit in any group activity. This is

not the same as the kind of evaluation referred to in the last paragraph, for that involved transcending the group; this involves the internal standards of the group, and one may, for instance, be a very competent technical performer on an instrument without having any deep awareness of the significance of the music one plays. Symphonies are not written for orchestras.

In the moral sphere, it is under this heading that conscience, as a reflection of the group moves, should come, and it is because this is inadequate, being limited to the group, that conscience is an insufficient guide to the Christian, or indeed to anyone.

(6) Finally there is the internalisation of the meanings referred to under the second heading. This is a very difficult process to describe; it depends upon how seriously the role is taken, and perhaps on the distinction the Germans make between Erfahrung and Erlebnis; experience as passively undergone and experience as actively and creatively lived. The whole problem of the vocabulary of the psychology of personality, and the fundamental nature of remembering, arises here, and must be left aside. But it is obvious that we are what we are because of what we have done. In some sense the articulated significance of our experience becomes part of ourselves, however hard it may be to find adequate language in which to describe the deeper layers of personality.

It may be that cue and response together make up a ritual, (though that would be a wider use of the term than is common in anthropology and social psychology), and that the other elements together make up a myth or ideology.

If we take cue + response = ritual, then language may be looked at from this angle, as Wittgenstein seemed to suggest in the unquotable Brown Book quoted in yesterday's discussion. In that case analysis of language would be analysis of verbal ritual, and the background of agreed meanings, in the special sense above, could not be left out.

A brief word should be said about status. This is a characteristic of all societies, which are sometimes spoken of as status systems. It seems to me to arise from the fact that some human actions initiate and control the actions of others, or set the framework in which they take place. This is most clearly seen perhaps in an army or regiment, with its clearly demarcated hierarchy, its chain of command and authority. In a complicated society the power-elite and the prestige-elite may become separated, as in England where the King has the prestige and the Government the actual power. But I want merely to indicate the obvious fact that roles tend to form a hierarchy, and that the term status refers to this fact, so that a

person appointed to a certain position inherits the status attached to it.

There is no time to deal at all adequately with the application of all this to religious groups, but a few remarks may help to start the discussion. There are obviously intermittent religious groups, like the Parish Church, whose members form the group at intervals, meanwhile performing other roles. There are also religious communities in the strict sense, where people have more permanent roles. I speak with great diffidence here, but it seems to me that the Christian and Catholic view implies that all human groups are or may be religious, even when the roles are practical, everyday ones. Our Lord came eating and drinking and working; He set His blessing on roles not specifically religious when, for instance, He changed the water into wine. I find it a pleasing reflection that, had He been an Englishman, it would have been changed into beer.

If this is so, we might say that there are no specifically Christian roles. A Christian is not a person who takes certain roles, but a person who takes a certain attitude to all the roles he may be called upon to play. Moreover, it seems to me that this attitude is not even specifically Christian in the sense of being limited to members of the Church; it may leaven a society in which Church members are few, and it may, alas, be absent in a given local Church.

How may we describe this attitude? It is, I think, partly negative; it involves not taking one's roles too seriously, not regarding oneself primarily as a member of a status system or of a hierarchy of social or professional functions; and not worshipping the symbols which develop in acting these roles. And the more exalted one's position in the hierarchy and the higher one's status the harder this is to do. It is easy to realise, if one is a cobbler or a roadsweeper, that God is not likely to be impressed by one's status. It is much harder to realise this if one is a high executive. Not many mighty are called. Not many wise, either, for the subtlest temptations arise when one's role involves the achieving of insight by means of symbols; it is fatally easy to forget that they are only symbols, and our insights only partial and limited. Heaven, whatever its climatic advantages, has a deplorably low academic standard. God is not impressed by cleverness either. Perhaps this attitude comes hardest of all when one's role is specifically religious; the genuine value and importance of the priestly role, for instance, must bring its own temptations to the man who plays it. In religious communities, as history shows, these temptations are sometimes very strong; and in the best communities special measures are taken against this very tendency to identify oneself with one's religious role.

The negative aspect of this attitude does not mean however, the renouncing of roles, for the Christian. It is spiritually, though not physically or socially, an easy way out to imitate the fakir or yogi, and withdraw from the world of social action. The Christian and Catholic way is variety, not negation; it is to embrace the richness of life, to explore all possibilities of significant action, to revel in contrasted and complicated symbols, and to encourage people not to fear being different. It takes all sorts to make the next world.

I don't know whether this notion of role-taking is a picture, a model, an analogy or what. It is certainly, like all these, a symbol, or rather a set of symbols. I find it difficult to think of it as a model, or analogy, for the usual model seems to me to be a kind of picture to enable us to group some of the relations in a situation we cannot grasp immediately, or about which we know little. It therefore increases knowledge, by telling us something we did not know before. Psychology does this comparatively seldom, and rarely in social psychology where we usually find what we already know. We act as if we were in a play, or a drama. But the as if is not a substitute for better knowledge. So with much of Freud; it is a regrouping, in a new system, of what we already know.

2. By Michael Argyle

Methods of Studying Religious Groups

Before methods can be considered, the sorts of problems which are to be investigated should first be mentioned. There are, firstly, problems of the nature of the interactions within groups, such as those studied at the Research Center for Group Dynamics at Michigan, only within religious groups instead of within groups of undergraduates or factory hands. Secondly there is a problem about any particular religious group activity as to whether the psychological explanation is adequate to describe what happens. It seems to me that knowledge of interactions would be useful in the context of religious groups as elsewhere, while the latter problem opens up the possibility of an empirical proof of religion, but not a disproof, since I do not think that empirical statements about religious group activity are an important part of religion and in any case they could only be a residual effect of the order of the psychokinetic phenomenon. It should be clear that work such as I propose would be a positive contribution to both psychology and religion. I shall describe the methods

and techniques of social psychology as they stand to-day and indicate how Sister Emily's hypothesis could be tackled empirically - that a religious group decision properly conducted with prayer and fasting is hastened by Divine assistance (taken from her paper "Rational Decision-Taking in Religious Groups") - taking this as an empirical statement. I shall discuss briefly the three methods of Observation, Interview and Experiment with their difficulties and possibilities, and indicate how they might be used in the investigation of this particular problem.

The method of observation has the advantage of not unduly disturbing the phenomena to be studied, although it took three weeks for the Bank Wiring Observation Room in the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company to accept their observer and behave naturally in his presence. The difficulties are, firstly, that the observer cannot observe everything, his perceptual habits may lead him to emphasise the wrong things, and he may lack adequate categories and concepts for description. If, as in the Bank Wiring Observation Room, the observer has certain problems and hypotheses, and has adequate categories in which to record the data required, valuable results can be gathered. In the case mentioned the results were extremely fruitful in getting a picture of the ingenious practices employed by the group for restricting output. Secondly, the experiences of those observed are necessarily a closed book to the observer, and these can only be obtained by means of the interview. Thirdly, the effects of different variables cannot be disentangled: this can only be done by the experimental method. Hence our particular problem cannot be solved by observation alone, although a record of who said what, who changed his mind, the relative statuses, and the sub-groupings present, and so on - all of which can be obtained by observation - would provide a good exploratory study for our problem.

The method of interviewing enables us to discover what the members of the group are actually experiencing, what meanings objective events have for them, in short what their world is like. It may also, of course, be used to evaluate the subject's personality and to find out about things he knows and you do not. I include questionnaires here, since these are best delivered in the form of an interview. An example of the use of the interview for exploring the world of the subject is Hyman's investigation of status; he found, for instance, that there are enormous individual differences in the criteria people employ for status. Similar investigation of what people do when they pray would be of value. There are, however, several difficulties with interviewing, which themselves are of interest. First, the role of the interviewer determines what the subject says. Doob, when investigating poor whites in a southern town adopted three different roles: for one he drove up in a cloud of dust and with a screeching of brakes announcing that he was a social scientist from Harvard; for another he

was introduced by a 'particularly Christ-like country doctor'; for the last he got employed by a social relief agency. For each role different topics were opened up, and different information about the same topics obtained. Some workers think it best to preserve their 'stranger value' and play the first role of the social scientist, since this has the advantage that obvious as well as intimate data may be more willingly revealed to an outsider. Second, the subject may be ignorant, deluded or misinformed about the subject asked about, and his words and experiences may bear little relation to his behaviour - as psychoanalysts and behaviourists have pointed out. Even so, it is of great interest to know how the members of the group experience the phenomena under study. Third, subjects require motivation if they are to be candid about matters of religion and social relationships, both of which are subjects about which people tend to be inhibited. In the clinical situation the desire for recovery is sufficient motivation, while when Moreno made people choose room- or work-mates to find the patterns of choice and rejection, they knew they would probably get them. Apart from such methods, which are closely bound up with the role of the interviewer, many people are sufficiently led on by the opportunity to be listened to by a patient and intelligent audience, who doesn't argue, who praises them for accuracy in reporting, and who relieves anxieties. Fourth, there may be difficulties of communication. The subject will not be able to report social relations so well as novelists and social psychologists can. The interviewer may not be sufficiently steeped in the cultural context of the subject to understand properly all that is said. The subject may speak with different purposes - to impress the interviewer, to make conversation, to amuse him, or to get something out of him (if the latter is a relief worker for instance). The interviewer, like the Freudian analyst, may take notes only of his selection out of what was actually said. And the interviewer may suggest answers by the form of his question; as Piaget says, if you ask a child 'Who made the moon?', the question may never have occurred to it in this form and the answer will be useless. The skilful interviewer, however, can evade all these difficulties of communication so long as he is aware of them. Fifth, either a truly random sample must be taken, or the whole group interviewed. Care must be taken that those who want to evade it are not allowed to do so, since they may represent an important trend common to themselves. The method of interviewing could well be used for investigating religious issues. The investigator might play a role of being a member of a Church of England commission for studying the advantages of the religious life. As applied to Sister Emily's hypothesis, however, while interesting material would certainly be gathered, the issue could not be crucially decided; for this we must turn to the experimental method.

The experimental method in social psychology has been considerably developed in the last ten years by the pupils of Lewin, and no doubt will be developed further. Generally the experimental method disturbs the system to be studied, but it does permit the separation of the effects of different factors which can be varied one at a time. To take a very simple example, French inveigled an organised group (a football team) and an unorganised group (some undergraduates chosen at random) into a room on different occasions to do some problems. Each time he left them to it, locking the door behind him. Smoke soon began to pour into the room and when those inside found the door locked panic resulted. This was carefully noted by a battery of observers stationed behind a one-way window in the ceiling. The result was that the organised group showed more fear and aggression. Here all was supposed to have been held constant except the organisation or cohesiveness of the group, which was varied. The resultant behaviour in each case was elaborately recorded by trained observers in previously decided categories; one observer recorded conversation, another interactions and subgroupings, and a third acts of aggression. In other cases it may prove more difficult to know what factors to hold constant, to know how much has been varied, and to record what happens.

A first basic difficulty with experiments on social groups is that if the same group is put through two different situations there is danger of transfer effects, while it is extremely difficult to match two groups, or to match in all respects save one, as in French's experiment. One of these two basic designs must obviously be used. If a group is put through two successive and slightly different situations people may smell a rat and resist the changing of their social behaviour by the experimental variables, or (as in French's experiment) the game is up when it has been done once. This can sometimes be got over by repeating the situation ostensibly because something has gone wrong, and pretending to overlook what happened first time, or if the group is unaware that an experiment is in progress they can be put through two situations without difficulty. It is difficult however in field experiments to obtain stringent controls. If two matched groups are used, one must know in what respects to match them. French's experiment was inconclusive, since his unorganised group consisted of psychology students who were naturally not taken in by the smoke situation as the others were; - he had failed to match for psychological sophistication. Lewin and Lippitt in their famous experiment on autocratic and democratic atmospheres matched two groups of five boys for age, size, intelligence, leadership and group memberships, and for the interrelations within each group as measured by Moreno's choice-rejection method.

Secondly, there are certain problems about generalisation from the results of such experiments, which may be briefly summarised. The laboratory situation as such may have peculiar effects, and social psychologists at some time must try to discover exactly what these effects are. It is certainly best if the subjects are unaware of the experiment and its purpose. The particular design of the experiment may lead to unwarranted generalisations; the cat-in-puzzle box experiment has been used to support three different theories of animal problem-solving by the use of three slightly different puzzle boxes. The personality of the experimenter may have unknown effects; some people do affect the psychological atmosphere wherever they are, and it is best to repeat the experiment with another experimenter. The group should be representative of the sub-culture to which the results are to be applied; and even if it is representative the results are limited to that sub-culture, similar experiments in different cultures being needed to get more general results.

How could such an experiment be done to investigate Sister Emily's hypothesis? If matched groups were used, the best match that could be obtained would be another religious group of similar structure, intelligence, etc., but which did not use this system of group decision. It could be found which came to agree more quickly after an equal degree of divergence. If there was a difference in the direction predicted by the hypothesis the considerations mentioned above apply; if there was no difference it could be claimed that God would help a religious group whatever method they used (though this would render Sister Emily's methods redundant). A non-religious control group could then be arranged of similar structure, intelligence, etc. It might be that, if there was a difference now, it was because the religious group had learned habits of agreeing quickly with the majority. It would not be possible in the present state of theory to perform this experiment adequately with matched groups. To turn to the alternative method, the religious group could be observed making a group decision on two occasions when it did and did not use the method of prayer and fasting. If the experimenter organised this the results would certainly be useless, and it is unlikely that they would concurrently use the two different methods. If they did, one could not well rule out the effects of prayer in either case, since the effect might be due to some such process as prayer rendering people more suggestible to the majority decision, and we do not know anything about this, so it is clear that the experiment could not yet be performed. Possibly in ten years' time when the quantitative effects of such factors can be definitely predicted, and when we know more of what factors are relevant, this experiment could be done. For the present we must be content with simpler problems and await the development of theory and methods in this rapidly growing field.

3. Summary of discussion

- R.B. Braithwaite Novels, especially comic novels, are a good source for data and hypotheses about groups.
- E.A. Armstrong Religious groups have the distinguishing characteristic of inclusiveness.
- M. Masterman Disagreed.
- David Russell What is a religious group - a monastery or a parish?
- Victor Ranford I would limit the term "religious group" to an enclosed society.
- Matthew Shaw I suggest the distinction: Religious Group of type A - Religious Communities, Colleges, Little Gidding and the Christian family. Type B - occasional groups such as parishes, Sunday Schools, discussion societies, etc.
- R.B.B. A and B run into each other. The amount of time people spend in each other's neighbourhood (not necessarily company) is the criterion for a non-occasional group.
- D.C. Mayer Youth Hostel Associations are just as inclusive, if not more so, as the occasional religious group.
- R.B.B. and E.A.A. Is there not a second distinction - that between open and closed groups? Religious groups are open in the same way as is the Labour Party.
- E.A.A. Religious groups include hierarchies within them.
- R.B.B. The Society of Friends is an exception.
- E.A.A. Being hierarchical is a characteristic feature of religious groups. The Society of Friends is a quite exceptional case which can be ignored.
- M.M. Sister Emily doesn't think so!
- Discussion as to whether Sister Emily's paper should be read now.
- R.B.B. A hierarchy has to be founded on a transitive asymmetrical relation.
- Discussion becomes tense again.
- M.M. I think we had better read Sister Emily's paper.

VI. IS DEMOCRACY A RELIGIOUS IDEA?

1. By Sister Emily (Novice Mistress of the Community of the Epiphany)

Rational and Irrational Decisions in Religious Groups and the Conception of Role and Status which goes with this¹

The purpose of this paper is, firstly, to contrast the procedures for making rational and irrational decisions in religious groups; and secondly, to describe by giving examples the concepts of role and status which go with each of these. Thus the plan of the paper falls into three parts. The first of these describes, with examples, irrational - not to say hysterical - procedures of mob decision taking place in religious groups. The second part contrasts with this again with examples the true rational religious procedure, of reaching a common decision, namely that of holding a meeting of the whole group within the framework of a shared common life, allowing prolonged and completely free discussion, thus ventilating the whole issue, and of then waiting upon the Holy Spirit until there gradually or suddenly emerges quite spontaneously a "common mind", the findings of which can then be embodied in an agreed resolution on which it finally becomes possible to act. This second procedure which is both truly rational and also a true instance of group dynamics or group action which cannot be accounted for in terms of a combined action of individuals, is, or should be, at the heart of every true Church and also the mainspring of all true democracy.

The third part of my paper, which I am afraid is very scrappy, consists in some remarks about the development in each individual in such a place as a Christian religious community, of what is really a rational decider's role. I think my thesis in this paper is really this: that it is always in close-knit religious groups, theocracies regulated by a blind obedience which is very close to tyranny, that emotions break loose, and that hysterical procedures which lead to irrational group decisions break out. In equally close-knit religious groups, however, namely those which have a tradition of the true procedure, and which train their members to this, the outcome is quite otherwise. And the experience I have had of such a religious group training leads me tentatively to put forward the view that small experiences of playing roles in Chapel and outside it which do not seem on

(1) Owing to illness Sister Emily was not able to be present at the conference; and this paper, which she had written for the occasion, was read on her behalf.

the surface to have anything to do with fostering the powers of rational decision do in fact foster it by helping the person under training to overcome her nervousness and fears, and centuries of experience in religious communities has shown that this is so. But I am very tentative about all this, and I do wish to emphasise that this is throughout a field-worker's paper and not the contribution of a theorist. I am quite ignorant, for example, of much modern technical group dynamics terminology.

In accordance with the traditions of my Community I have made use throughout of biblical material, which is, indeed, one of the richest sources of information about group dynamics that any investigator could hope to have.

In the history of religion, as in social history, there have been exhibited from time to time extreme cases of mob hysteria, or frenzy, in which drastic action is taken by a group of people, fired with the same emotion, which no single member of the group would dare to take on his own account. The action may be good or bad, but is mostly bad, since reason and judgement are laid aside, and the emotions are in the saddle. A group cannot think, or reason, as a group, in a group, but it is possible for the emotions to become inflamed, and for the emotional frenzy to spread and to get completely out of hand, as in a conflagration caused by a bush- or prairie-fire.

I suppose that of such actions in history the trial and crucifixion of our Lord offers the most extreme example of mob fury and unreasonableness. It is true that the mob which cried "Crucify" was packed; that though the common people had no grudge against Jesus of Nazareth, the Scribes and Pharisees had, for had He not disorganised the Temple market and reduced their gains? But the venom which had percolated from their minds into those of the common people was out of all proportion to the occasion. Among those people there must have been many who formerly had hung upon His words, or had witnessed His miracles of healing, but for the moment they were blind and deaf to everything but the desire for His death, and they were willing that His blood should be on them and on their children. It is an incredible story, and the most incredible thing about it is the fury of the mob which not only had no grudge against Him, but had received from Him so many acts of grace. It is possible to see in this action of the mob a result of the past history of the Jewish nation considered as a group. In the early days of its national life Israel had been a theocracy, under the direct rule of Jehovah, or Yahveh, administered by judges, until in the time of Samuel the people desired a king to rule over them. For this reason they appear to have been a very closely-knit people, so much so that the race mattered everything, and

the individual little or nothing, the corporate relationship of the whole nation being so strong that the prophet Ezekiel had to teach the doctrine of personal responsibility as a new thing - "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." (Ezekiel, XVIII.4.)

There are some other grim and lurid incidents in the pages of church and monastic history in which sane judgement was swept away under the influence of mob frenzy, one of the ugliest being the murder of Hypatia as told by Kingsley. Hypatia was a Greek philosopher whose powerful intellect and personal charm were a bulwark of the pagan religion, and her unconcealed contempt for the Christian faith rendered her obnoxious to the authorities of the Alexandrian Church, and though it is clear that officially they knew nothing of the riot in which she was lynched and killed by a mob of wild and infuriated Christians, yet the crime left a dark stain in the history of the Church of Alexandria. The fifth century was a rough and cruel age, and Kingsley was no friend of the monastic life, but there is no doubt that from time to time such incidents have happened, to the great discredit of Christianity and of monasticism.

In some ways the Japanese are not unlike the Hebrews, since they too are a very closely-knit people, or were so under the system of Emperor worship which was almost a theocracy. The Japanese are specially liable to being overcome by mob hysteria, of which in saner moments they are ashamed. After the great earthquake of 1923, in which the two great cities of Tokyo and Yokohama were largely destroyed, it was rumoured that bands of Koreans resident in Tokyo had been looting, and this infuriated the Japanese, who were giving them houseroom. A friend of mine happened to be in a train going to Tokyo, the first to get in after the earthquake, and said that one person, as the train entered the city, began to call out 'Kill the Koreans', and in a few seconds the whole train was shouting the same words, and this was taken up by people in the city, with the result that many Koreans were killed.

In a small way I once experienced this phase of Japanese conduct, though I would like to put it on record that it was the only occasion on which I experienced any kind of hostility. It was in the difficult days just before Pearl Harbour, when tension was very high, and most foreigners suspect, that I was standing on an "island" waiting for a tram to take me to the city. The traffic islands were apt to be very congested, and the trams horribly crowded, and on this occasion were packed to capacity. As I stood there, I suddenly felt myself the centre of hostile thought, and realised that the unspoken word "spy" was being passed from mind to mind through the whole group. It was the only occasion on which I was conscious of any hostility, and though unpleasant at the moment, was quickly over, as my tram came up

and I was allowed to proceed on my journey.

These incidents, selected at random from many others, appear to indicate the need of training the members, or potential members, of any religious group, in responsible thinking and in courageous action. The Japanese, though highly literate, were not, in pre-war days, taught reasoning. The mastering of at least 4,000 "ji" (Chinese characters) occupied a good deal of the school life, and apart from that knowledge generally was taken on trust. Also, as a nation, in days preceding the war, and also during the war, the people swallowed all the lies their leaders chose to tell them. It did not occur to the majority to question the truth of these statements, and the few who had the courage to do so were imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts". This does not imply that the Japanese are incapable of rational thought, but that the previous history of this close-knit people, especially under the long period of feudal rule, had generated in them a mentality which tended towards the evasion of responsibility.

It is not always the case that decisions in religious groups which are reached by an irrational procedure are bad in their effects. A very clear example of a good decision, which was reached nevertheless by an irrational procedure, is provided by the story of the election of St Ambrose to the See of Milan. In A.D. 374 the Arian Bishop who had ruled the Diocese for 20 years, died, and party feeling ran high in regard to the choice of a successor, whether he should be Arian or Catholic. The election was so critical, and the prospect of disturbance so great, that a young but highly trusted magistrate named Ambrose, a catechumen but not yet baptised, was present in the Cathedral to keep the peace. The controversy was fierce and long, but in a moment of quiet a child's voice was heard calling "Ambrose Bishop", and the cry was unexpectedly and instantly taken up by both sides, to the astonishment and dismay of Ambrose himself. In this matter there may have been some rational thought behind the emotion, since Ambrose, being as yet unbaptised, was for that reason acceptable to either side (though Ambrose quickly settled the matter by saying he would accept baptism from a Catholic Bishop only, and the Arians rapidly lost ground in that city). Ambrose was not only a saint, but a great administrator, and became one of the leading Doctors of the Western Church, and it is reasonable therefore to believe that the decision taken at his election was a good one. Nevertheless, it was reached in a non-rational manner.

Let us now contrast with all these instances some instances of rational decision procedure in a religious group.

The Forming of a Common Mind

Having considered certain aspects of irrational action in religious groups, we can now investigate the completely reasonable process by which, as experience shows, disputing parties are able to arrive at a common mind under the influence of that real thing which Christians speak of as the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of God, "Who maketh men to be of one mind in an house." In view of the barren results of so many conferences, political, international and religious, in producing agreement, it may be of value to consider this genuinely reasonable religious group procedure in some detail.

There is much to learn from the little we know of the primitive church, and in Acts II, 41-42, we have statements of great value about its character and life. It is recorded of the early Christians (II,42) "They continued steadfastly in the Apostles' doctrine and fellowship, in the Breaking of Bread (the Eucharist) and the prayers" and (44-47) "And all that believed were together and had all things common, and they sold their possessions and goods and parted them to all, according as any man had need. And day by day, continuing steadfastly with one accord to the Temple, and breaking bread at home, they did take their food with gladness and singleness of heart, praising God and having favour with all the people."

In these few words we have a picture of the Pentecostal Church glowing with the experience of the first Whitsunday, and living under the vibrant influence and guidance of the Holy Spirit. There is a dynamic quality about this group of people which however, even in the pages of the Acts, tended to weaken as time passed and the membership of the church increased. Nevertheless, the chief marks of the Church persisted - the Apostolic teaching and fellowship, the Eucharist and the prayers. The word I want to stress here is the word "Fellowship", in Greek "koinonia", in Latin "communia", used so frequently in the Offices of the Church - "The grace ... and the fellowship" - communion - of the Holy Ghost. Here is clearly an ideal, to which on the Day of Pentecost the descent of the Holy Ghost gave form, and which, despite the deplorable failings of Christians throughout the ages, is still available to-day.

In Acts XV - about A.D. 49 - we find this fellowship very seriously attacked, but with a triumphant issue, through the same power of the Holy Ghost. (Acts XV and Galatians II, 1-10.)

A difficulty had arisen in the Church which might have caused a split, and which seemed in danger of doing so. On the one side was the Hebrew party, some of whom were extreme Judaists who insisted on circumcision and the whole Mosaic law being imposed on the Gentile

converts. On the other side were Paul and Barnabas, ardent missionaries, who from their missionary work knew quite well that this would be too great a burden for them.

To settle the difficulty Paul and Barnabas, with others, were sent to Jerusalem to lay the matter before the Church. A meeting was convened at which were present not only the Apostles and presbyters, but also what is termed the "multitude", or body of disciples, in order that whatever decision was arrived at might be the act of the whole Church (V,22). James, as Bishop of Jerusalem, presided over the assembly, while probably Peter and John sat on one side and Paul and Barnabas on the other. Free utterance was allowed, and at first there was much discussion. Probably the Hebrew party was more numerous than that represented by Paul and Barnabas, and James, as Bishop of Jerusalem, was a strict Hebrew. It is significant, however, that he was sur-named the Just.

After the matter had been discussed Peter stood up and reminded the assembly that God's will in the matter had been revealed some years previously, at the admission of Cornelius and his household by divine command, a fact which the Hebrew party appear to have forgotten.

After Peter's speech there was silence, giving Paul and Barnabas the opportunity to drive home Peter's argument by further evidence from their own missionary labours. There appears to have been no further discussion, and it remained for the Chairman to sum up the debate by proposing a resolution. James rose up, and after demonstrating from a passage in the Book of Amos that it was clearly the Divine Will that all should be saved, and not merely the "chosen people", proposed that they should not alienate the Gentile converts by requiring them to be circumcised and keep the whole Mosaic law, but that there were four simple rules that they should be asked to keep. They were:-

(1) Not to eat the meat of animals that had been sacrificed to idols. That would be to share in idolatry, and was therefore a moral prohibition.

(2) Not to eat the blood of animals, nor

(3) Strangled animals which had the blood in them, because to the Jews blood denoted the life. These two were not moral prohibitions, but forbade customs which would have made the new Gentile converts obnoxious to the Jews.

(4) Not to commit fornication, which in the Gentile world was not considered a sin. This again was by its nature a moral prohibition.

These rules, though simple, were just what was needed to enable Jew and Gentile to live together in the Christian Church; and to this all present gave their consent, and in this unanimous agreement they recognised the action of the Holy Spirit. V,28. "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us."

This method of conciliar action, which was democratic in everything, except that there seems to have been no formal vote, was intended to be perpetuated in the Government of the Church, and especially in that of the Bishop with his Synod. It embodies two principles - the reality of responsibility, since one man is given authority and is expected to use it, and also the co-operation of members of the body in free discussion, in order to form a common mind. Though these principles have been largely neglected during the course of history, yet they are still potentially there and find expression in so far as, and only in so far as, the Church is true to her calling.

What has been said about arriving at a common mind in the matters of the Church applies to the government of Religious Communities, which has always been of a democratic nature. St Benedict, in the 6th century in which his famous Rule came into being, has given an ideal which has been followed and developed during the ages of Western monasticism. In the third Chapter of his Rule, on "Calling the brethren to council", he says:

"As often as any important matters have to be transacted in the monastery, let the Abbot call together the whole community, and himself declare what is the question to be settled. And, having heard the council of the brethren, let him weigh it within himself, and then do what he shall judge most expedient. We have said that all should be called to council, because it is often to the younger that the Lord reveals what is best. But let the monks give their advice with all subjection of humility, and not presume stubbornly to defend their own opinions, but rather let the matter rest with the Abbot's discretion, that all may submit to whatever he considers best."

Here are stated the two principles of government, responsibility on the one hand, and free discussion with consent on the other. There is no question of voting, but the matter nevertheless rested on the genuine attainment of a common mind, reached through patient discussion and the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The absence of a vote is perhaps partially accounted for by the fact that all Communities founded on the Benedictine ideal are spiritual families, each with a common vocation, a common ideal and a common purpose. Each possesses a rich variety of individual experience and judgement capable of making valuable contributions, but hoping through these individual contributions to arrive

ultimately at a common conviction and a corporate decision. That is the ideal, but how far short each religious group fails to attain the ideal is shown in its history and development. Cardinal Newman, for instance, all through his life as a Roman Catholic, lamented the disappearance in his day of the procedure of the Mediaeval Theological schools, in which matters of doctrinal interpretation were freely debated and discussed during long periods of years, varying views and aspects being raised and ventilated, until at last the matter became so clarified as to make the issue plain, and a true decision reached and confirmed by authority.

At this point I desire to praise the Quakers, without, however, knowing very much about them. But it does seem to me, from what I have heard of them, that their procedure in Meeting of first waiting in silence upon the Inner Light, and then, when they think the moment right for it, of ventilating the issue, until the common mind emerges, when the Clerk of the Meeting embodies the common decision in an agreed resolution which is then acted upon, is an outstanding example, in a religious group, of exactly the rational decision procedure which I desire to describe.

In one respect, however, the procedures of both the Quakers and the early Benedictines, though they were fully religious, were not fully democratic in the modern sense of this word. I refer, of course, to the fact that there was no voting procedure which governed the actual decision. It must not be thought, however, that there are in the Church no Religious Communities which are fully democratic in this sense. In the Community to which I belong for instance, there are not one but two voting procedures; one used for important decisions, by secret ballot, and the other used for lesser decisions, by show of hands. Nor are all decisions always unanimous, although in the case of certain key decisions it is laid down that, for the decision to be valid, a majority exceeding a stated size has to be obtained. Perhaps I should state here that I should be very far from saying that the procedures employed by St Benedict and by the Society of Friends ought not to be called democratic. I think both these procedures, besides being truly Christian, are both truly democratic, as can be seen by their effects. Nevertheless, one does wonder whether the deepest form of Common Mind may not be that in which the underlying unity, which desires a Rational Decision Procedure to be maintained and its decisions to be acted upon, is so complete and profound that it even survives the existence of a comparatively superficial difference of opinion upon a particular issue, which is indicated by a non-unanimous vote.

That complete unity of spirit in charity can exist in a fully democratic Religious Community and one in which freedom of opinion is

encouraged, is something to which the present writer can testify from a lifetime of experience. It may be, and probably often is the case, in the experience of fully democratic Religious Orders, that matters requiring decision are introduced on which, at first, the Community is sharply divided. In such cases, and indeed in all cases, prayer for the guidance of the Holy Spirit is offered, followed as in the case of the Council of Jerusalem by opportunity for free discussion, and remarkable instances could be given of the solution of perplexing difficulties when those who seemed to differ widely became conscious of a unanimous conviction, a common mind, which seemed to come directly from the Holy Spirit.

To sum up - St Benedict, though far ahead of his time, was not fully democratic, in my view, but he pointed the way to fuller democratic government. The Quakers, similarly, though they have a right to the deep respect of their fellow-Christians for their faithfulness in maintaining a true Rational Decision Procedure in their religious life, yet do not seem to me fully democratic in that, I think, they do not actually vote. I would characterise a truly rational and truly religious Rational Decision Procedure as being marked by the following stages.

Firstly, a period, which should not be too short, of common worship and living together.

Secondly, the free ventilation of the whole issue. This should be as complete as possible.

Thirdly, the period of waiting upon the Holy Spirit.

Fourthly, the emergence of a common mind.

Fifthly, when it is clear that this common mind has emerged, the taking of a resolution embodying it.

Sixthly, the making arrangements for the implementing of this by action, which will not necessarily be the work of the whole group but will quite probably be under the superintendence of a particular person.

This may seem a slow way of reaching a Rational Decision. But I believe that it is the truly religious way, and the truly democratic way, and that in so far as it is faithfully implemented, far from time being lost, over the long run, through the acceptability of the decision reached, much time is gained.

Building up the Role of a Rational Decider

Owing to illness, I have not been able to prepare a continuous draft of this part of my paper, which is all the more unfortunate as it is this third part which links what I am concerned to say with the subject of this symposium. I am not quite sure, moreover, what the few things which I have to say are worth; especially as the examples which I have been able to gather together are so scrappy, and, except for the last, concerned with such small things.

But I do think that this role of a Rational Decider, which I feel so strongly that every true Christian is called upon to play, is not in the case of almost any personality, innate. It is, as we say, a manifestation of grace; and of grace that must, by right training, be brought out. And I rather think, especially in the case of people who tend to shirk responsibility, that the fact that the training of novices in almost any Religious Community partly consists in their learning to perform public physical acts which require exactness and initiative and self-control, and on which the smooth running of a whole ceremony, for instance, may depend, does help in assisting them to become responsible and rational beings at a later stage. I cannot prove what I say; I cannot even at present imagine what kind of tests would help to prove it, but I do feel that, as opposed to democratic bodies who desire to do the will of God, as we do, but who have not the advantage of an explicit religious inspiration and setting, they do and we do not leave the training of the body out. People who tend physically to shrink into the background will tend also to shrink mentally into the background, and people who go to the other extreme, of thrusting themselves physically forward, will tend also to be aggressive and uncontrolled in discussion, and therefore not fully co-operative.

Here are the examples, very tiny ones I am afraid, which illustrate this from my own experience. A more or less common plan of training exists in most communities - a novice is trained, as soon as she becomes a member of the family, or group, to take responsible action as a member of the group, or family. She is taught - among other things -

- (1) To ring the bell which calls the Community to Office, or to any form of meeting. This requires exactitude in method, punctuality, etc.
- (2) To prepare the Altar and light the candles for Offices and other services.
- (3) To close the Chapel at night, leaving all in readiness for the morning.

(4) To rise early in order to open the Chapel and put all in order. This requires great exactness in detail and is really a very responsible job.

(5) A Novice who has the necessary knowledge is required to play the organ.

(6) In the plainsong chant a Novice learns to take her part as cantrix. In some communities, not ours, the Novices are responsible for this work.

(7) In the second year of the novitiate the Novice is given, for a time, full and genuine responsibility somewhere, before she is professed, as far as circumstances permit. This kind of training was initiated in regard to the training of Japanese Novices, naturally on a small scale, as before the war they were very few, and the work barely started. But they were definitely being trained in responsibility, and I am sure that with larger numbers, and the near prospect of complete self-government, that aspect of their training is being pursued, in fact even stressed.

(8) No one can exaggerate the effect for good made by the wearing of the religious habit upon the development of the religious life.

(9) It is found in experience to assist rational thought and correct speaking for Sisters to stand up when they speak in chapter.

I think it possible that the increase in rationality which is produced by all these procedures is due not to their direct effect upon rationality but to their removal of that rather primitive physical fear of being conspicuous, which many people feel, though they may not admit it or even be conscious of it. The fear is of facing what will be the physical consequences of their actions, if they speak up and say what they think. I think that, even when people seem incapable of rational decision, the reasoning power is there, only, through this fear people often seem more indecisive and incapable of initiative and responsibility than they really are.

I think, too, that this role of a Rational Decider is not quite the same in a religious community as any role of responsibility which is filled in the outside world. (It may be the case that such a religious group as e.g. the Society of Friends should be classed with religious communities in this respect, and there may be other such religious groups of which I do not know.) The point I wish to stress is that in a good community every single member, no matter what her natural character, race, background, education, has to learn to fulfil this role of being a decider, the truth about this matter being just

the opposite of what opponents of the Professed Religious life believe it to be. In the ordinary world, those lead and decide who are naturally able to lead and decide. It sometimes happens, but not very often, that, as people say, "the job makes the man". But in a religious community, although on the one hand there is discipline and obedience, so that people must learn to be adaptable and pliable, yet on the other hand there is complete and equal shared responsibility.

I do not know whether there is much to say about the status which goes with this role except that I do feel the facts go to show that any touch of slave-status in the people concerned, either apparent or disguised is fatal to the procedure of any rational decision. Variety in equality - that is the glorious Christian ideal. There may be variety of employments, but all are equally valued, because all the workers, no matter how apparently menial their employment, have all, in the eyes of themselves, of each other and of their Divine Master, the same unique status - that of "heirs of God, and joint-heirs of Christ" - and inheritors of the Kingdom of Heaven.

2. Summary of discussion

- D.M. Emmet That is a lovely paper.
- Matthew Shaw The decision to read Sister Emily's paper and its effects are in themselves striking instances of group dynamics.
- Mary T. Hoskyns Sister Emily's paper bears on the position of women in the Church. The effect of never doing any public acts is to make one tend to withdraw from responsibility for decisions of the Church. Mothers' Union speakers preach, teach and take services, but this movement is unofficial and the activities go on quite independently of the other activities of the Church. There is trouble felt on this account in the Central Council for Women's Work in the Church. There was a manifestation of an irrational group behaviour when I made a speech giving information about the official pronouncements concerning the status of Deaconesses and lay women workers (a) at a Women's Fellowship meeting when it was met by hysterical protests, (b) at a Parochial Church

Council when one male member resigned and I was told, "This is not the kind of thing that ought to be said."

E. A. Armstrong

Many church roles are not the special result of ecclesiastical action, but of the ordinary state of society outside.

David Russell

There is a change of role for men in parochial worship, e.g. of little brat into choirboy. In the case of women, particularly mothers, there is no change of role; they look after the children at home on weekdays and in church on Sundays. Thus they do not get the refreshment of a change of role. This is quite wrong, and they cannot even get a change of role by "projection" since all the servers etc. are men.

Michael Argyle

Should everyone of the same religion live in the same street?

Everyone

No.

M. S.

Let us take the example of the family parish camp when an integrated religious group, revolving round young families, is formed for a fortnight. They say, "We concentrate all the rows into that fortnight."

M. Masterman

Suggested a third possibility - that of recurrent religious groups, but of the right kind, i.e. democracies not hierarchies, like Shaw's camp and this Conference.

Everyone

Agreed.

M. M.

Neuroticism, servility, and cynicism were rife in a women's church choir I knew - the women had no proper role.

R. B. Braithwaite

wished to distinguish de jure from de facto. What is supremely wrong in the Church is the de jure exclusion of women.

D. R.

There is a need to restructure society by occasionally changing roles.

- M.M. But not instead of changing the society de jure.
- M.S. What about the Parish meeting technique?
- R.B.B. Yes, but what authority has this body got? Nothing causes quarrels so much as argument without proper authority. It has no authority over what is the most important church decision - "What is to be the main service on Sunday morning?" The crucial question is: is the Parish Meeting an advisory body or has it power?
- D.M.E. Remember the Life and Liberty Movement. When its report was published, there were telegrams: "Is it true we can now sack the vicar? Give particulars." But the answer to nearly everything was: "No, you cannot."
- Victor Ranford Is Sister Emily a democrat?
- M.M. Yes; and the Community of the Epiphany is in the fullest sense a democracy.
- R.B.B. There is an example backing Sister Emily's theory from Cambridge College practice: a quite Junior Fellow, on occasion, presides in Hall.
- M.A. Could we have more details about Sister Emily's training course for rational deciders by doing exercises?
- M.M. Mentioned a supplementary letter from Sister Emily, giving the tentative hypothesis: cure the physical fear e.g. of standing up in chapter, and you will unleash rational faculties which were there all the time.
- V.R. The ex-service people at Kelham, who have learnt to take many difficult roles, are being very good at doing them. But this training could not have been given in Kelham.
- R.B.B. The Church of England has the whole thing in its hands: it has the opportunities necessary if it would use them.

V.R.

Agreed. No physical participation is possible in the Baptist Church, but it is in the rituals of the Church of England.

M.A.

The difficulty is of those in the congregation who play no active part in the ritual.

M.M.

There could be rotas, as at the Matins and Evensong at this Conference. Note the tense look on the philosophers' faces before, the relieved look after, the changed roles of the Kelham fathers. None of us would miss it for the world.

3. By Michael Argyle

Comments on Sister Emily's Paper

This paper is little more than a hasty note containing my immediate reactions to Sister Emily's very impressive paper, which I have only heard once (and quickly) and so may have failed to understand properly. I shall simply take up for discussion four points on which a psychologist may legitimately comment: - (1) the distinction between 'rational' and 'irrational' decisions, (2) the implication that there is Divine causation in a religious group decision, (3) the statement that the Church is democratic, and (4) the statement that all have equal status in it.

(1) By 'irrational decision' Sister Emily means what is often called 'crowd behaviour'. She distinguishes this from the results of more sober reflection, including what may be called 'group decision'. If the psychological processes occurring in the two cases are compared this distinction can almost be made to vanish. While, for instance, a lynching is not fully understood, it seems likely that the two most important causal processes are (a) intense motivation generated perhaps by fear of economic frustration and physical assault, and (b) the effects of the interaction and interstimulation of the crowd-members, whereby new norms are suddenly set up to which everyone instantly conforms. At a group decision rather similar processes operate: (a) again all are motivated - for instance, those of low status are motivated by forces to conform with the views of their elders, and (b) the interaction produces convergence and the setting up of new group norms or standards. The differences between the crowd and the

discussion are that the whole thing is speeded up and intensified in the former case and that the new standards last longer in the latter. However the basic similarity is obvious, and while the similarity is greater in the case of a group decision, the same considerations apply to decision under any conditions.

Sister Emily's use of the word 'rational' for the group decision implies that logical considerations play some part in this kind of decision. Psychologists often assume too facilely that reason plays no part in a decision save only to consolidate the new position by rationalisation. Little is known about thinking, and psychologists draw no distinction between correct and incorrect conclusions, but there is the familiar evidence of the psychoanalysts and behaviourists that our experience often does not tally with our actions. Further, social psychology can predict the probable influence of such non-rational influences as propaganda. Nevertheless it is clearly nonsense to suppose that the decisions of a mathematician, philosopher, or scientist are not influenced by reason, but it is equally nonsense to suppose they are determined by reason alone. Arguments and evidence are likely to be accepted to the extent that one agrees with them or the attitude behind them - unless one is a very sophisticated and detached person. Thus Sister Emily's distinction is misleading, and there is no evidence that rational processes play any larger part in the one case than in the other - though there is certainly more time for them to act in.

(2) Sister Emily says that if a religious group decision is conducted with a suitable amount of prayer and deliberation the Holy Spirit will help to bring about a common point of view. It would be interesting to know whether she means here to give a reinterpretation of the psychological explanation of what happens or whether she is opposing her statement to any possible psychological explanation. It may be that she intends to postulate a gap in the psychological causation of the decision, and in a later paper I will show how it could be determined whether there is such a gap or not. It seems likely that all empirically verifiable statements of this kind will be translatable into psychological ones before long.

The existence of such translations will be embarrassing at first to many, but I think that these will be the people who have overlooked the all-too-human character of much that was phrased in theological terms. This is not to say however that the other interpretation should be abandoned in those places where a translation exists into psychological terms; the old interpretation itself is of the greatest value and none the worse now that we have two useful ways of making sense of the same set of facts.

(3) Sister Emily says that religious groups can be democratic. In the first place ought they to be democratic? To answer this all the old political arguments for and against democracy would have to be worked through again in a religious setting, and the result would depend largely on theological views as to the role of the priest. It may be that democracy would be too slow and inefficient, as it would be in the Army, or it may be that the views of the common man are so worthless as compared with those of the experts that the former are not worth considering. It is interesting to note that the structure of industry is slowly changing in the democratic direction under pressure from workers and social scientists.

Secondly, what would a democratic religious group be like? While there would be leaders and perhaps a hierarchy of leaders, these would be elected by the flock, and their politics would be directed by popular vote. Theological controversies would be brought before the common people and their views taken as much notice of as those of theologians. While certain broad views would be laid down from the central authority a particular flock would be able to effect lesser changes in practices and doctrines, while with sufficient support central doctrines could be voted away. This all makes nonsense when so stated, as it would if a democratic army were to be so described; the reason is that we are steeped in autocratic ways of thinking about our religious group, and without deciding whether it is good or bad it is worth while pointing out just how autocratic the Church actually is.

Consider the Church of Rome to which the High Anglican Church is similar in several respects. There is a permanent hierarchy of leaders, each level exerting power over the lower levels, this being backed by the sanction of excommunication, and often subtly mediated by confession. Further, truth is laid down from the top of the hierarchy and is independent of the pronouncements of theologians of whatever brilliance, while the voice of the common man is not heard. In other words there is a formalised autocracy. At the opposite extreme - the Quakers - while there is complete absence of formal autocracy, it is doubtful whether the method of the Quaker Meeting secures any degree of representation in view of the convergence toward the dominant that I mentioned above. Not only must there be the absence of formal autocracy but there must be positive machinery for democracy. Some of the low churches have a church meeting at which all the congregation can be present and vote.

I believe that democratic religious groups are desirable, but think that the manner of working this out will be difficult; in particular the role of the religious expert needs clarifying, and that of the priest.

(4) Finally Sister Emily says that all members of a religious group should have the same status. Firstly what kind of status? - presumably not intellectual status or social status, for members of a religious group are unlikely to have the same status in these respects, and it would be difficult to change the whole social structure and the roles embodied therein - though it might well be desirable. I shall assume she means equal charismatic status, in Max Weber's sense: a person with high charismatic status has special supernatural gifts of the spirit and the authority resulting from this. If all the members of a religious group had equal charismatic status this would mean (a) that they behaved towards each other as if they were equal in this respect, or (b) each thought he had the same status as the others (these are the two chief observable criteria for status). The first meaning lands us in difficulties in an organisation where the social distances between priest-curate-communicant-heathen, etc. are laid down in doctrine and liturgy so that there are standard non-reciprocal relations between them (to use Thouless's term), or there is a formal hierarchy of statuses. Further for anyone, like Sister Emily, who trains others in the religious life, to say that they think all have equal charismatic status in the second sense is nonsense. In fact those who give lip service to the statement that all are equal in the sight of God must be unaware of the obvious differences of charismatic status. There is one way out however: if we distinguish situs from status (à la Benoit-Smullyan) where situs refers to the behavioural roles and status to the conscious ascribing of status to oneself and others, the members of an organised religious group could be of unequal situs but of equal status. This would seem to apply to the tribe known as the Arapesoh where there is no status system, and where it is regarded as a slight disgrace to be made the leader, though it is recognised that it is necessary to have a leader. This would be rather hard luck on the clergy, for it would deprive them of one of life's rewards in a prestige-seeking culture.

4. By Matthew Shaw (Society of the Sacred Mission)

One question that arises from both the papers is: In what sense is democracy desirable as a system of church government, whether we mean the government of the church at large or of a relatively small group within the church?

I think that on one minor point Argyle and Sister Emily do not really differ as much as they might seem to. Sister Emily says that religious groups of whatever size ought to be democratic, that her own community and others are democratic, and the machinery for democracy is available for the larger ecclesiastical unit, the diocese, in the old system of the bishop and his flock meeting in synod. Michael Argyle, while agreeing that democratic religious groups are desirable, points with good reason to the markedly autocratic appearance of the actual government of the church, and suggests that we are so steeped in autocratic ways of thinking on this subject that we overlook the feudal character of the church's organization and procedure. You will remember that he describes certain features that might be looked for in a democratic religious group, and then says: "This all makes nonsense, when so stated." But in fact those very features which he describes are to be found in Sister Emily's Community and in my own - and I am sure in all or most others. I was a little surprised at the - to my mind - moderation of his demands for a democratic religious group. In many communities the leader is elected by vote of its members: his or her policy is directed by the two fold sanction that in electing him the community has expressed confidence in his probable policy, and if the worst comes to the worst the constitution provides machinery for the deposition of the leader; theological controversies are discussed in chapter, and all have equal rights of free speech - and so on. Michael Argyle's description of a hypothetical democratic religious group does very accurately fit all the communities of which I have any knowledge. But of course he was thinking of the government of the parish and diocese. Here, if I understand her aright, Sister Emily would say, "Yes, indeed, we have fallen into bad habits; but if the church were true to her principles she would be equally democratic there." So I do not think there is any real opposition between the two viewpoints about democracy in the church.

But I don't think that this measure of agreement gets us very far. "Democracy" is a difficult word to use. I am prepared to defend democracy as a method of government only in the sense expressed by a remark (attributed to Winston Churchill) that "democracy is the worst form of government - except all the others that have been tried." What matters about it, in the context of this discussion, is that it is a means to certain desirable ends. Sister Emily names two such ends,

viz. that all should have full opportunity of growing to maturity by learning to exercise responsibility, and that all should share the privileges and status of full membership. That is to say, democracy is being advocated because of its good effects on the democrats, not because it is efficient. Now this question of the fostering and bringing to perfection of all the latent possibilities of personality is important in a discussion about the church; because, after all, this is in fact just what the Church is supposed to exist for. "Salvation" is both etymologically and theologically closely linked with "wholeness", and if some members are not blossoming, but being stunted, whether they are men or women (and I don't think we should forget that this applies to men also), then there is certainly something seriously wrong. One factor in such a decline from principle has not yet been mentioned; I mean the desire to "play safe". The risks and insecurity involved in sharing responsibility have often been shirked, by both clergy and laity. But such shirking is a decline from principle, not a mere mistake in policy: for it springs from unbelief.

This is why Sister Emily lays such stress on the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Argyle asks whether she means to exclude or to reinterpret possible psychological explanation. I think this is a very big question.

What is the relation between a scientific explanation and an explanation in terms of the purpose and activity of God? Are the two incompatible? Suppose the following experiment were made?

A religious community meets in chapter, discusses a problem and reaches a decision. Sister Emily is present and agrees that this case exactly fits the conditions she has described in her paper as necessary for rational decision in a religious group. She is prepared to quote this as an instance of waiting on the Holy Spirit, and receiving his guidance. Argyle has also had a battery of trained observers in attendance, and he produces an explanation in psychological terms, which makes no mention of divine causation, and which he maintains is a complete account of the events. We then have a situation comparable to that described by John Wisdom in his famous article "Gods". And so this question asked by Argyle is really the question:- Do we mean by the activity of God the Holy Spirit the kind of gardening that went on in Wisdom's parable? - that is to say, do we think of this divine activity as in principle unverifiable? I think that we do. But this need not disturb us. Theology has never professed to give scientific explanations, in the sense of this phrase which means that one kind of entity or event is analysable into other entities or events or processes which, however different they may seem, are still ultimately of the same kind as those to be explained. In so far as theology seeks to explain natural phenomena, it seeks to explain them in terms, not

of other phenomena of this world, but of another world. And whether such explanations are true or not, they are certainly not necessarily incompatible with ordinary scientific explanations. They are on a different logical level.

The Christian need have no fear that psychological explanations will ever succeed in explaining away the activity of the Holy Spirit in the world. For he believes in a God who is the ground of those regularities which make scientific explanations possible, and without whose inspiration the explanations could not be found.

5. Summary of discussion

Marjorie V. Sisson The difference between rational and irrational decision needs clarifying. Sister Emily's paper does not make clear whether the members of the group themselves carry out the decisions they have made.

(M. Masterman gave, in confidence and on experience from her general knowledge of the Community of the Epiphany, the subject matter of the group decision referred to in Sister Emily's paper. This completely convinced the conference that it was a decision which the deciders had to carry out.)

R.B. Braithwaite Defended Sister Emily's distinction between rational and irrational procedures against Argyle's criticism. If a lynching party were adjourned the lynching would not take place. The right way to decide behaviouristically between a rational and irrational decision is to see whether an adjournment affects it or not.

David Russell There are really three types of decision:
(1) a football crowd or lynching mob,
(2) a normal committee decision,
(3) decisions as reached by Sister Emily's group of rational deciders.

E.A. Armstrong Consider a Parochial Church Council. Always voice a problem at one meeting and settle it at the next.

There are a series of different levels of behaviour, going from human to animal. Lynching is a form of reversal to the animal.

D.M. Emmet

What is important in democracy is not unanimity, especially not a forced unanimity - but loyalty to decisions democratically reached. There is a story of a Scottish Divine who was found vigorously carrying out a policy after it had been duly decided on when he had formerly declared it to be wrong and foolish. "I still think it is wrong and I still think it is foolish, but I have come to see that it is the will of God."

M.M.

Caryl Brahms said, after the Labour victory in the 1945 General Election, "I will not allow the Yanks to prevent me from having the kind of Government I disapprove of." Sister Emily would say that in a group of rational deciders the young ones are not overawed by those of superior status.

D.R.

In the Army the junior officers speak first and so on upwards.

Michael Argyle

The convergence to the dominant is unconscious.

M.M.

So must the training of a Rational Decider be, or largely so.

R.B.B.

Strongly protested against Argyle's concept of "convergence towards the dominant" as being basic: in a committee each person is dominant at a particular point. For example, at a meeting of an important Cambridge committee one person who was at no point dominant converted all the rest.

M.M.

This criterion must not be taken as basic. Who is dominant in this room? Are we now converging towards the dominant?

D.R.

This is the weakness of experiments of the Lewin School. Would it be the same if people didn't know they were being experimented upon? Insight cannot be described in terms of convergence towards the dominant, much less can the Holy Spirit.

M.M.

I believe and Christians believe in the Holy Spirit -

something like Jung's co-consciousness, something below consciousness which makes us members of one another. Only it is a good connecting force, though not a conscious one - the Holy Spirit not the Devil.

R. B. B.

Described spontaneous Quaker silences as an example of what is meant by the Holy Spirit.

Mary T. Hoskyns

There is an analogy with trying to find the answer to a mathematical problem. You cannot get at it, you're almost demented, then suddenly you're all in one piece, a deep uncontrollable quiet comes on you. Then you know you've got it.

D. R.

People are afraid of silence. We distrust the unconscious, but Freud has made us see that there are different levels of unconscious.

E. A. A.

It is better to speak of lower levels instead of unconscious levels.

(Conference agrees.)

E. A. A.

There is a difficulty of terminology - we don't know how to describe the biological process of emotion - it is a force that tries to make associations which rational thought separates and exhibits the formation of new linkages. Köhler's apes, like the Community of the Epiphany, took time.

M. M.

Sister Emily would say that big democratic decisions can't be hurried - little ones can be.

R. B. B.

It is hard to decide which is which. We should cease to try to divide them, e.g. getting meat from the Argentine was a second class decision which turned into a first class one with international repercussions.

E. A. A.

The bequest of Lane Pictures with the empty room waiting for them in Dublin was another case of a second class decision which became a first class one.

M. M.

Why couldn't the religious procedure be put into operation retrospectively over a second class decision which unexpectedly became a first class one?

- D.M.E. Here is an illustration of the difference it makes when people live together: the testimony of a man who resigned from U.N.O. who said that the fact that different delegations live in separate hotels and people travel by air instead of having five days together on the boat had a great deal to do with the artificial atmosphere which made constructive work almost impossible.
- M.M. The House of Commons is the right kind of group, because its members do live together.
- (Conference agrees.)
- David Mayer Rousseau said much of what Sister Emily says in his Social Contract. His decision procedure is not necessarily a religious idea.
- M.M. There is a case for saying that the origin of democracy is Greek.
- E.A.A. Everything old anthropologically is religious, though not necessarily good.
- R.B.B. Secular life, as opposed to religious life, originated with the Greeks. Science was secular; everything else was religious, so democracy was a religious idea.
- E.A.A. We must distinguish between magic and religion; science comes from magic.
- R.B.B. I think the best definition of democracy is that given by Leonard Woolf - that democracy is a system of government in which the governors themselves are governed by those they govern. Directness of representation is irrelevant, but the people at the top must be controllable. There's no good reason for saying that democracy is not just as efficient as any other form of government.
- D.M. Is Sister Emily's democratic procedure essentially religious?
- M.A. Is democracy desirable? E.g. the Army cannot be democratic owing to need for quick decisions.

- R. B. B. In one sense there is democracy in that soldiers have votes.
- D. R. The Army comes under Leonard Woolf's definition of democracy.
- M. A. Should the Church be like the Army? Perhaps it should be run by experts, in which case democracy would be undesirable.
- R. B. B. There is no case for it being like the Army since the circumstances are quite different.
- D. M. I repeat my question: is democracy a specifically religious idea?
- M. M. Sister Emily says it is, i.e. that twentieth century democracy doesn't work because it has ceased to employ her procedure, and Church Government doesn't work because it fails to be democratic.
- D. M. Would a democratic group be religious if it adopted the right religious procedure without admitting that it was religious?
- M. T. H. The Christian view of individuals is that they are all equal, and you have to have the form of government which conforms with that. What we mean by "speaking as Christians" is "speaking of all men as being the children of God."
- E. A. A. A happy family is the Christian ideal; the nature of democracy is irrelevant. What does "democracy" mean?
- V. R. The expression "Christian democracy" is as bad as "Christian philosophy". One should be both a Christian and a democrat. Sister Emily attaches importance to democracy because she thinks it gives the Holy Spirit a chance to work. We have the phenomenon of a release of tension when the common mind emerges. Acts XV is the ideal of Christian decision. Various Vatican activities are the opposite i.e. autocratic. "Democracy", whatever it means, must form a part of Christian living.
- M. M. What David Mayer wants to know is: what is to be

taught as democracy to the peoples of Africa?

V.R. and E.A.A. The Church is not and should not be democratic.

(Discussion became tense.)

R.B.B. What did Christ come into the world for except to introduce democracy? Democracy is the kingdom of heaven.

(Violent argument between R.B.B. and V.R.)

D.R. What we now need is an interval for contemplation.

(Five minutes break for tea. In interval R.B.B. apologised to V.R. who said that he (V.R.) was an anarchist. R.B.B. claimed anarchy as an extreme form of democracy. Dorothy Emmet reopened the discussion.)

D.M.E. There are two questions: (1) What is democracy?
(2) Is there any connection that matters between Christianity, religion and democracy?

An irrelevant and disastrous view is that "democracy is the view that the majority is always right". Democracy is, on the contrary, the system which respects the rights of minorities and encourages them to organise themselves. Western democracy is a procedure for working out the rules for fair discussion. The democratic system is much the most successful which we have known for doing this in politics. It allows responsible decisions to be made better than any alternative system does.

Now for the Church: We must not misuse the analogy of the family, to keep the same people always fathers and the same always children. Real children grow up. William Temple said that a reason why the Roman Church is unacceptable is that it keeps so many millions of people permanently in the status of children.

E.A.A. Defended oligarchy rather than democracy, but an oligarchy in which the high-ups can be deposed.

M.A. How, in a democratic Church, would you make decisions on doctrine?

D. M. E.

A political democracy must not be confused with its eastern form. In it you do not take plebiscites on everything, but every one has a say in the choice of those who propose decisions.

M. A.

We should distinguish decisions of policy and of doctrine.

M. M.

Defended the methods used by the Church of England Commission on Doctrine (1938).

E. A. A.

Defended Roman Catholic opposition to communism in China.

M. M. , V. R.
and M. A.

We must not regard all communism as an enemy, and on this ground back up contrary forms of totalitarianism.

E. A. A.

Christian practice requires renunciation in the individual.

M. M.

Yes, but it also requires acknowledgement of vocation. The Church is a collection of vocations and the first step in making the Church democratic again must be to recreate the machinery for testing and discerning vocation. The so-called "vocations" of priest, sister, tertiary, layman are not what I mean by vocation. St Paul had the right idea of differentiation of vocation.

M. T. H.

In Christian authority the governor is servant of all. In democracy this does not work out.

R. B. B. and M. A.

You mean in the Church it doesn't work out. In British democracy it does.

Matthew Shaw

There is a divergence here between theory and practice. The Pope in theory is the servant of all, but is he in fact?

D. R.

Renunciation must not be taken in the Eastern manner, as the same as withdrawal. The Christian's trouble is that he mustn't renounce. He must be in the world but not of it. The trouble about an oligarchy on Plato's lines is that you find some very nice Greek virtues, but not the Christian ones.

- E. A. A. We don't really disagree, as I now see that my oligarchy is one form of democracy. In my ideal government the governors must think of themselves as servants.
- M. M. The best safeguard against abuse of power is a strong vocation in a contrary direction. Both in the Community of the Epiphany and Cambridge University you find people saying: "Don't put me in authority or I shan't be able to do my own work."
- M. S. Is the democracy that we approve of something that can be produced mechanically, or does it require special people to work it?
- M. V. S. The example of the Gold Coast may tell us.
- D. R. Shaw's is a false antithesis, i. e. between system and people.
- M. M. Democracy needs practice. The British are democratic because they practise it young.
- E. A. A. In Ireland they do practise democracy young; in England they don't; it's stifled.
- D. R. It makes a big difference whether you have a mass society, as in urban England, or not. It's much more a question of the opposition between town and country than between England and Ireland.
- M. A. In Lewin and Lippitt's experiment all the boys except one - an army officer's son - were happier under democratic leadership; but the democratic way of life had to be learnt whereas the autocratic had not.
- M. M. This supports Sister Emily - the basic advantage of democracy is that it trains everybody in leadership in case of need, and fosters improvisations.
- D. R. In the last paragraphs of Sister Emily's paper she says that the Christian must encourage variety.
- M. A. Then should the Christian encourage class distinction?

- D.R. No, rather charismatic status. There are two sorts of charismatic status - permanent and temporary.
- M.M. Sister Emily recognises only one status - inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven, everything else is role and therefore temporary. All good religious orders fight against the establishment of a feudal order within themselves, which is always liable to arise.
- E.A.A. But dominance is a fundamental biological concept.
- M.M. Yes, but I believe in the Holy Spirit which is the real force in the world and which can fight dominance.
- E.A.A. What I mean by dominance is the Holy Spirit.
- R.B.B. and D.R. Protested against the biological concept of dominance being used about human affairs.
- M.M. The distinction between role and status will be needed in the end, even in biology.
- R.B.B. Look at this conference. It has not responded to dominance. Who has been dominant this afternoon?
- D.R. (Chairman) I haven't, I ought to have been.

VII. ASCETICAL THEOLOGY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF MYSTICISM

1. By Victor Ranford, S.S.M.

My concern in this paper is to differentiate two studies, on the one hand, dogmatic and ascetical theology, on the other the psychology of mysticism; to show the relationship between them; and to suggest some possible means of their unification. My standpoint will be that of a theologian, but of a theologian who does not wish to ignore other studies and leave theology a self-contained subject.

I. The study of theology has traditionally been divided into three parts: (i) dogmatic theology or the study of the dogmas of the Christian faith. Here we are confronted with the problem of the relation between reason and revelation. It is certainly arguable that the Western Church, relying on Aristotle, has made too great a separation between them; but with the paradoxical result that what has been revealed has also been reduced to a rational system; (ii) moral theology or the study of human behaviour in the light of God as man's true end. Here we are confronted with a second problem, analogous to the first one, of the relation between law and conscience. For just as, in dogmatic theology, the data of revelation have been rigidly systematised, so too, to the unsympathetic, moral theology may seem nothing more than a rationale of the system of penance; (iii) ascetical and mystical theology. These again may, I think, be described as two aspects of one study. The word "ascetical" emphasises the discipline which is demanded by the Christian life; the word "mystical" refers primarily to the so-to-speak "revealed" prayer of pure contemplation, in which the soul, completely detached from the things of sense, knows God, not indeed as He is in Himself, but in a wholly spiritual manner. In this sense "mystical" prayer is the end and object, and may thus be said to form part, of the ascetical life.

Ascetical theology has, however, in addition to the two aspects already mentioned, a pure theoretical side. The word "mystical" may refer also, and, in a sense, should primarily refer, to the mystical life of the Holy Trinity. Fully to share in this life is man's end - so this theory goes - and God by becoming man in Jesus Christ has achieved this end; or rather, has caused this end to be perfectly achieved. This fact, stated thus by the first century Christians, forms the foundation for an enlarged sense of "Christ". "In Christ", in this new sense, all men are brought into the orbit of the mystical life of God; and through the discipline of the Christian life - and

this is strictly identical with the ascetical life - they are made increasingly aware of the mystical life of God.

By keeping this second use of "mystical" in mind we can distinguish between Christian mysticism and other kinds. The theory of Christian mysticism is rooted in the historical life of Jesus Christ. The Christian mystic, it is claimed, becomes increasingly aware of his relationship with Christ, and shares in his suffering until he can say that no longer he lives but Christ who lives in him. And it is because of this that Christian ascetic theologians feel and say that Christian mysticism cannot therefore be considered simply as a method of prayer common to all religions.

Christian mystics themselves seem sometimes to speak as if the exercise of mystical prayer belonged to an élite who have progressed into a supra-Christian life, which they describe in terms almost distinguishable from those used by Buddhists and Plotinus. This, I think, is unfortunate. We do not, it seems to me, learn from others by ignoring the difference between us and them.

II. What I have to say falls into five parts. First I would like to tell you why I think ascetical theology needs psychology. Many Christians to-day remain doubtful of the value of any psychologising of the Christian life. First, because the word "psychology" has no very precise connotation, so that when it is used in relation to religion it tends to reduce both prayer and sacrament to vague concepts, and also to eliminate the possibility of anything existing which could rightly be called moral striving. Secondly, the development of epistemology, which Christians took to be a form of psychology, seemed to them to undermine the validity of all knowledge of the real by saying that all we could know was sense data. Thirdly, having discovered the unconscious, psychology then proceeded to treat all religious phenomena as some form or other of self-deception. And the fourth reason why many Christians distrust psychology is that, like me, they remain profoundly ignorant of what the psychologists are trying to say.

Now some fruitful relationship must exist between theology and psychology. Not only does common sense force this conclusion, but also, for the Christian, sufficient reason for believing it is that our Lord redeemed all human life, which includes all human knowledge, even and perhaps especially this psychology that always seems to be undermining Christian faith. The truth is that though modern psychology, like modern philosophy, has got out of touch with Christian thinking (or, if you prefer it, let's put it the other way round), Christians and non-Christians are dealing with the same mystery. "The kingdom of Heaven is like unto treasure hid in a field." What is this field, and how does one set about buying it? How does one become a

Christian? Certainly not, as Kierkegaard or Dostoevsky would equally say, by simply accepting a set of propositions which immunise us from ordinary living. On the contrary we need to know all about what human life really is: its origin, the stages of its growth, the significance of knowledge, and the end towards which the organism strives. The Christian who thinks must concern himself with all this; and if he does, he will be acting as a psychologist. In all ages there have been Christians who have also been psychologists. St Paul, e.g. in Romans 7, was concerned with different levels of the will; so was St Augustine in the Confessions; so, far more explicitly, was Augustine Baker in what is called his Confessions. So is all the language about the mystical marriage. The Church has always regarded the language about the mystical marriage as rather dangerous language except for the few; but this language explicitly stresses that the whole of human life, especially sex, is the raw material of sanctity.

If, therefore, we allow the existence of two legitimate subjects, ascetical theology and psychology, the question immediately arises as to what is the relation between them. We have lately been hearing a good deal about the mind as the "ghost in the machine"; and it may be that at long last we are to be released from the tyranny of thinking of the human being as composed, in the Cartesian sense, of body and mind. This is necessary, if the point of view which I am putting forward in this paper is to be upheld, for if these two, body and mind, are completely different, all knowledge about them must be either about the one or about the other, or about their interaction; and so dogmatic theology, which regards both as inseparable equally from each other and from God, must be either a matter of irrational faith or a study of a field which would have no existence for philosophers. Christians rather nostalgically look back to Aquinas and the Middle Ages, not as to an age of faith, which on the whole anyway it wasn't, but to a time when rational argument was taken seriously. I think, however, that we can look back with profit to St Thomas, not particularly for what he said in those thousands of articles, but because fundamentally he gives us a more sensible approach to the question of the nature of psycho-physical knowledge. (If we could only try to discover what questions he was trying to answer and not repudiate his answers to our quite different questions, we should gain something too.) Dogmatic theology is often treated as though it were a matter of finding a synthesis of what all the theologians have said throughout the ages; or as if it were a body of propositions deduced according to strict logical rules from certain absolutely fundamental empirical postulates. Both these methods of study, in my view, have their uses, but neither covers the whole ground, and by themselves both are misleading. What the Church is trying to comprehend in its dogmatic system is the experience of the revelation I mentioned earlier; namely, the revelation of God in Christ, which covers the whole series of

events on which our Christian faith rests. And it is trying to do this because this whole series of events forms a prototype of a parallel series of events which must be experienced by any Christian before dogmatic theology can be understood.

In saying this I do not in any way deny the importance of historical criticism and the careful examination of all evidence. I simply point to the fact (a) that the Christian Church has this kind of dogmatic system, and (b) that ultimately the Christian faith is acceptable in life. There are, therefore, two questions to be discussed not one; both what this dogmatic system means, and secondly what it means in terms of life; for, if I am right, even in the most rationalist theology what the theology means in life must play a part. If it does not, then it loses touch with the real context, where real people live, and fails in its real work. It seems arguable that in Western theology too great a distinction has been made between the work (say) of St Thomas Aquinas and that of St John of the Cross. St Thomas at the end of his life, it is said, viewed all that he had written as straw in comparison with the reality that he sought. On the other hand it has been argued that the writings of St John, though professedly presupposing the Summa of St Thomas, seem somehow to ignore much of what one might call ordinary Christianity. I think this separation artificial. The Christian contention that no one should engage in mystical exercises until he has passed through the discursive exercises of the intellect ought not to blind Christians to the mystical element in all thinking and living. And if that element is present in all thinking and living, then it is not sufficient, though the Church often seems to act as though it were, for the ordinary Christians to accept with the top of their heads, to use a phrase of D.H. Lawrence, certain propositions, and carry out certain rules of behaviour. Ascetical theology is not, in my opinion, a completely different study from dogmatic theology; certainly not a top dressing for it. On the contrary it forms the foundation of dogmatic theology, since, in its developed form, it develops what belongs essentially to the ordinary processes of knowledge. Lex orandi lex credendi cannot be ignored.

Thus the second contention which I want to put forward is that ascetic and dogmatic theology do indeed form a whole, that ascetic theology is foundational, not an extra, and that it is with this combined whole that the relationship with mystical psychology has to be defined.

III. The point of union between the two is mystical knowledge. "The dark night," says St John of the Cross, "is a certain inflowing of God into the soul which cleanses it of its ignorance and imperfections, habitual, natural, and spiritual. Contemplatives call it infused contemplation, or mystical theology, whereby God secretly teaches the

soul and instructs it in the perfection of love, without efforts on its own part beyond a loving attention to God, listening to His voice, admitting the light He sends, but without understanding how this is infused contemplation." Descriptions like this will sound absurd only to those who think of human knowledge as something purely cut-and-dried, as something held apart from the holding of it. In fact what we are seeking to know surpasses the possibility of such objectivity, such cut-and-driedness. Furthermore, the process of getting to know involves continuous change in the knower.

In its broadest sense knowledge is a function of existence; in its narrowest sense, the only sense apparently admitted by some, it is a statement that some bit of experience is connected with some other bit, that so-and-so is a such-and-such. I do not want to argue this question in general; what I want to say is that the process of gaining mystical knowledge can be best described as an articulation of the existence of him who is getting to know. In this process the intellect has a very definite part to play; its part is to form objective systems by means of which the variety and depth of experience is made manageable. Intellection does not exist for its own sake; it rests on and springs out of the deeper levels of consciousness (what may be called, in the phrase used in Braithwaite's Aristotelian Society paper on Belief and Action, springs of action); and it is directed towards the fulfilment of the whole person. The work of the intellect does tend to become detached from the deeper levels and thus to lose its own function, and it is against this misuse that the mystic protests. But equally the Christian mystic protests against 'nature mysticism' like Wordsworth's in e.g. the poem about the intimations of immortality. The developing mystical consciousness does not sink back into a prenatal stage of unconsciousness, as Wordsworth seems to think it does. I think that we are easily liable to misunderstand such phrases as the 'dark night of the soul', which seem to imply that this is the process which, in the earlier stages of mystical development, takes place. It is true that the author of the 'Cloud of Unknowing' and others speak of a via negativa, and it was thought to be an advanced state of sanctity that enabled St Bernard to walk along the side of the lake at Geneva without observing it. But this via negativa is not an infantile turning away from adult responsibility to the life of the womb. The mystics are always telling us that we must cease to be the slaves of our own ways of seeing things, of our memories that imprison our sensitivity, of our wills enslaved in habits. We have indeed to become like children if we would enter into the kingdom of Heaven; that is true on any level of experience and in any sphere of study. But the emphasis does not need to be laid on the ignorance of the child, though of course all who go on learning become more not less conscious of their ignorance, but on the child as a growing entity, with a vast number of possibilities open before him which have not yet closed. The child grows simultaneously

outwards and inwards; he grows into reality as he grows into himself. That is true too of all men who truly learn. And it is about this growing that the mystic tells us. The mystic grows, in a new sense and to a new extent, into reality, and he calls it God. He knows all things in God, not simply as the end to which all things strive, but also, and most important, as the point from which all things spring. Thus he knows men not just as men, i.e. in universal terms, but as immortal souls, i.e. as deriving from God, each one himself. He who leaves, says our Lord, for my sake, brothers and sisters and friends and wife and the rest shall receive them again, even now; and this the mystic does, but he knows them in a new way. In the state of contemplation the soul does not lose its identity; but knows itself in God, no longer over against God. God is no longer an object of intellection; He envelops the soul with a light, which to the still earth-clad soul is darkness, luminous, however, if such a paradoxical expression may be allowed, with God's presence. In this state the faith that 'inspirits' all knowledge, on whatever level, transcends all intellection. Nevertheless, it has to be described, in so far as it can be.

IV. A more typical word in the writings of the mystics is love, a matter not of the affections but of the will. "The will and the understanding had a race," writes Ramon Lull in the Book of the Lover and the Beloved, "to see which of them loved the Beloved the most. The understanding won." Here 'understanding' refers to the intellect, which can talk about love more easily than the will can accept it. In the Confessions (and I dare say in Holy Wisdom) Augustine Baker writes about passive contemplation. The term seems to have two meanings; one corresponding to the more ordinary and habitual infused contemplation of St John of the Cross, the existence of which, as a true form of passive contemplation, Baker also implies; the second, and apparently more usual one to Baker, signifies a special experience, a conversion, which changes the whole course of a man's life. This is not just a kind of vision, which may quicken interest in spiritual things and thus make prayer pleasant and possible; it in some way changes the will. Baker says, "The same passive exercise doth enable the soul for the future to produce far more efficacious aspirations and elevations than it did or could do before the said passive contemplation had." Baker had three such sudden 'contemplations', the third of which is alone dealt with in the edition of the Confessions. The effects of that third sudden contemplation, which came after a long period of lapse, he writes about at considerable length: how, that after it, for six years and nine months, he spent many hours each day in prayer, and how during that time the aspiration, "which doubtless," he says, "proceeded from within," seemed at first to be exercised without the body, and then gradually took possession of him, beginning with the extremities and working upwards until "all seemed to be drawn up into the head;" and then he describes how after that the exercises became

short every day, and he spent most of his time in writing and translating. Thus Baker describes how the will wins the race over the understanding. Anyone who perseveres in the aspirations of the will finds at first dullness and stupidity, but when the 'ascent into the head' has been achieved, then the dullness goes and there comes an 'increase of light' in dealing with one's proper business; and the effect of a sudden contemplation is not to produce a quite different effect from this first aspirative process, but to hasten the whole aspirative process. What Augustine Baker says is echoed by other writers.

This may sound a bit exceptional and 'queer'; nevertheless, I think that we shall entirely misunderstand what the mystics are describing if we separate their experiences from those of more normal human beings. Quite ordinary men, for instance, speak of the compulsive power of a new idea. Father Kelly, of Kelham, was fond of speaking of intellectual vision as the way in which the soul grasped the grace given to it. The bright idea is given and it 'converts us', but we always tend to mould it into our interests, and come to think of it as though we had invented it. But as far as I know Father Kelly never attempted to correlate the impelling power of the bright idea with a psychology of the will; and it is here, as it seems to me, that psychology ought to come in. Like a good Augustinian Father Kelly was content to speak of the mystery of the will. Now in any attempt to reduce this mystery we tend to talk about whether or no the will is free and also to talk about alternative courses of action; in other words we tend to intellectualise the will, itemising certain very familiar states of volitional consciousness. I want to talk about the springs of action of the will. I want to say that strictly speaking we can will only what we are capable of willing, though we can fail to will this in actual fact. And I want to say further that a man can will only his true end; for even in recognising his failure to will this he is still willing his true end. I want to say, finally that the mystic passivity is the true end of man. The whole mystical or ascetical process is not to be thought of as a crushing of the will, a denial of the rights of the individual; it is really a fulfilling, a completion, of the will. And on every level the drive towards fulfilment reaches its end. The emphasis by mystics on the spiritual marriage disclaims any real mutilation of the essential personality. And that is why, if for no other reason, the sort of work done by Margaret Masterman in "Psychology of Levels of Will"¹ is very important. We are always in danger of disembodiment the will as we are the mind and also the intellect. That no Christian should do if he wishes to be true to dogmatic theology's incarnate God, who is incarnate in the bones, the nervous system, the very body itself.

(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1947-48.

V. To complete this discourse I must say that, as a plain matter of fact, the mystics universally ascribe all that they do and all that happens to them to the direct work of God. "All we have to do," says de Caussade, "is to receive what we are given and allow ourselves to be acted upon." St John of the Cross (The Living Flame, p.82) says, "Contemplation is to receive." The end of all mystical exercises is self-abandonment to God's Will. And to quote de Caussade again, "previously the soul saw by her own ideas and lights how the plan of her perfection was working out; this is no longer the case when she is in this condition (that of the Night). God now communicates himself to her as life, but is no longer before her eyes as the Way and the Truth." Now the difficulty of sorting out what 'God' means here lies in the fact that the life of the mystics, "though extraordinary in its perfection, shows nothing on the exterior but what is common and very ordinary. They fulfil the duties of religion and of their state; others, as far as appearances go, do the same as they. Examine the rest of their lives: you will find nothing striking or special; it is made out of the ordinary course of events. What distinguishes them - the dependence in which they live on the will of God which arranges everything for them - does not fall under observance. ... When God gives Himself to the soul in this way, the ordinary sequence of life becomes extraordinary. That is why nothing extraordinary appears outwardly because it is extraordinary in itself and consequently does not need the ornament of marvels which have nothing to do with it." This might have been written by St Teresa, the most practical of the mystics, and it should remind us that what mystics are talking about is not the exclusive property of odd people. In fact the oddities of mystical phenomena are regarded by the mystics themselves as false developments, which they often refer to as the work of the devil, whose business it is to upset the steady development of the soul into conscious union with God.

The psychology of mysticism is the psychology of all of us. It serves to throw into relief the stages through which the human soul develops, and to remind us that no psychology that attempts to account for human experience without reference to what mystics describe as the soul's striving for God is adequate. With this concept of 'God' the psychologists have got to deal. Psychology has got to deal with the fact that, in the unanimous testimony of all mystical writers: "Know then thyself, presume not God to scan; the proper study of mankind is man," is only true if we remember that the knowledge of man as it increases needs increasingly an apprehension of God. And it is when psychology faces the necessity of dealing with this concept and the fact described by and represented by the use of it, viz. that of the direct action of a real Something upon the passive soul, that ascetic theology and volitional psychology can harmoniously unite.

2. By Margaret Masterman

Theological and Scientific Terminologies

Introduction: the challenge which theology presents to the empirical philosopher, as soon as it is presented as being founded upon empirical material.

The great merit of Ranford's paper (VII.1), as I see it, is that he has presented the relations of the subjects known as Dogmatic Theology, Moral Theology, Ascetic and Mystical Theology to one another and to the psychology of mysticism in such a way as to make it possible to consider how far and in what way these subjects have an experiential basis. If, however, we follow Ranford's thought sufficiently far to allow him to make us see the whole subject in this new light, then we are immediately aghast at the complexity of the problems which confront us. For Ranford, though an empiricist theologian, is an empiricist theologian of the "Catholic" type, not one of the "Protestant-Modernist" type. He is an empiricist, yes, but not a "boiler-down"; he is not a man, that is, who takes hold of the old doctrines one by one, rubs their corners off, smooths them, and reduces them until they "say almost nothing" and are "utterly harmless". Ranford empiricises the logico-linguistic complex which he makes by interrelating the theological subjects, but he empiricises it as a whole. The result of this is that the traditional languages, in all their pictorial glory and a priori inconvenience, now starkly confront the linguistic philosopher. What is he to do with them? For they are now empirical. And all the rich welter of startling and still unsifted descriptive material, labelled now "empirical: potentially scientific", analogously confronts the bewildered psycho-biologist. What is he to do with it? This is the challenge which Ranford's paper throws down.

It is not possible, of course, to solve these giant problems in one paper; neither shall we solve them by having just one symposium on one aspect of one of them. Nor is there any space or time, at this point, for me to go into any of that examination of detail which alone, in the last analysis, is valuable in an inquiry of this kind. All I can do here is to produce some preliminary suggestions which might show the beginning of an entrance to a way through the tangle - and that only by using the ordinary methods of General Philosophy, and by starting, in the main, as the subject of the symposium requires, from the theological end.

The first suggestion is that we should consider the different parts of theology, i.e. moral, ascetic, dogmatic - that is, of theology

as empiricised by Ranford¹ - not as being different subjects but as being different terminologies. The result of this change will be that theology looks rather more like science than it has done up till now.

The second suggestion is that we should borrow exact techniques both from the new structural linguistics and from formal logic, in order to enable us to distinguish theological terminologies from one another.

The third suggestion is that the important evaluative distinction which can be made between terminologies is not that between terminologies which are significant and terminologies which are meaningless, but between terminologies which are fertile and terminologies which are sterile; a sterile terminology being one with which no other can be matched, in the gradual process of transition from old terminologies to new.

The fourth suggestion is that, if this distinction is applied, two theological terminologies in particular will stand out as scientifically fertile, and therefore as pointing to fields of fact which ought to be further investigated.

This suggestion does not cut out the possibility that other terminologies, which now, at this preliminary stage, appear sterile, might, to future generations, appear as fertile; and vice versa. It merely gives to empiricists a short-term directive: "two theological terminologies are fertile now; look into them."

Since, however, any investigation, of no matter what kind, presupposes investigators, my fifth and final suggestion is that before any serious theologico-scientific investigations can arise, the investigators will have to be given some idea of the empirical "universe of discourse" in which they will be expected to live. For Western investigators this universe of discourse will have to be at once Christian, contemplative and scientific. The question is, what does this last phrase mean?

Thus, I find myself putting forward five fundamental suggestions, in a paper the scope of which does not allow me to do more than say a very few words about each. Is this worth doing? Yes, I think it is. Would it not be much better for me, as a philosopher, to take just one of the suggestions and develop it? No, I think it would not; it is

(1) Ranford, of course, in his thought is building upon the work of many other empirically-minded theologians. His acquaintance with modern linguistic philosophy, however, brings him closer to the problems.

necessary to make all five. For the general point which I want to make in this paper with all my strength is the one which I made briefly, right at the beginning, namely that it is vital to realise the magnitude of the task which confronts the modern linguistic philosopher who really faces both the problems raised by the growth of empiricism and also those raised by the persistence of religious practice, religious ritual and theology. People talk glibly about "resolving the conflict between religion and science", or of "bridging the gap between theology and the modern world". They do not begin to envisage the breadth of the gap they are talking about; they make no attempt to focus upon the intricacies of the problems which they wish accurately to compare with one another, so that they may be "solved". I wish to present a more honest picture of the real situation; but to present this as constructively as possible. I therefore make five fairly detailed suggestions, the implementing of which might put future generations in a better position than we are for bridging the gap that really divides the theologies and the sciences. If the suggestions were successfully implemented, the first bridging operations would then have been taken from either side. But this kind of approach gives the scale of the cost; it shows the level, the span, the intensity and the duration of effort which will be required. All the strenuous variegation of labour which is suggested here, and probably a great deal more besides, will be needed before the gigantic split in the disintegrated personality of the modern world can be healed; before, speaking as potential religious contemplatives, we can say, My soul hath a desire and longing to enter into the courts of the Lord, and at the same time have even a glimmering, when we consider ourselves as twentieth century sol-planet inhabitants, of the full span of what we mean. How much easier to pretend either that the facts of religious contemplation and redemptive sacrifice, on the one hand, or that the methods and findings of scientific inquiry, on the other, do not exist; that, of the two, one can always be ignored.

Two exploring enterprises, however, hang inescapably over this century. The first is the physical one, of building a rocket which will reach the moon, - of bridging, that is, the geologico-astronomical gap. The second is the intellectual and spiritual one, of connecting the religious era and atmosphere to the scientific one; of bridging the incantatory-experimental gap. Of the two enterprises, I think the second is, on the whole, the more difficult. Both, though in different senses, presuppose rocket-building and space-stations; and both require crews who will not be afraid.

§2: the first suggestion: that we stop talking about "theological subjects", and start talking about "theological terminologies".

In dogmatic theology, Ranford says, we are confronted with "the problem of the relation between reason and revelation". But once revelations, i.e. propositions which have the special self-authenticating characteristic of being "revealed" (whatever this may mean) are embodied in a theological system, it will be impossible, either in theory or in practice, to distinguish them from the other propositions of the system. Either, therefore, the whole system will have to be taken as "revealed"; or the "revelation" of the "revealed" propositions will have to be waived, and the system treated as any other system put forward to provide an acceptable explanation of our experience. The first alternative would lead to highly paradoxical consequences; it therefore seems reasonable to choose the second. That Ranford does in fact choose this second alternative is shown by the fact that he says: "What the Church is trying to comprehend in its dogmatic system is the experience of the revelation of God in Christ, which covers the whole series of events upon which our Christian faith rests. And it is trying to do this because this whole series of events forms a prototype of a parallel series of events which must be experienced [in life] by any Christian before dogmatic theology can be understood. ... There are therefore two questions to be discussed, not one; both what this dogmatic system means, and secondly, what it means in terms of life."

Moreover, once we waive the element of "revelation" in theological systems, the ground is cleared for discussion of their relations with the facts. And here we come to the next important point in Ranford's paper, - namely, his assertion that dogmatic theology must be founded upon ascetical and mystical theology and not vice versa. "Ascetical theology," he says, "is not, in my opinion, a completely different study from dogmatic theology; certainly not a top-dressing for it. On the contrary, it forms the foundations of dogmatic theology, since, in its developed form, it develops what belongs essentially to the ordinary processes of knowledge. Lex orandi lex credendi cannot be ignored."

Lastly, Ranford's paper is important because he approaches the problem of determining the empirical basis of theology by discussing, - though not always very clearly - the subdivision of theology into its various sorts and kinds. If we were to work out the implications of what he says, I think we should have to try and disentangle about seven different theological subjects; "natural" and "revealed" Dogmatic Theology (which he unites into one); social and individual Moral Theology; Mystical and Ascetical Theology (which he unites into one), and a pictorial form of the general theory of this which he calls "the study of the Mystical life of the Holy Trinity". But if we envisage

all the mystical-cum-ascetic theologies, whether of the creative principle of the Universe (the Trinity), or of the religious group (the Church), or of ourselves, taken as separate individuals, as being somehow parts of one triply interpretable theology, and, if we further envisage the two Moral Theologies as parts of this one,¹ then we are left with two complex aspects of one single, enormous, empirico-theological subject, "natural"-cum-"revealed" dogmatic theology "on the top", as it were, and "underneath", in one single though logically intricate total, all the rest.

Up to this point I have merely followed and made more explicit Ranford's own line of approach. But now I think it more profitable to pass from a distinction between different branches of theology, or theological subjects, to a distinction between different theological terminologies. For obviously, if the whole of theology is now to be one complex empirical subject, there is no point in talking about theological subjects any more. What we are left with is not a bunch of theological subjects, but a bunch of theological terminologies: and we will provisionally define a terminology as "a technical language which has to be learnt and used when making an approach to any field of fact."

As soon as we try to state the whole matter this way, however, we find ourselves dogged at once by two apparently insoluble problems. The first of these is the problem of determining how one theological terminology is to be distinguished from another. The second problem concerns what we might call "the theological facts". What special facts - if any - is theology about? And, - if there are some facts which theology is about - is there any way of describing these same facts which is not theological?

These are the twin problems presented by any attempt to empiricise theology. Ranford is cognisant of them, though not quite explicitly. "There are therefore two questions to be discussed, not one," he says in the passage that I have already quoted, "both what the Christian dogmatic system means; and secondly, what it means in terms of life." We may think at first that Ranford is not attacking our two problems, but two other problems rather like them; but a moment's reflection will convince us that this is not so. For we have only to assume that what Ranford calls "the Christian dogmatic system" is not a logically homogeneous entity but a loosely-knit cluster of different theological

(1) For the contemplative Christian, as opposed to the ordinary moral philosopher, "right conduct" is conduct which genuinely proceeds from and genuinely contributes to "charity". Since Ascetic Theology is the general study of what, in the individual or group, promotes the growth of charity, Moral Theology then becomes the detailed study of a part of it.

ways of thinking (i.e. of what I have called different terminologies) for his two questions to be restatable as ours.

The further question: 'What shall we do next to solve these two insoluble problems?' is one which nearly always causes a mood of philosophic and religious querulousness to arise in the thinker who tries to answer it. It can be argued, of course, by those in the grip of this mood, that the whole idea of trying to empiricise theology is perverse: that there is no point at all in trying to compare theology and science, either from the theological point of view, or the scientific. The question of the extent to which it is profitable to keep the two separate will be discussed at the end of this paper, in §6; the paper's main purpose, however, is to discuss not the extent to which it is profitable to make the comparison, but the extent to which it is possible, given the diversity and complexity of the languages involved. It can also be argued that such a comparison will show at once that theology is not in the least like science; theology, it will be said, is a sort of poetry, and is concerned with feelings, science is an investigational technique, concerned with the exact presentation of facts. People who argue like this, however, usually do not know what science is; they are people who have never come close to scientists or labs. Such people, for instance, will probably have an idea that descriptive, or non-mathematical thinking, forms no part of what is done in doing physics. This error, which is widespread, would be immediately corrected if it were a laboratory rule that tape-recording machines were always to be placed beside cyclotrons and Wilson cloud-chambers. In actual fact, any true account of scientific thinking must be an account of the thoughts which scientists really require to think in doing science, not merely of the much more meagre thoughts which they think they require to think. Then again, there is the very widespread but uninformed feeling that science ought to be homogeneous as well as exact. Paradoxically enough, it is just the philosophers of science of the Ayer type - the ones who want us to hold that theology is "purely emotive" whereas science is "meaningful" - who assimilate their whole picture of science to that of a sort of Platonic metaphysical theology. These philosophers want us to envisage all scientific terminological diversity as being capable of being transcended into one single, all-embracing "physicalistic" formal system, without realising that as soon as this has been done, all their own objections to theology and metaphysics immediately begin to apply to their own conception of science. Surely, however, it would both be more realistic and more sensible to make the theologico-scientific assimilation the reverse way on: i.e. to assimilate our picture of a piecemeal cluster of theological terminologies to that of an equally piecemeal cluster of scientific ones - to assimilate day-to-day theology, as it used to be carried on, to day-to-day science as it actually is carried on. For - speaking broadly - what does "science"

consist of? Of an ever-growing collection of loosely-linked but precisely differentiating terminologies, some deductive, some not, each of which is supposed to be associated with a particular technique, and each of which, taken as a whole, has a connection, usually undefinable, with fact. In terms of these terminologies predictions can be made which are, occasionally, startlingly verified - though after the verification, no one concerned ever feels too sure of just how, or why it occurred, not sure either of exactly in terms of what they are verifying what. And now - speaking now very broadly - what is theology? At a first approximation, something of very much the same kind. For once we have decided that we are dealing with an empiricised theology (i.e. once we base the whole thing, as Ranford does, on the Ascetic-cum-Mystical theologies), then it becomes evident that theology also has its techniques and predictions, and that sometimes these predictions too are startlingly verified. Of course, one might say that the whole thing is infinitely more haphazard than most things in science. But one might also retort that it is much more important than many things in science; that it is imprecise just because it deals with a fundamental, and not with an easily accessible field of fact.

Thus reflection shows that it is not prima facie ridiculous to compare theological with scientific terminologies. And anyone who objects, in a final burst of querulousness, that the comparison cannot possibly be made, on account of the prevalence, in theological terminologies, of concrete pictorial imagery and crude anthropomorphic teleological thinking will show himself, if he is not extremely careful in the way he words his arguments, to be both unsophisticated about science and also ignorant of theology. Developed theologies are about Ens¹ (Esse) (derivation Latin) or about This-and-That (a highly distorted translation from Vedic Sanscrit), or about the \rightarrow , the \Rightarrow and the \Leftarrow (derivation Chinese). Physics is about energy and valency (derivation Greek); morphology is about development and differentiation (derivation Latin), each set of ideas is as abstract as the other; and so it goes on. Clearly you can't say, without qualification, that one discipline uses concrete and infantile ideas, the other abstract and adult ideas. Neither can you say, equally without qualification, that theology thinks in terms of goals and designs, whereas science, which is up to date, thinks mechanistically. Within science, - as also, in a different way, within theology - there can be distinguished right and wrong methods of teleological thinking and right and wrong methods of mechanistic thinking, as also right and wrong methods of using metaphor and image and model of any other kind.

(1) Ens instead of esse because esse (in the scholastic sense as a noun) is invariably misunderstood by scientists and philosophers (cf. below).

We conclude, then, that it may be allowable to say that empiricised theology might be rather like science. But if we admit this, we are immediately brought back, by the admission, to the reconsideration of our twin problems. For these, taken together, ask the question: "Exactly how and in exactly what ways and to what extent is the theologico-scientific comparison to be made?"

I am by no means sure that either of these two problems is soluble. Nevertheless, all the suggestions put forward in this paper are of methods for dealing with one or other of them. Thus in §3 an attempt is made to suggest how theological terminologies might be distinguished; in §4 to suggest how, on an empirical basis, they might be evaluated; in §5 to suggest how we might get nearer to the facts.

But there is one thing which must be faced at the outset. It is no good putting forward any methodological suggestions for dealing with the problems unless we are prepared, before we do this, to give provisional and limited answers to the questions which they ask. For it is the fruitfulness and validity of these preliminary provisional answers which the more detailed methodological suggestions will test. Faced with problems of this depth and complexity, it is no good making an undirected attack.

I will conclude my exposition of this first suggestion, therefore, in a tough-minded manner, by provisionally answering each of the questions in turn. First - taking Christianity, the nearest religion, as my example, and with the help of only the most general philosophical considerations - I will say into what broad logical classes I think theological terminologies tend to fall. I will then state, also intuitively and without making any attempt to argue the position, what I believe to be the main Christian theological field of fact.

It is possible that I should have started this whole paper with the assertion of these two provisional "hypotheses". I wished, however, to begin at the earlier point where Ranford's general argument left off, namely, with an overall glance at the whole problem raised by an empiricised theology. I wished, moreover, to do this without taking over his second, more particular contention, to the effect that science has got directly to explain the "mystic passivity" if scientists wish theologians to take them seriously. This last suggestion of Ranford's has an inescapably literary flavour about it. The suggestions for further scientific investigation of religious material which are made in §4 of this paper are already awkward enough for any working scientist; but they are straightforward and practical compared to Ranford's suggestion as made in his section V. How on earth, such a working scientist might irritably inquire, am I to bring the mystic passivity within the purview of science?

To take first the question of terminologies. I think that Christian theological ways of thinking, or terminologies tend to fall into about six main logical types. The first of these (speaking now quite generally), consists of incantatory formulae, such as are found in the hymn called St Patrick's Breastplate, or exemplified by the key-sentences of the sacramental ceremonies. The second consists of prototypic representations; dramatic ones, such as the Baptismal and Eucharistic rituals, or ideographic ones, set out in pictures or stained glass; or poetic-allegorical ones, such as the Book of Revelation; or temporal-allegoric ones, such as the Church Kalendar; or narrative ones, such as the Gospel of St John. The third class of terminologies consists of metaphysical theories, which either, like the Athanasian creed, provide an official theoretic terminology for the use of the organised ecclesiastical body, or, like the Logos Doctrine, a generalised rationale of the otherwise only prototypically represented facts. The fourth class of terminologies consists of folk descriptions; the more primitive parts of the Gospel of St Mark, for instance, or the "folk-descriptions" alleged to be by eyewitnesses, and included in the canonisation-processes of saints. The fifth class of terminologies consists of pre-scientific generalisations, either poetic and metaphorical in type, or set out as general principles underlying the Rules and Constitutions of Religious Communities. The sixth consists of personal testimonies; documents like the autobiographical parts of St Paul's epistles, and St Teresa of Avila's Interior Castle; these constitute the most adult Christian documents which we have. And in addition to these six types of theological terminology, I think we shall need to distinguish, in an equally rough-and-ready manner, three types of scientific terminology. These would be firstly, scientific descriptive terminologies, secondly, scientific theoretic terminologies, and lastly, factual symbolisms, each consisting of one or more interpretable object, such as a photograph, a "treatment", a slide, or a field-observation, which is such that it is agreed that it can be used for the communication of the facts.

So much for the terminologies: now for the factual field. I believe that that which the Christian religious incantations are designed to induce, the prototypic representations to represent, the metaphysical theories to rationalise, the folk descriptions to marvel at, the pre-scientific generalisations to indicate the outline of the personal testimonies to describe, and the scientific terminologies to reinterpret and reinvestigate, is a fundamental developmental sequence of events which I will call the life-death-resurrection process. This creative - or rather re-creative - process is said by Christian theology to exist even at the scientifically most fundamental level; i.e. in the Ens itself, within the Godhead, beyond physios. The process is also said to exist biologically, "in creation", though the implications of this assertion have never been empirically worked out.

Finally, it is assumed to occur psychobiologically, i.e. to work itself out, in certain individuals especially, in a sharply characterised and recognisable pattern, consisting of an observable sequence of particular events. Above all it is said to have exemplified itself with startling clearness once, in the life and death and subsequent paranormal apparitions of a Palestinian Israelite, a young man who was executed under Roman administration, under strong pressure from the Jewish authorities. In him (the Christian view is) the whole process exploded, as it were, in full force, thus "giving" the whole pattern once and for all in a form which (so the very early Christians fondly thought) would be easily understood. Thus Christian theology takes a life to exemplify a process; it takes the pattern provided by the details of this one life as the prototype of a process which might take place in all lives: possibly also in the life-span of all organisms, - let alone that of the Universe itself.

To anyone who thinks that this account of the whole matter has anything in it at all, Ranford's recommendation to empiricise theology by translating theological accounts of mystical experience into terms of the psychology of mysticism cannot but seem inadequate. For this recommendation neither makes clear just what it is in theology which is going to be empiricised, nor does it give any guidance to the scientist as to how he is to "explain" a series of unobservable and inexpressible mystical experiences. Moreover, the Christian claim, whether true or false, is evidently not merely a psychological one. It cannot therefore be empiricised in terms of one branch of psychology.

We shall return to this point of our argument in §5: i.e. in making the fourth suggestion on our list.

Let us first, however, try to find how to distinguish from one another not the facts, but the fact-conveying terminologies.

§5: the second suggestion that we make use of certain contemporary linguistic and logical techniques to distinguish theological terminologies from one another.

It will be clear at once that the classification of theological terminologies given at the end of the last section is a logical one. It is not, for instance, a rehash of Ranford's division into subjects. To a certain extent, indeed, it reflects current philosophico-logical distinctions. Isolated statements falling within category (a), for example, might be called by some contemporary philosophers performatory statements. I can imagine a discussion, too, in which those in

category (b) would be called story-sub-titles. Those in category (c) are often called regulatory statements, or metaphysical directives, or metaphysical "pictures". Statements in categories (d) and (f) would be descriptive statements; the first kind being of Wisdom's "Other Minds" variety, the second kind based partly on introspection; those in category (e) would be pre-scientific metaphors, or methods of representation, or models. For the reasons developed below, I do not think that this pseudo-philosophic nomenclature helps very much. It does serve, however, to show that it is upon considerations of logical usage, rather than upon distinctions of subject, that the new type of classification is based.

Of course it is true, too, that these category-divisions are not mutually exclusive. An extract from a folk-description (category d), for example, could easily be used as an incantation (category a); and it is arguable that it is often so used, - when occurring, for instance, as a plainsung antiphon. Moreover, several logically differing forms of statement may be, - and often are - included together inside one terminology. Further, both isolated theological statements, and also whole terminologies, must be classified by their use; or rather, by their outward appearance only in so far as this gives a clue to their main use. Lastly, the division into categories given above is an extremely rough-and-ready one. It does not go into the niceties of the anthropological distinctions between incantations, efficacious rituals, secret names, spells proper or other magical formulae; it does not distinguish between a folk-description of something happening for the first time and an origin-myth; it does not distinguish sufficiently clearly between, say, a metaphysical analogy and a pre-scientific metaphor; and so on and so on. There is everything to be said against it except that it is a classification of theological terminologies into several logical categories, not just into one; it makes it more difficult to talk vaguely of "theology".

But if we do not mean to talk vaguely of "theology", still less do we want to talk vaguely of "terminologies", or of "logical categories of terminologies". It therefore becomes imperative to discover some logical procedures which will enable us to clarify our general notions of a terminology; in particular, our notions of the nature of a terminology, the structure of a terminology, and the boundaries of a terminology, as we shall be using these terms in this theological inquiry. This problem, of developing formal procedures which will enable us to distinguish from one another whole terminologies, or ways of thinking (or, as Wittgenstein called them, statements made in different notations) does not arise only in the study of theological language. It arises also, and pressingly, in the philosophy of inexact science; and also in the comparative study of languages. But theology is an exceptionally good field in which to tackle it. For, if there is one

thing more obvious than another, it is that theological ways of thinking, like poetic ways of thinking and ideographic ways of thinking, but unlike some descriptive-scientific ways of thinking, do not function according to what philosophers persist in calling "the dictates of common sense"; that is according to Western European late nineteenth-century conceptions of how concepts and statements should be used.

Now the logical and philosophic situation is that there are two techniques at present available for this work, both of which are capable of extremely subtle development in some directions, while subject to very early limitation in others. There is firstly the linguistic-philosophic technique which consists in examining the range of usage of a concept by taking and comparing almost similar cases of its use; a technique the best-known practitioners of which (not counting Wittgenstein himself, who first developed it, and G.E. Moore, who originated it) are Wisdom and Ryle. This technique is a development and refinement of that used by dictionary-makers; by those detailed dictionary-makers, that is, who give many slightly differing examples of each usage of each concept whose meaning, or general usage, they are examining. A good example of such a "spread" of slightly differing examples is to be found, for instance, in the analysis, in the larger Lewis and Short's Latin-English dictionary of the meanings of the Latin word res. It is important to grasp the implications of the fact, however, that the new philosophic technique employs extra refinements which the dictionary-makers do not use. It distinguishes, for example, two apparently similar usages of a concept (the concept being embedded, in each case, in a statement) by drawing logical consequences, in each case, from the statement, or, it contrasts the two usages by comparing each to a logically more sharply defined analogue, and then contrasting the differences of usage between the two analogues. Or it relates the usage, in the case of each statement and in detail, to situations in which it would be completely natural to assert the statement; and then examines how the two situations, rather than the two statements, differ from one another.

I shall call this general technique Usage Analysis; it is the most subtle technique known for examining apparently similar usages of a concept or statement. But it is subject to several very serious limitations. The first of these arises from the fact that its use presupposes that there is only one, agreed, intuitively known way of drawing logical consequences, or of relating a statement into the situation which it "fits", or of comparing a statement with its analogue. The second limitation, which is a result of the first (that is, from the fact that the whole technique rests upon the performance of intuitive logical operations, not explicit ones), is that, in practice, the technique can only be employed to analyse the usages either of single

concepts or of very short whole statements. Wisdom once brilliantly distinguished, by means of it, agreed differences of usage in the following whole statements:¹

"Matter exists": (logical consequence: I put up my hand and my hand is solid and material enough, isn't it?).

"Matter doesn't exist": (analogue: "Fairies, unicorns, dinosaurs don't exist").

"Matter doesn't really exist": (analogue: "There's no such thing as Beauty; Beauty doesn't really exist").

"Material things are nothing over and above sensations": (logical equivalent: "statements about material things can be analysed into statements about sensations").

"Matter is just sensations": (said with a desire to shock: analogue: "There's no such thing as thought or feeling, only patterns of behaviour").

"I don't believe in matter": (analogue: "The ship is bearing down on us but I don't believe there's anyone aboard").

"Matter is a fiction": (certain indirect empirical expectations or non-expectations could genuinely be held to follow from this).

"Matter is a logical fiction": (logical equivalent: "matter is a construction out of sensations").

But no one has successfully applied the method to any units of discourse longer than those given above, and indeed it has taken great intuitive expertise on Wisdom's part to apply it to distinguish these. It is clear, therefore, that this is not likely to be the right technique for distinguishing whole theological terminologies.

The situation becomes quite different when we consider the second widely current linguistic analytic technique, that of formal logic. For formal logicians revel in long formulae. Nor do they, in any ordinary sense of the word "intuition", use merely intuitive procedures

(1) John Wisdom, Moore's Technique, reprinted in his book Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis (Blackwell, 1953), from The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, The Library of Living Philosophers, 1944.

to compare formulae with one another, to contrast them with one another, or to deduce them from one another. It seems at first sight, then, that this is the technique which we need. But actual experience destroys this hope. Formal logic, in present practice, means propositional logic; and it is a truism that propositional logic does not fit any actual language or form of language, prose, poetry or incantation, Lithuanian or Chinese. It is not necessary to go into technicalities to make clear that both the "fit" and the "feel" of propositional logic are quite different from those of any natural language or form of language which is known. For granted that p can stand for any statement, and q for any other statement, and granted, too, that, say, " \supset " can be taken to mean "implies" (in some sense) and " \neg " to mean "not", and " \wedge " to mean "and" (which is already granting a great deal that ought not to be granted) even then, when propositional logic is thus "connected up" with (or "fitted on to") real language, its "feel" (that is the kind of formulae which the logic exists to produce and examine) remains utterly different from that of statements made in any known form of language. Take, for instance, the formula

$$\mathcal{Q}((p \cdot q) \supset \{([p \cdot \neg r] \supset q) \supset (p \supset \neg r)\})$$

" p and q implies that p and not $\neg r$ implying q implies that p implies not $\neg r$ ".

"The tree is green and I am happy implies that the fact that the tree is green and the sun is not shining implying that I am happy implies that I am happy implies that the sun is not shining."

Who in their senses would ever want to make a remark like that? Logically, the relationships disclosed by propositional logic may be interesting. Linguistically and philosophically, i.e. when interpreted as statements in an actual language, they are trivial and puerile.

If we are to tackle our original problem then, there seem to be only two courses open to us. The first is to find a kind of formal logic which, as compared to propositional logic, better fits theological languages, and to analyse theological statements in terms of that. I have followed this course in my Analysis of a Religious Paradox (IV in this volume), but there are evident disadvantages to it arising from the fact that no form of formal logic really fits a language. The second course is to find a linguistic analytic technique which allows of the subtle usage-distinctions being made which a Wisdom or a Ryle would want to make, but which can be applied to larger units of discourse. This technique, I suggest, or something very like it, is foreshadowed in the logical analytic technique now being used for "structural analysis" by those who are concerned with the comparative

study of languages. Some development of this, I submit, could be adapted for our present purpose, provided (1) that it took for its elements whole words (morphemes) instead of single sounds (phonemes), and (2) that it was used to analyse and compare terminologies occurring within a natural language, rather than the whole natural language itself.

I have no space here to argue that the analytic procedures employed by structural linguists are logical analytic procedures and not linguistic ones; that is, that they form no part of the more old-fashioned study of learning to acquire skill in using a new language. Fortunately, the fact that this is so has just been made explicit beyond any reasonable doubt by a structural linguist who has worked with formal logicians.¹ Moreover, the two adaptations of the technique suggested above, which are designed so as to enable it to operate both on a larger scale and over a narrower range, are already being used to some extent. What I am here suggesting, therefore, would not be, for structural linguists, an innovation. It is an innovation only for formal logicians, grammarians and linguistic philosophers.

For them, however, this technique is an innovation of so startling a kind that I have very little hope of being able to explain to them in a few words what it is, and still less hope of being able to persuade them to employ it. And that leads me back to the fundamental point which I made in my preface, namely that what is known in philosophic circles as "the religion and science problem" cannot at present be attacked because neither general philosophers or theologians are prepared to envisage undertaking the huge amount of detailed work which will have to be done in several fields if the gulf between theological and scientific thinking is ever to be crossed. For all the suggestions which are put forward in this paper can be ignored as having two damning philosophic defects; the first, that they nearly all require the establishment of control of unfamiliar detail; the second, that they are nearly all strictly practical. The fact that the study of detail is psychologically necessary to philosophers, in that the roots of the true abstract imagination lie in the childish qualities, in the childish eye, childish curiosity, childish wonder, is something which philosophers themselves, taken as a race, always refuse to admit. Nor do they face, a fortiori, the immediate consequence of this admission, which is that if you suppress the adult analogues of these childish qualities, by refusing to fiddle, refusing to look at new things, refusing to probe in detail (in an untroubled, relaxed sort of way), into beautiful new intellectual worlds, the roots, even of the purest logical or mathematical intuition, will be cut off, so that the whole plant eventually dries up.

(1) Zellig Harris, Methods of Structural Linguistics (Chicago, 1951).

But the matter is more important even than that. The pursuit of crucial detail, at the growing points of thought, is an absolutely vital philosophical activity, which heralds every great philosophic advance.¹ So much is this so that the decision to avoid it is the decision, ultimately, to stop doing general philosophy. But it does not follow from this, as scientists sometimes think it does, that all philosophers have got to become wholly extroverted and tough-minded, since philosophy is going to turn into a practical laboratory activity, pursuable by machines; or that philosophy has now become the sort of activity in which "armchair thinking" and solitary self-torture in pursuit of truth have no longer any place. Far from it. The philosopher, unlike the scientist, learns to control detail precisely in order to draw new general implications from the new detailed knowledge which he gets; he should make use of his own practical and extroverted moments precisely in order to make sure that his own power of generalising has not become disordered, - that what he is giving his general picture of is not merely a part of his own fancy, but real life itself. His difficulty should be not that he is unwilling or unable to assimilate any new discipline whatever; but that he is not clear into which fields of detail he should enter; that he has not yet located the contemporary growing-points of thought. Indeed, it is in deciding where these growing points of thought are that he acts, most characteristically, as a general philosopher.

To return now to our present immediate objective, which is structural linguistics. It may well be that the development of this new discipline, together with that of information theory, does not constitute one of the key-facts about which general philosophers should learn. My judgment is, however, that we have here, par excellence, just such a key fact; since the concurrent successful development of these two disciplines will lead us, inevitably, to more fundamental conceptions of forms of thought and of language, and thus to the fundamental logical features of the symbol-forming process itself. Structural linguistics is, of course, only a very small part of all this, since it is merely the exact method which is mainly used by contemporary linguists for the comparative study of natural languages. Nevertheless, it gives the "feel" of all the rest; and the rest, as I have said, is a contemporary field of detail the assimilation of which cannot indefinitely be shirked by any thinker, general philosopher or dogmatic theologian though he be.

(1) K.R. Popper, Nature of Philosophic Problems and their Roots in Science (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, August, 1952).

The main object of this technique¹ of structural linguistics is to describe the structure of a particular language or way of thinking, not in terms of pieces of discourse which do occur in it, but of pieces of discourse which don't; that is, in terms of restrictions upon the possibilities of combination of its elements. An element, in this technique, is the logical unit; it can be either a single significant sound, a phoneme (very vaguely speaking a letter), or a significant combination of sounds, a morpheme (very roughly speaking, a word). If necessary, the element could be the whole sentence, or utterance. Each element is presumed to have an environment. For a phoneme, or sound, this is usually presumed to be the sounds before and after it, provided that these sounds can also occur in other combinations; but a more extensive environment can be used if required. The assumption upon which the whole technique is based is: provided that the analytic techniques used are sufficiently refined, every change of meaning in the use of a language will produce a change of environment. Thus meaning can be examined in terms of contextual environment. Thus, far from "eliminating meaning", as its critics allege, the whole discipline is founded upon the study of it; with the reservation that the "meaning" studied is not the crude fixed "meaning" presupposed to exist in language by formal logicians (sometimes also by grammarians) but the same subtle "meaning-given-by-usage" which is the object of study of Wisdom and Ryle.

In order to obtain boundaries to the language or terminology, a stock of connected or unconnected utterances is chosen which all speakers would agree to be typical of the way of thinking, or of the language. These, together, constitute the corpus. In practice, we choose these utterances rather than others as belonging together because historically they have belonged together, and this is where, in spite of logicians' protests to the contrary, genetic considerations become relevant in determining the boundaries of the terminology or language. Until the last stage of the analysis, this corpus is presumed to be co-extensive with the whole terminology or language. At the last stage, however, when the formal description of the structure of the corpus is as complete as it can be made, a formal logical system is created to correspond to it, i.e. the rules of which reproduce its main features. Then, by turning formulae produced in the system back into actual utterances in the terminology (as was done, above, in the case of propositional logic) the "feel" of the system can be tested and the wisdom of choice of the original stock of utterances checked.

(1) The main centre of the development of the technique is the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: the main object of developing it is to make electronic machines capable of translating from one natural language into another: the formal logician who is mainly concerned with it is Professor Joshua Bar-Hillel; the structural linguist who is mainly concerned with it is Professor Zellig Harris.

The crucial procedure of the technique (apart from a set of procedures designed to distinguish significant elements, at any level, from noises or gibberish) consists of the application of a principle called the Principle of Complementary Distribution. The distribution of an element is the totality of its environments. This principle asserts that two elements, A and A' (two elements, that is, which are usually very like one another) are in complementary distribution, when A is never found in any environment in which A' is found, nor A' in any environment in which A is found. Thus the t sound which occurs at the beginning of words like "tree", and the not very different t sound which occurs in the middle of words like "setting" are, in English, in complementary distribution; in environments where you find one, you never find the other. This, of course, is only one English rule of complementary distribution; there are many more. When the total complementarity of the language, at every level, has been determined, it will emerge that the rules of complementarity are themselves interrelated, sometimes in considerably complex ways. These interrelations constitute the structure of the corpus, the grammar of the language.

I have obviously no space or time here adequately to illustrate this new linguistic analytic method. All I can do is give one single illustration of its use in establishing one rule of complementarity of utterance "in theology". Take now the two theological utterances Jesus Christ is both God and Man, and Jesus Christ was a god, and he was a man. Now, if we want to include both these utterances within the corpus of a theological metaphysical terminology, I think we shall find that they are in complementary distribution; wherever one is found, the other is not, and this in spite of the fact that they are not, prima facie, incompatible. It might, however, be wiser to use this complementarity of distribution as one criterion for determining the boundaries of a terminology, rather than as a rule of its internal structure. We will then say, as Athanasius in effect said, "Any utterance which includes, at any point, the sequence of elements Jesus Christ is God and Man shall be included in our terminology: but any utterance which contains, at any points, the sequences of elements Jesus Christ was a god, Jesus Christ was a man, Jesus Christ was a man but not a god, Jesus Christ was a man but not God, Jesus Christ was Man but not God, Jesus Christ was God, but not Man, Jesus Christ was God but not a Man, Jesus Christ was a god, but not a man, - all these shall not be included in the terminology. Moreover, there exists a further obvious restriction of occurrence which governs the distribution of the elements which form these sequences. This can be stated by saying that in the sequence Jesus Christ ... God and Man the gap must be filled by the 3rd person singular of the present tense of the verb to be, i.e. by is; whereas in any of the other sequences, if a comparable gap is left, it must be filled by the third person singular of the past tense of the verb to be, i.e. by was. You cannot say Jesus Christ was (or will be)

God and Man; and you cannot say, e.g. Jesus Christ is (or will be) a god, but not a man.¹ Therefore is and was, in this corpus, are complementary in distribution.

This extraordinarily sketchy example of the working of the crucial principle of structural linguistic analysis, inadequate as it is, will here have to suffice. Various criticisms can be levelled against the whole method: to the effect that an analysis of this type could go on indefinitely and would thus be impossibly cumbersome; to the effect that if this method of analysis is adopted, it will show, not only that each writer's writings has its own grammatical structure, but also that this varies as between occasion and occasion;² and so on. Actual use of the method, however, does much to refute these criticisms. It is found possible to produce a complete structural description of a corpus; and it is found possible to discern and to discover broad differences of grammatical structure, as well as narrow ones. I suggest the application of the method to this field, because it seems to me to fit it; forbidding the use of certain utterances or of certain sequences of elements as being heretical, and thus restricting the distribution of their elements, was just what the theologians of the early centuries always did. Moreover, often, they did this in an authoritarian manner because lex orandi, as Ranford hints, had become lex credendi; an utterance, that is, which had been, for some reason, ritually taboo became epistemologically heretical. Moreover, this sort of rationale of restriction of utterance is still made.³ Against this type of theological restriction of utterance the whole modern world has very violently revolted; and this revolt, in itself, has discredited theology.

In this situation, the use of this new analytic method by theologians to discover, speaking grammatically and logically, just what has happened, would constitute, at the least, an act of amendment for the grammatical high-handedness of their forbears. If any of the theological grammatical and logical structures thus discovered turned out also to be fundamental or interesting ones, it might also constitute, in part at least, a twentieth century theological riposte.

- (1) It can be argued that circumstances might arise in which this last might be said; and it can be argued, too, that some of the sequences given here are non-occurrent. Both these difficulties are taken care of, however, if there is, from the beginning of the analysis, an agreed corpus.
- (2) Compare this with the current philosophic aphorism Every statement has its own logic.
- (3) This is another instance of where genetic considerations become relevant.

§4: the third suggestion: that we regard the important epistemological distinction between theological terminologies to be, not that between terminologies which are SIGNIFICANT and terminologies which are MEANINGLESS, but that between terminologies which are FERTILE and terminologies which are STERILE.

Anyone who has reflected seriously upon the nature of the techniques mentioned in the last section will see that in the naïf form in which he first asked it, Ayer's question, posed in vacuo, as to whether a theological concept, phrase, statement or whole terminology is, or is not meaningless is a question which it is just not reasonable to ask. For the question presupposes that both questioner and answerer know in every case what "the correct meaning" is. But the presupposition behind the first and the last of the techniques mentioned in the last section is both that the meaning of each of these theological language-forms depends upon their context, environment and use (and varies with their context, environment and use); and also that the usage of any particular concept, phrase or statement cannot be ascertained merely by studying it in isolation, but only by studying also the "grammatical structure" (in the sense we have defined) of the whole terminology, or way of thinking, within which it is normally found.

The question arises, then, as to how the empiricist is to evaluate theological terminologies, if the "significant-meaningless" type of criterion no longer applies. It might be said that it does apply, not to the isolated concept or phrase or statement, but to the whole terminology, which, taken as a whole, has meaning only in terms of the operations which verify it. But this approach to the problem (the technical name for it is the Operationist approach) leads, even in inexact science, to endless difficulties,¹ and in the case of empirical theological terminologies it would lead to even worse ones, since it does not allow of any theoretical hypotheses being meaningful until operations have been discovered which could verify them. It might be said, too, that theological terminologies must be evaluated by means of quite different kinds of criterion. A theological terminology could be evaluated by therapeutic criteria, for instance ("that terminology is the best which goes the furthest towards sending us into ecstasy"), or by aesthetic criteria ("that terminology is the best the use of which produces the moments of sheerest beauty in worship, thus momentarily creating the heaven it talks about"). But though, speaking logically, there is quite a lot to be said in favour of each of these two criteria (the first presupposes a conception of language as a therapeutic agent,

(1) For an account of these, see particularly Symposium on Operationism, The Psychological Review, vol.52, No.5, September, 1945.

and the second a conception of language as a creative agent, and, under certain circumstances, both of these conceptions can be justified), yet it is evident that neither of them is the criterion which the philosopher qua philosopher is looking for. What the philosopher desires is an evaluative criterion for connecting the terminologies with the facts, which is such that he shall be able to say, "this terminology connects better with the facts than that one does". In short, we must now consider the second of our twin problems mentioned in §2.

Suppose now, this being the case, that we pursue the analogy which was opened up at the end of §2, between a "cluster" of theological terminologies and a "cluster" of scientific terminologies. If we do this it will immediately be clear, in general, that we ought to apply the same evaluative criteria to theological terminologies as to scientific ones, and, in particular, that we ought to apply that criterion which distinguishes fertile terminologies from sterile ones. If we apply this criterion, instead of the "significance-meaningless" criterion, the enemies of religious ways of thinking can now say, not that theological statements are meaningless, but that theological terminologies are sterile; that they don't lead anywhere; that no new lines of research come out of them; that their development and amplification result neither in the investigation of new forms of knowledge, nor to a deeper and more precise understanding of that fundamental field of knowledge which they already profess to be able inadequately to cover. "The theistic hypothesis", such a critic will say, "is like the hypothesis asserting the existence of absolute simultaneity, or of fixed species, or of the all-pervading ether, or of phlogiston, or, indeed, of Ptolemaic epicycles. You can still assert these hypotheses if you insist on doing so; you can also carry on, if you do assert them, with the outdated ways of thinking to which their assertion naturally leads. But, if you do, you will find that these ways of thinking are sterile; they add nothing to knowledge; they usually cannot be confirmed or falsified, and, above all, they don't lead anywhere." As against this, the friends of religious ways of thinking can now say, "Are you sure that all theological terminologies are scientifically sterile? After all, you can't tell whether a scientific way of thinking is fertile or not just by looking at it. You've got to handle it, to know what can come out of it, how it can be used, what techniques of investigation inspired it or are associated with it, what hypotheses it suggests or might suggest; and so on. Moreover sometimes pre-scientific ways of thinking like the ancient Greek form of the atomic theory, which, at one stage, are thought for generations at a time to be completely fruitless and sterile, at a later stage may be seen to have contained, in seminal form, some fundamental truth. So are you really in a position to assert, thus cavalierly and a priori, that none of these ancient theological terminologies are any good?"

As soon as the controversy is put this way, one thing immediately stands out with dazzling clarity, which is that we have at present no foolproof and unsophisticated criterion for distinguishing between fertile and sterile ways of thinking, in the case either of pre-scientific fields of endeavour, such as the theological or the social-psychological, or in the case of fields of endeavour covered by a science or group of sciences in a very early stage (such as those covered by the ecological sciences, or those depending on comparative psychology¹). In such a situation, the only thing to do is to suggest the best available criterion, even though it may be (like the one I am going to suggest), a criterion which combines the disadvantage of being both complex and sophisticated and also, except when used with care and with precautions, vague and difficult to check.

I suggest the following definition of terminological fertility: that terminology, at the pre-scientific stage, is to be taken as most fertile which logically "suggests" the greatest number of other terminologies; which initiates, that is, either the longest chain of "matches" with other terminologies, or the greatest number of possible chains of such "matches", or both.

As this sounds at first just plain gibberish, I had better try to explain a little what I mean. In §3 mention was made of a technique which consisted of comparing a statement, in some particular usage, with an analogue. For instance, in the long example from Wisdom there given, the statement "Matter doesn't exist" was compared with the analogue: "Fairies, unicorns, dinosaurs don't exist", whereas the statement "Matter doesn't really exist" was compared with the analogue: "Beauty doesn't really exist; there's no such thing as Beauty" (see Text Fig.I.1). Thus, in each case, the statement under discussion was matched with another, analogous statement; and though we might be hard put to it to say exactly in what the matching process consisted in each of these cases, yet we would readily agree that, as we would say, "the analogy was there".

The suggestion now being put forward is that, in fact, in our intuitive theory-making operations, and especially in pre-science, we match not only individual statements, but whole ways of thinking, whole terminologies. This matching is often at present an intuitive, rough and ready affair; but need it be? If we had more exact ways, as suggested in §3, for describing terminologies, then it stands to reason that we should also acquire more exact ways of matching terminologies, either directly, by matching description with description; or indirectly, by matching calculus with calculus. In any case, I think

(1) Nearly all sciences, even physics, are at a very early stage.

TEXT FIG. I

DIFFERENT MATCHING - PROCESSES IN LANGUAGE

(In each example given "a" is to be matched with "b" etc.)

1 (a) *Matter doesn't really exist*

(b) *Beauty doesn't really exist*
 [After Wisdom]

孟子曰

2 (a) 萬乘之國弑其君者必千乘之家

(b) 千乘之國弑其君者必百乘之家

[After Mencius]

3 (a) $[(p \cdot q) \supset r]$

(b) $[p \supset (q \supset r)]$

[After Cooley]

4. A MATCH BETWEEN NUMERICAL CLASSIFICATIONS

Electrons liberated in tissue by radium Q-rays. The figures give the percentages of the total electron energy which are dissipated by electrons liberated with the stated initial energy.

Range of electron energies (emv) -----


- (a) Filter 0.5 m.m. Pt
- (b) 0.5mm. Pt + 1cm Pb
- (c) 0.5mm Pt + 1.5 cm Pb

0 -	0.05-	0.1-	0.15-	0.5-	1-2	TOTAL
0.05	0.1	0.25	0.5	1		
1.5	3.8	17.1	24.9	16.3	26.4	100.0
0.4	1.2	7.1	20.3	33.6	38.0	100.0
0.2	0.6	4.0	15.1	34.1	48.0	100.0

[After Lea]


5. MATCH BETWEEN TWO WAYS OF THINKING

(a) Lateral Aspect of the cerebral hemisphere of Lemur. The frontal and visual areas of the cortex are stippling



[After le Gros Clark]

(b) Diagram showing the relations of the Preconscious (Pcs), conscious (Pct), and repressed (Pcp) perceptions with memory residues with (aud), (surface only), (Repressed)



[After Freud]

6. A NON-MATCH

- (a) 走八十里而止
- (b) 2/6d
- (c) {{{((α)β)γ}}αα}βα}

N.B. These could perhaps be matched by "interpreting" (a) and (c), or by taking the whole as three lines of an esoteric modern poem. In these cases however, it would be the interpretations only which would be matched, not the statement as they stand.

[After Cooley]

[(1 = b) = d]

(a)

it must be conceded that this linguistic activity of finding analogues for statements and units of discourse, that is for matching one usage, one statement or one way of thinking with another, is not only about the most fundamental purpose for which we use language, but also the way, par excellence, in which language itself develops and expands. This point has been constantly made, in the last twenty years, by poets and literary critics¹; and also by sinologues talking about parallelisms (see Text Fig.I.2); but so far the world of more orthodox logicians has not listened to them. For formal logicians and philosophers of mathematics alike have always tended, until comparatively lately, to cast the "norm" of a logical statement into the form "A is B" (Ba), or "A is equivalent to B" ($A \cong B$), where this new attitude requires that the more fundamental norm should be "A is like B", or "A can be matched with B"; the cases where A is so very like B that it either "is" B or "is equivalent to" B being now regarded as special cases of this more fundamental, though less exact, relationship of matching. Nor does it refute this last assertion to say that, in many cases of such "matches", no logical norm can be held to be relevant, since the factors which would define the nature and scope of the "match" are not supplied. For it is perfectly possible, in any logical analysis, that variables should be included whose values may remain throughout unknown.

Neither does the existence, in a piece of discourse, of the type of linkage known as logical deduction refute the assertion that the fundamental relationship between all sizes of logical entities is not one of deducibility, but one of matching. If I say, for instance, "p implies q, and q implies r, therefore p implies r", the whole statement really asserts an intricate match between the statements "p implies q and q implies r" and "p implies r"; a match, that is, which is a little more intricate than at first meets the eye (see Text Fig. I.3). When, however, it is whole terminologies which are being "matched", and when, the whole matching-process is done "in ordinary language" (as we loosely say), or by means of diagrams or models (see Text Fig.I.4,5) without previous exact analysis of either of the terminologies which are being matched, then the match will very rarely turn out to be of this close, intricate, deductive kind.

All that I am saying comes to this: everybody knows that the operations of defining, transforming or otherwise manipulating symbols are logical operations, and fundamental ones at that. But no one allows for the fact that, before any of these operations can be performed, like symbols have got to be "matched" (see Text Fig.I.6), and

(1) See particularly I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936) and How to Read a Page (1943); Owen Barfield, Poetic Diction, a study in meaning (1928); and William Empson, The Structure of Complex Words (1951).

this omission turns out to be important when what we are discussing is not the logical process of linking individual concepts or statements, but that of linking whole ways of thinking, or terminologies.


Now, how shall we describe the matching processes between terminologies in such a way that the distinction emerges between a terminology which is fertile in producing matches, and one which is not? The only way in which, as I think, I can do this in a few words is by making use, myself, of a game-analogy, namely that between matching in scientific theory-making and playing dominoes. Dominoes is the matching game, par excellence; and when, in playing dominoes, the player cannot match any of the dominoes which remain in his hand with any of the dominoes which are "in play", on the board (if he is playing by himself), the game simple ends. Now, in this scientific dominoes, it is perfectly true that the terminologies, the dominoes, never quite match; if they match at three or four salient points, the matcher has done well. It is also true that, in this scientific dominoes, matching must be continuous; the two ends of the domino, must also be like one another. The designing of a new and cunning domino (to continue the metaphor) is the making of a "key" scientific discovery. Kepler's Domino, for instance, which can be conceived of as having a pattern of concentric circles at one end of it, and a corresponding pattern of confocal ellipses at the other, was outstanding; so was Newton's, with a pattern of unequally-sized objects falling on another object at one end, and a corresponding pattern of the same things pulling at one another at the other. But other remarkable dominoes have been designed; and the game of scientific domino-playing still goes on. For however complex and intricate the deductively-intracconnected patterns which are matched, it still remains true that matching, rather than deducing, is the more fundamental logical operation in science; that domino-playing, not deducing, is the fundamental scientific act.

Now in the diagram (Text Fig. II) which immediately follows, an attempt is made to apply this whole domino-playing conception to theology. A rough-and-ready attempt is there made to show the main ways in which earlier Christian theological terminologies have been matched by later ones, and to show also which lines of match are still "in play" and which are not. Since the division into kinds of terminologies upon which the whole diagram is based is only the rough-and-ready division given in §2, the objective value of the diagram is clearly not very great. Nevertheless, it gives a rough general idea of how this cosmic game of dominoes has actually been played.

Of course the picture of the actual "matching-process" which is given here is as rough-and-ready as the choice of terminologies. For instance, no one who was skilled at comparing different ways of thinking could seriously maintain that a direct "match" could be made between

DIAGRAM INDICATING POSSIBILITIES OF "MATCHING" BETWEEN THEOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC TERMINOLOGIES


TEXT FIG. II



KEY TO TEXT FIG. II

I. The different types of terminology are indicated by different kinds of lettering.


- a) The Prototypic Terminologies are indicated by single, heavily-drawn single letters, Hebrew or Greek, thus:




- b) Metaphysical Terminologies are indicated by upper-case sans serif type, thus:




- c) Folk Descriptions are indicated by German Gothic type, thus:




- d) Personal Testimonies are indicated in cursive script, thus:




- e) Pre-scientific terminologies are indicated by italics, thus:




- f) Scientific Descriptive Terminologies are indicated by upper-case italic type, thus:



- g) Scientific Theoretic Terminologies are indicated by upper-case Roman type, thus:



- h) "Facts" are indicated thus:



II. Junctures are indicated by single or double arrows, drawn with continuous or broken lines, as follows:


- a) A single arrow running from the Terminology [A] to the terminology [B] is to be interpreted as: "B can be considered as a match for A". It is written thus:



- b) A double arrow joining two terminologies is to be interpreted as "Each of these two terminologies can be considered as having been matched with the other". It is written thus:



- c) Boundaries of, and connections between, not yet existent terminologies are written with a broken line, thus:



III. The flow of time is to be interpreted as going from left to right, as indicated by the long arrow at the bottom of the diagram.

The Life-Death Resurrection Process
 FLOW OF TIME
 B.C.

what I have called "Greek Trinitarian Theory" - between, say, the way of thinking embodied in the Athanasian Creed - and the "mana-terminologies" collected by the social anthropologists of the first quarter of this century. The truer set of "matches" make a much longer series. They would consist firstly of the match between the more primitive pre-Socratic and Orphic Greek terminologies with their concept of "strength", and the social-anthropological reconstructions with their concept of "mana"; then of that between the later Greek Sophistic-cum-mystical ways of thinking, and Platonism; then that between Platonism and Neo-Platonism; then that between Neo-Platonism and the Logos doctrine; and then that between the Logos doctrine and Athanasian theory. This whole series of matches I have barbarously telescoped, for simplicity's sake; and comparable simplifications have been made throughout.¹

The object of the diagram is two-fold; firstly to show the sterility of the matching processes at the top, as contrasted with the fertility of those at the bottom, and secondly, to try and throw a little more light upon the nature of the matching-process itself. The two dead ends (marked by question-marks) at the top of the diagram represent what one might call respectively the Comparative Religion Dead End, and the Mystical Physicists' Dead End. With regard to the first, it has been admitted already that a startling "match" can be made between anthropologically primitive ideas of "mana" and more evolved Christian religious ideas of "grace". But having once matched these, what more can we say? There is at present no further terminology, either existent or imaginable, with which any further "match" can be made.

Similarly, it is often truly said that the sophisticated basic ways of thinking of modern fundamental physics fit in much better with scholastic and neo-scholastic ways of thinking than those of Newtonian mechanics ever did. But when this has been said, what else is there to say? There are at present no two terminologies, scholastic and physical, between which any direct match can be made; and any attempt to create intermediate terminologies (unless so many precautions are taken that the complexities and distortions of the matching processes

- (1) It may seem strange to include "facts" among the terminologies. But firstly, the communication of facts always involves the use of some symbolism which has to be interpreted, even if it is the symbolism of photographs of microscope slides. Secondly, the findings of Gestalt Psychologists show us that, even in our perceptions themselves we tend to impose "patterns" on the facts; and it is not yet clear that people of differing linguistic traditions always impose the same type of pattern on the facts.

become all but intolerable) will almost certainly result in a conception of a God who, in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics, is "running down".

So this way of thinking, too, seems to come to an end; it is at present sterile. But the ways of thinking which have initiated the matching-processes portrayed lower in the diagram are not proving sterile; in the next section, advantage is taken of this fact. And the contrast which can be drawn between the two sterile ways of thinking just discussed, and the more fertile ways of thinking shown at the bottom of the diagram does throw a little more light on the nature of the matching process itself. It becomes clear, for instance, that no direct matches can be made between any fully theological and any fully scientific terminologies. Even the uncouth, rough-and-ready matching processes shown in the diagram presuppose the creation of two new descriptive-scientific terminologies, the biology of ascetic development and the psychobiology of ascetic groups. The creation of these would in its turn and in the long run have an effect upon the principles of the General Theories of Physiology and Biochemistry of the future, and this fact in its turn enables a second generalisation about the whole matching process to be made. This second generalisation is to the effect that a theologico-scientific matching process can only successfully be undertaken if the earlier terminology affects the later one as much as the later one affects the earlier one. For instance, if the suggestion which is to be made in the next section is well based, to the effect that ascetic development, both as described metaphorically, by religious contemplatives, and as described behaviouristically, in religious Constitutions and Rules, far from being a biological aberration or a perversion, represents a fundamental kind of developmental process, then the implications of this fact will very considerably affect the future development of a whole group of sciences, ranging from bio-chemistry to psycho-analysis. In the scholasticism-physics matching-process, however, this condition, i.e. that each terminology should contribute something to the "match" was not fulfilled. There is nothing in scholasticism which can help modern physics; it was in no way due to the effects of scholastic ways of thinking about Ens or Esse that the notion of energy was substituted as the fundamental notion of physics, for the more limited Newtonian idea of mass. The result is that, from the scientific point of view, the match is not worth making; and the result of this is that the whole train of thought has become sterile.

There is a third characteristic of the matching-process which the diagram itself does not bring out, though the previous explanation made an attempt to do so. This is that the "match" may be either vague or exact. It may be made either between pre-scientific metaphors, or between statements made in different technical terminologies, or

between sets of equations framed in different branches of mathematics. Thus to talk vaguely about it, as I have done, does not necessarily mean that the process itself is vague.

In the next section more will be said about two particular "matches", and about the trains of thought to which they lead.

§5: the fourth suggestion - that, as two theological terminologies, in particular, stand out as scientifically fertile, the two fields of fact towards which these point should be further investigated

In the "matching game" shown in Diagram II, two lines of play, in particular, were found to be fertile; firstly, that which led through the pre-scientific generalised terminology labelled General Mystical Metaphors, to a new branch of biological science which I have called The Psycho-Biology of Ascetic Development; secondly, that which led through the pre-scientific terminology labelled Religious Rules and Constitutions, to a new branch of social science which I have called The Psycho-Biology of Ascetic Groups. Thus I suggest the creation of two new branches of subsidiary science, each of which, in its turn, would have direct and indirect effects in causing reformulations of the more general theories of morphology and physiology.

The general terminology labelled General Mystical Metaphors is not, of course, a genuine theological entity. The first step, therefore, is to construct it; and Diagram III suggests a method for doing this. Psychologists of religion who complain that no direct correlations can be found between the different accounts of contemplative mystical experiences have far too naive a conception of the kind of thing such a correlation (speaking logically) would have to look like. If the correlating principle is made a little more complicated, the whole situation changes; a remarkable degree of correlation, in fact, can be found, both between the apparently differing accounts of Christian contemplatives and between these and the accounts given by contemplatives in other traditions. From the theological - that is, from Ranford's - point of view, I think that the necessary assumption that all advanced contemplatives become aware, in some sense, of "the same thing" can be reconciled more easily than is usually thought with the facts upon which Ranford himself lays such stress, to the effect that they describe what they have seen in differing terms and that they develop in themselves, as a result of what they "see", widely differing patterns of behaviour. For the facts of which the advanced contemplative becomes aware are not necessarily or directly correlated with the

TEXT FIG. III
 TABLE SHOWING THE DIFFERENT MEANINGS ATTACHED AT DIFFERENT TIMES
 TO THE MYSTICAL TERMINOLOGY OF THE PURGATIVE, ILLUMINATIVE, UNITIVE WAYS

A. ORIGINAL ANCIENT MEANING OF THE THREEFOLD TERMINOLOGY

(Nothing but "passive" graces counted as, very often, among primitive peoples now)

I PURGATIVE WAY	II ILLUMINATIVE WAY	III UNITIVE WAY
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(Notice how well the words fit)

[CONTROL SEQUENCE OF CORRELATED "PATHS" AND "WAYS"]

I Intellectual and emotional enthusiasm. Faulty life. Great intellectual outburst	II Intellectual action mixed with recollection. Emotional enthusiasm "purged" by blankness growing self-knowledge	III Establishment of recollection. Amendment of life. "Simplicity" sets in "Protestant" stage	IV "Active" recollection: then prayer of "quiet" Purgation of sinfulness in night of "faith" Tendency to general psychophysical illness.	V "Passive" contemplation (once only). First onset of Unitive Life. Return of Intellectual balance. Drastic psychophysical "Catholic" stage.	VI Discontinuous unitive graces, now psychophysical Purgation of conscience in night of will. Specific psychophysical illnesses.	VII Stable unitive state Continuous passive contemplation. Conspicuous health. Manifestations of creative genius of "Terrible strength" of the saints.
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B. & C. THE MORE USUAL "CLASSICAL" MEANINGS OF THE THREEFOLD TERMINOLOGY
 (Division better, but terminology now inapplicable, since purgative way "covers period of enthusiasm, and "illuminative way" period of greatest blackness)

B. DURING THE BENEDICTINE CENTURIES

I PURGATIVE WAY	II ILLUMINATIVE WAY	III UNITIVE WAY
-----------------	---------------------	-----------------

C. IN ST. JOHN OF THE CROSS'S WORKS

I PURGATIVE WAY	II ILLUMINATIVE WAY	III UNITIVE WAY
-----------------	---------------------	-----------------

D. EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURY MEANING OF THE THREEFOLD TERMINOLOGY
 (Words again apply to certain extent, but theory is lost.)

I PURGATIVE WAY	II ILLUMINATIVE WAY	III UNITIVE WAY
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(Table reproduced by permission of the Aristotelian Society)

pattern which eventually emerges in his life. This pattern of life is, of course, a reaction to the facts; nevertheless, it will be shaped to a considerable extent by the contemplative's tradition, and, within this, by the prototype of perfection which he holds before his eyes. The Buddhist prototype, for instance (and speaking now only very vaguely and generally), is that of the infinitely wise, infinitely serene and mature, infinitely compassionate, loving, simple and humble sage. The Christian prototype is that of Christ the healer, saviour and prophet, who is yet the servant of the poor and the Suffering Slave; and of him crucified. The result is that in Buddhist countries the contemplatives advise rulers, give helpful and expert counsel, check greed and violence, advance mathematical and philosophical knowledge and spread tolerance, whereas in Christian countries the contemplatives work in the galleys, serve - and ultimately free - the slaves, hatch democracies, nurse plagues, tend lepers and build hospitals. To such an extent, indeed, have the patterns of life imprinted by the two great prototypes diverged, that each of the world's two greatest religions has become impoverished. For the Western Church now urgently needs sages who, though they are also servants and slaves of humanity, really will check violence and advance knowledge, whereas modern Buddhism is in equally urgent need of truly compassionate healers and loving-hearted suffering servants who, though they are both serene, mature and wise, in the Buddhist manner, are also ready, in the Christian manner, to be crucified.

The idea for correlating Christian mystical terminologies which is worked out in Diagram III is a development of the approach to the whole subject made by a Dominican writer, P. Garrigou-Lagrange,¹ who compares the successive "conversions" of contemplative development² to the three crises of growth in the ontogenetic development of the individual. This he does firstly by separating two interpretations of the Christian symbolism of the Three Ways,³ and secondly by postulating two degrees of intensity with which souls can go through the three stages which the symbolism represents. If the soul is "generous", and squarely endures the whole contemplative process, says Garrigou-Lagrange, it becomes a "perfect", a matured contemplative, a "saint". If, on the other hand, the soul is less strong and less generous, it goes through the process partially and unevenly, so that it becomes stunted. In its stunted state, it is not like a soul which has never started to grow; it is far more like a soul which, though it has started to grow, has failed and

(1) P. Garrigou-Lagrange, The Three Ways of the Spiritual Life (Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1938).

(2) In the diagram the transition, in the control-sequence, from states I and II to state III; from III and IV to V; and from VI to VII.

(3) Those marked C and D in Diagram III.

become deformed, through having had a distorted and uneven development.

With the help provided by these two sophistications, Garrigou-Lagrange succeeds in giving a far more successful correlation of mystical descriptions than any other writer has done so far. Moreover the objections which have been raised to his work and to his attitude can largely be discounted in this context, since they are precisely those which literary thinkers have always raised against the work of scientists. In order, however, to make Garrigou-Lagrange's work scientifically fertile, further developments must be postulated to both his doctrines. For, firstly, his conception of physical growth needs greater plasticity; he has confined his observations exclusively to vertebrate mammals, and, as a result, has to postulate the existence of more "stunted souls" than he need. The developmental drive can take more forms, and has at its disposal enormously more resources than he allows for. Secondly, in order to account for the facts of comparative religion, it is necessary to have four main forms of interpretation of the Three Ways Symbolism; not two. And the comparison of the evolution, throughout centuries of time, of these four main types of interpretation, suggests the formulation of a further hypothesis. This is that as man psychologically evolves he acquires more layers; the adult can no longer arrive as easily as the child and the primitive can at the contemplative state marked on the control-sequence as V;¹ he has further to go. Several practical consequences can be drawn from this, if it be taken in conjunction with Garrigou-Lagrange's view. The first is that to legislate for a church, or religious group, as though it contained nothing but children or primitives, in an attempt to induce the onset of states V, VI and VII, is not to make saints, but, on the contrary, to stunt souls. For if the analogy with growth really holds, states V, VI and VII cannot normally be induced until states I to IV have been gone through: just as a rose cannot bear a flower without first bearing a bud. First the intellect of the contemplative must really (and freely) develop; then his pattern of detailed moral intuitions for the improvement of his own soul and of the society around him must genuinely, and without coercion, emerge in his life. Only after all this double process has been completed can the mystical development proper of the contemplative adult begin. Moreover, it is only at this final stage that the traditional procedures for assisting and hastening mystical development proper (procedures such as submission of judgment, conformity to Rule, obedience to ascetic Director, etc.) really apply. Thus, in our time, and through ignorance of all this, we encounter two kinds of equally disconcerting phenomena. The first is that of contemplative secular thinkers, administrators and

(1) cf. Roger Bastide, Les Problèmes de la Vie Mystique (Armand Colin, Paris, 1948).

philosophers who, having passed without knowing it through stages I, II, III and IV, are utterly taken aback by the onset of stage V, which they cannot ignore.¹ The other is that of devout and contemplative believers who, lacking both incentive and courage to think and act for themselves, and thus properly to traverse stages I to IV, never arrive at that stage of development for which their belief and practice would really fit them, namely the later stages, starting with V.² Further, on this view, and with the help of Diagram III, the two main ecclesiastical attitudes of our time towards the whole subject of contemplative development can be explained. The Catholic Church, which has made the mystical educational apparatus obligatory at all stages and upon all, tends more and more to have children and primitives for its saints. Protestant and secular opinion, on the other hand, while training much better than Catholicism does for stages I to IV, denies that there are any mystical stages to go through, and thus diagnoses insanity if people arrive at stage V.


All that remains to be done, in explaining Diagram III, is to say something about the control-sequence of mystical states, the formulation of which owes much to the work of Garrigou-Lagrange. This has been made by first correlating the findings of St Teresa and St John of the Cross, then making these more intelligible with the aid of the more modern-sounding concepts of Augustine Baker, and then sprinkling the whole with conceptual trimmings taken from depth-psychology. It is not fully satisfactory, and not fully self-explanatory; but in the space available no more can be done to explain it.

- (1) The outstanding case of this line of development is found in the French contemplative philosopher, Simone Weil.
- (2) The Catholic answer to all this would be that unless the intellect is "rightly" (i.e. Catholically) trained, and unless the moral sense is "rightly" (i.e. Catholically) formed, true spiritual development can never even begin. This is the hypothesis which is being falsified by the facts, and that even from the Catholic point of view. A power of intellectual judgment which, at the early stage, is never really formed - because the modern Catholic believer does not dare to form it - cannot, at the later stage, be "submitted", simply because there is nothing there to submit. Similarly, a moral sense and conscience which have never fully developed because the owner of them has never felt free to try them out in life, are just not there, at the later stage, to be transformed and re-made. Whereas the non-Catholic who is free, and who blunders about making every possible mistake (though, of course, he may completely wreck himself), may also come safely and completely through, - only, however, all too often to wreck himself on the genuine rocks and snags of the more distant mystical countryside.

There is one further point, however, which needs to be stressed. The criteria which the diagram sets out are qualitative, and therefore what an exact scientist would call "vague"; but this limitation, in this case, is more than balanced by the fact that the diagram points the way to two extremely powerful hypotheses. The first of these asserts the possibility of making the correlations; the second presses the analogy with organic development. And if interesting consequences can be drawn from a hypothesis, scientific experience shows that it may not greatly matter if the criteria for "fitting" these consequences on to reality are indirect (as in fundamental physics) or qualitative and therefore inexact (as here). Lawn tennis is still an interesting and complete game, even though it is not chess. A scientific argument is still a complete and tight scientific argument, even if the criteria for fitting it with the facts are qualitative or statistical. Only (if the argument is to be worth pursuing in practice), the more indirect the fit with the facts, the more powerful has to be the initial hypothesis which it is the aim of the whole argument to put to the test.

Only in the light of this last consideration shall we get a pre-scientific slant upon Diagram IV, which otherwise will appear a work of pure fancy. For whereas the fields in which the hypotheses of Diagram III could be tested are extensive, those in which the hypotheses suggested by Diagram IV can be tested are much more restricted, while the interpretational criteria are even more vague.

Nevertheless, this diagram, like the last, embodies quite a pretty hypothesis, from which wide consequences can be drawn. The hypothesis is that ascetic religious groups (which means, in the favourable case, groups dominated by the contemplatives whose lives were the subject of inquiry in Diagram III) have Rules, or patterns of life which, though different from one another, can be plotted as points on one of two curves given by a double scale. This scale is formed by making use of two criteria, the first of which evaluates "openness of life", i.e. the degree to which members of the group are allowed to mix with the ordinary world, and the second of which evaluates "degree of obedience". This second criterion comprises primarily an estimate of the strength and scope of the group's elective machinery (if any), those groups being estimated as requiring a heavier obedience which are more despotically governed, and a lighter obedience as they are more democratically governed. It also comprises an estimate of the degree to which the particular Rule in question binds "under sin". This means that those Rules are considered as requiring the heaviest obedience which work out as being closest to sealed Army orders given in war, and that those Rules are considered as requiring the lightest obedience which work out as being closest to advisory recommendations for living, which the group member is free, if the circumstances warrant it, to put on one side. The degree of obedience under which a man is living - that



**COMPARATIVE TABLE
OF ASCETIC GROUPS**

TEXT FIG. IV

is, the degree to which the individual is...
 self - is something...
 order to give...
 (Barth's...
 aid of the...
 policy. Barth's...
 religious...
 Diagram IV, just as...
 of Diagram III.

It is possible...
 purpose of Diagram IV...
 point out that if...
 groups can be...
 placed along a curve...
 considering them now as...
 from the larger,...
 they can be considered...
 that which starts from...
 life, and ends up with...
 life of the modern...
 This curve also represents...
 closer contact with...
 which the members wish

This way of...
 the relationship of...
 which they...
 a question...
 or by...
 function of...
 of living...
 living...
 those of...
 function...
 of the...
 society...
 Paris...
 primarily...
 memory...
 course...
 benefit...
 (1) Don...
 Ockler...
 Barth...

is, the degree to which in the last resort, he cannot dispose of himself - is something which it is notoriously difficult to estimate. The criteria given here for estimating it are those proposed by Dom Cuthbert Butler in the comparative chapters of his study of monasticism;¹ but of course these should be supplemented and tested with the aid of the more detailed techniques of group dynamics and social anthropology. Butler's suggestions for making a comparative study of religious Rules have considerably influenced the presentation of Diagram IV, just as the work of Garrigou-Lagrange has influenced that of Diagram III.

It is possible, of course, to reject both criteria completely. The purpose of Diagram IV is not to insist on their acceptance, but to point out that if they are accepted, by making use of them, ascetic groups can be compared in two further ways. Firstly, they can be placed along a curve of withdrawal, according to the extent which - considering them now as sub-groups, - they withdraw, for ascetic purposes, from the larger, primary group of "the world", or of society. Secondly, they can be considered with relation to an alternative curve, namely, that which starts from the enclosed, but unorganised, solitary hermit's life, and ends up with the completely "open", but strictly disciplined life of the modern apostle or evangelist who is a member of a community. This curve also represents a movement of ascetic groups towards a closer contact with society, society being now regarded as something which the members either try to combat or to serve.

This way of looking at the matter brings up the whole question of the relationship of ascetic sub-groups to the larger community within which they occur, and of their roles and functions with regard to it; a question never sufficiently considered either by social scientists or by planners. Various suggestions can be made about this. Is the function of ascetic groups to originate simpler, more vigorous forms of living within an over-sophisticated, over-tired society - forms of living which, with their greater cohesion and directness, foreshadow those of the new society which is destined to supersede the old? The function performed by the primitive Benedictine communities at the end of the Roman Empire seems to lend some colour to this view. Or do ascetic groups come into being to correct some abuse in society which society has not enough flexibility and vitality to correct for itself? The function of St Vincent of Paul's Sisters of Charity in 17th century Paris lends some support to this view. Or do they come into being primarily for conservation purposes, as a sort of corporate race memory? The Christian theological reply to this question would of course be, "Professed religious groups do not primarily exist for the benefit of the larger human society, but for the glory of God." The

(1) Dom Cuthbert Butler, Benedictine Monachism (Longman's, 1924).

widespread existence of such groups, however, in non-Christian societies, some of which are not, in the narrow Christian sense of the word, theist, prevents a satisfactory answer being given to this question in terms of any one religious theology. What we are looking for when we ask this question is a scientific answer, not a theological one, and Diagram IV helps to bring this fact out.

And this brings up the whole problem of the relationship with science proper of these two branches of an empiricised theology, namely the study of General Mystical Metaphors and of Religious Rules and Constitutions. In §2 we talked boldly of a Life-Death-Resurrection process. It is fairly easy to see how this process connects up with any or all interpretations of the Three Ways terminology, and therefore with correlated General Mystical Metaphors, though there still remains the problem of choosing between interpretations A, B, C and D. It is also sufficiently clear how, at a first approximation, this links up with the rules of ascetic groups. What is the process, however, when seen scientifically?

In §2 it was asserted that, according to the Christian claim, the process existed at every scientific level; within "the ground of all that is", i.e. somewhere in physics; within "creation", i.e. somewhere in biology; and within ourselves and especially within the saints, i.e. somewhere within the psycho-biological field. Reason has been given, in §4, for thinking that the attempt to make a match between the Christian view of the world and fundamental physics proves sterile; and this matter is re-discussed, from another angle, in §6. Argument will be henceforward maintained, therefore, on the basis of the point of view maintained throughout this paper, that this process which we are looking for is a deep-seated developmental process; or rather, that it indicates, pre-scientifically, the existence of a fundamental developmental potentiality which comes into effect, and therefore becomes observable, only in very exceptional cases. And it is this last fact - that the whole empirical purpose of the religious terminologies which are compared with one another in Diagram III is to indicate a condition to which humanity might attain, although it does not - which has prevented descriptive science from getting on to its track. Clinical psychology - whose field is the exceptional case - takes correlations of accounts of mystical experience extremely seriously. But experimental psychology - which pursues only an illusive abstraction, a sort of mirage, called the Normal - and morphology, which, in so far as it is an observational science, observes only growth as it is, - these sciences are not going to agree easily to preoccupy themselves with growth as it might be.

On the other hand, - and speaking now purely scientifically - neither of these two sciences are in at all a happy state. Morphologists

know, and experimental psychologists have a well-grounded fear, that the biological sciences have got to be refounded on a theory of development and of differentiation which, to put the matter in a popular way "sees under the surface". Only one descriptive biologist since Darwin, however, has made a serious attempt at this. He was the very great morphologist D'Arcy Thompson,¹ who used simple but elegant mathematical operations to interrelate the forms of different existent organisms, so that these appear as different realised manifestations of a single drive, a drive with a huge unrealised potential. To do this Thompson had to revolutionise the common-sense conception of "growth" to an extent of which the scientific world has not realised the implications even now. In his hands the general conception of growth, or of development, becomes "at once a process and a force". It is considered to have three main forms: (1) ontogenetic development, individual growth, or the development of the individual to maturity, (2) reproductive development, or the special operations which the mature organism develops to increase the numbers of the species, and to reproduce its own strain, and (3) regeneration, the occasional operations of which the organism makes use after injury, to renovate damaged tissue, to replace ablated organs, and to restore, in so far as restoration is possible, its general state of health and balance. Experimental work has done something to show that, to put it popularly, these three are all forms of the same thing (Huxley, 1932). Further experimental work has shown both that this "force of development" exists in an immensely stronger form, within all organisms, than common-sense observation would suggest; and secondly, that this immense force, at every level, is a force to be reckoned with; if it does not "go right", it will "go wrong". In the course of this work, amazing discoveries have been made, - discoveries of which the literary and religious worlds take no account, although they have helped to alter the whole climate of thought of our time. Among these is the discovery that certain "organiser" or "inducing" cells have the property of organising undifferentiated tissue into a complete organ, while other "normal", less developmental cells, though they have, like the others, the property of separating by fission, only produce, when they do so, other cells like themselves. Moreover, sustained attempts to find the biochemical basis of the inducing cells have now produced another far-reaching discovery. This is that though it appears at first sight as though organiser-cells, and ordinary "normal" cells, and pathogenic, or malignant, cancer-causing cells must be, biochemically, different in kind, in fact careful experimentation shows that this is not so. If "normal" cells are subjected to desiccation, extreme temperatures or fat solvents, they become inducing cells, capable (with qualifications) of inducing the development of a whole organ; whereas, under only slightly differing circumstances, i.e. when their environment

(1) D'Arcy W. Thompson, On Growth and Form (1917; 1942).

is of adult rather than of embryonic cells, they can become pathogenic, and capable of inducing malignant growth.¹ Thus, as a philosopher said who had been hearing of this last discovery, "the ascetic principle operates even at the unicellular level". Roast or freeze an ordinary normal cell, and it becomes miraculously able to influence the development of other cells; roast or freeze it in an only slightly less competent (i.e. more mature) environment and it becomes pathogenic, propagating agents which produce cancerous tissue into its whole organic neighbourhood. It's all just the same with cells as with human beings. Roast or freeze a human being just right and in the right environment and he will become a saint, healing, serving and directing for good the whole neighbourhood around. Roast or freeze him just wrong, and in the wrong environment, and he becomes a Hitler; some one who must be cut out of the body politic, before he causes widespread death.

Now, of course, no such analogy as this must be taken too seriously. Neither must the presupposition that there is just one ascetic principle. Notice, however, how far we now are from common-sense; from the popular idea, which is supported also by naïve popular ideas about genetics, that things grow just how they do grow, and, except for monsters and mutations, there's no more to be said. Once postulate an unlimited developmental force within us, the potentialities of which, in the normal course and under normal circumstances, are never realised, and the experiences and happenings recounted by the mystics suddenly make sense. Moreover, it is just those mystical habits which seemed most inexplicable which now look most completely sensible; the "roastings and freezings" (the penitential practices), the enclosures in silence, in desolate places, in cells or in the dark, in order to undergo a sort of metamorphosis, to grow; the increase in various powers which the mature contemplatives claim, - increase of physical powers, of resistance to disease and to fatigue, of regenerative power, of the power to learn, and the power to organise; and so on. In considering this whole matter, although the developmental analogy must not be taken too naïvely, neither must it be taken too lightly. The wildest analogies, in science, are often those which in the end work best, provided always that they open out avenues of detailed research. There is also, at moments of scientific crisis, a good working rule: "after the first, largely descriptive, period, if you wish to 'see under the surface' and to initiate further discovery, refound the general theory on the exceptional case". This is the rule an application of which is here advocated. Just as there are now biological sub-sciences, such as teratology, to study monsters and mutations, in the endeavour to chase all interesting exceptional cases,

(1) J. Holftreter, Concepts on the Mechanism of Embryonic Induction, and its relation to Parthogenesis and Malignancy (Society of Experimental Biology, Symposium II, Growth, 1948).

so now there should be a neo-hagiographical sub-science, a science of exceptional, that is, of ascetic development; and this new sub-science should be given a physiological and biochemical setting, as well as a para-psychological one, by "development" in this context, being taken in the new sophisticated technical sense, not the general common sense one.

The philosophical and theological implications of this suggestion will be discussed in §6. The neuro-physiological and biochemical ones may arouse equal prejudice; but this will be more because the suggestion runs counter to an established de facto habit of scientific thought, rather than because it offends against any basic scientific principle. It is often rather naïvely assumed, by scientists, that though "mental" processes must be assumed to have physiological aspects (since the Mind-Body, the organism, forms a psycho-physical unity), that these effects only occur within the cerebral cortex. They are thus the concern of neuro-physiologists; but they can be ignored by the practitioners of every other science. This naïf experimentalists' solution of what philosophers call the Mind-Body problem, fails to give satisfaction from any point of view. For on the one hand neuro-physiology, with or without the help of the new science of cybernetics, can perfectly well be considered as a self-contained physiological science on its own; it doesn't need to include any "mind" in its subject-matter. And on the other hand, if the assumption of psycho-physical unity, to which so much lip-service is paid, is to be taken seriously, every "mental" event must be held to be also, in some sense, physiological, morphological, biochemical; just as every physiological, morphological and biochemical event, whether introspected or not, must be held to be in some sense or other, "mental". Thus the use of psychological analogies to develop morphological theory may run counter to current scientific practice, but it cannot run counter to fundamental scientific theory; on the contrary, it is directly suggested by the general principle of psycho-physical unity.

It is obvious that if there exists a principle of individual ascetic development, that this principle can also be studied corporately. From the strictly biological point of view, it must be conceded that there is no great point in undertaking this study, except to confirm that there is one unitary developmental process which really does occur in the individual. From the social scientist's and anthropologist's points of view, however, and, even more, from the religious thinker's point of view, there is every reason for undertaking it, since the study itself suggests its own technique. Ascetic groups, unlike saints, permanently exist among us; we can observe them, we can compare them, and, more important still, we can create and recreate them under observable conditions, as such groups as the Anglo-Catholic pioneers, and the modern French Dominicans, have convincingly shown. At

present observational study of ascetic groups is hindered, - in the cases where it is not totally prevented - by a natural but unedifying secretiveness within the groups themselves. It is at least arguable, however (to speak in religious, rather than in scientific language), that the secretiveness of religious contemplative communities springs less from the spirit of renunciation than from that of pride. To subject oneself patiently to the importunities of anthropologists and clinicians might well be more mortifying (in the religious sense) than to hide from them; to a philosopher it quite certainly would be. Moreover (see Diagram IV), though the contemplative life may thrive on "hiddenness", the apostolic life does not; Christ, after all, before he died, was stripped naked and hung up high. One thing is certain (speaking now scientifically); if those observable psycho-physical tendencies, the existence of which are taken for granted within religious communities, could become equally well known to the scientific world, a theoretic revolution would have to take place in psycho-biology not less far-reaching than that initiated by the work of D'Arcy Thompson, or of Freud.

At present, however, and as soon as these issues are raised, a spirit of general defeatism pervades both the scientific and religious world. The scientists, naturally enough, are not anxious to invade a disconcerting new sphere in which investigation of the "material" is going to prove a matter of exceptional difficulty - while there are so many other easier fields to investigate. The religious people, to whom the advancing of such an investigation might well be thought to be a matter of urgency, behave like chickens which, when you are about to step on them, "freeze" and quite literally cannot move through fear.

Why do they assume that the only purpose of scientific investigation (speaking religiously and in terms of faith) is to annihilate? And, if there is to grow up a new generation of contemplatives who will be less pusillanimous, what would the "philosophy" or world-outlook of these men and women have to be?

The sort of considerations advanced in the final section of this paper are those which will determine the kind of outlook which is required.

§6: Fifth suggestion: that an attempt be made to envisage the general outlook which a thinker who was at once a scientist and a religious contemplative would need to have.

In theory, "now that scientists are no longer so materialist nor religious people so intolerant" the gulf between religious and scientific ways of thinking should be growing less. In practice, it is growing wider all the time; and in particular, new causes for disagreement have appeared during the last ten years. The first of these is the movement of recent theologians to "become definite". This is largely due, in my opinion, to the failure of the first generation of "modernist" or "scientific" Christian thinkers to be, in this particular field, anything but vague. In establishing criteria for the critical investigation of religious texts, Anglican and Protestant scholarship has won the world's respect. In exploring the relations between religious and scientific ways of thinking, however, no comparable result has been achieved. This is partly because many of the late-nineteenth century scientists had a very crude and limited view of science, but partly also because the training of the religious thinkers, then as now, was far too much centred upon the literary subjects, on the "humanities". The result was that the more orthodox theologians, reacting against the modernists, became, as they themselves proclaimed, "more definite". But from the point of view of those interested in religion-science controversies, the definiteness was of an entirely fruitless kind. No one who was troubled about the issues at stake; no one who was even informed about them - received help from any "definite" statement the theologians made, any more than from the earlier vague statements which the modernist theologians had made. The new definiteness just put the clock back, and in a very jejune way.

Nor is "the retreat into the ineffable" of any help either, except possibly at its most sophisticated point. This (speaking now very vaguely and roughly) is the device of the new generation of modernists; its object is to preserve a place for religious intuition in what is now admitted to be a scientific world view. One very simple form of this intellectual tendency - and one which has been intermittently encouraged by experimentalists' absence of a philosophy of science - holds that since science and religion cover different "spheres", neither need or should invade the sphere of the other. According to the most common version of this view, science investigates the "material" and religion the "spiritual". This is a view which, in view of recent developments within the sciences, it only takes a moment's reflection to disallow. According to another version of the same view, science investigates the "repeatable", whereas religion investigates the "unique", the province of the "unique" consisting especially of "personal encounters". The most unique thing in the whole Universe, in this sense of "unique" is an encounter between two personalities,

between an "I" and a "Thou". Finally, there is the sophisticated neo-idealist, or neo-metaphysical view of the problem, which holds that whereas the language and scope of physical science is, by the very nature of its method, caused to be comparatively superficial and shallow, that of theist metaphysics is unlimited and deep. According to this view, the facts about God are not of a quite different kind from the facts about the physical universe, but they are more fundamental; they are either super-physical, or meta-physical, or sub-physical: they are deeper. Therefore no developments occurring within physics can upset them.

There is one great disadvantage, however, to all these attempts made by philosophers to impose limitations on science, which is that the scientists themselves do not feel the limitations, although if these were real one would expect that they should. Of course it is true that man's mind creates the sciences which in their turn explain the mind of man; but no neuro-physiologist or biochemist feels inhibited by this fact. (The logical truth does not affect the scientific investigation.) It is true, too, that "the human element" is an ultimate constituent in scientific inquiry; anyone who has ever had to "cook" an experiment is aware of this fact. At one point in particular, human variation in perception played so important a part in astronomical research that the sub-science of the psycho-physiology of perception had to be developed to study it. But the fact that (contrary to the view given above that "science is repeatable whereas personal encounter is unique") no scientific experiment is fully repeatable, and also that in every scientific experiment "the human factor" has to be more, or less, allowed for, all this does not prevent scientific investigation going forward; it merely makes the scientific undertaking more complicated and difficult than it might appear to be at first sight. And, a fortiori, the fact that no scientific experiment is fully repeatable prevents a hard-and-fast line being drawn between any sphere of the repeatable and sphere of the unique. Metaphysics apart, and talking now in a robust way, personal encounters are not in the least unique; if they were, novelists, let alone clinical psychologists, could not ply their trades, since no "personalist" concept would apply to any two situations, and therefore thinkers about persons would have no words to use. Neither are experiments in the realm of, say, Animal Behaviour all that repeatable; but this does not prevent Ethology from being a true inexact science, and one in which interesting discoveries are being made. There is no one kind of easily adjustable "fit" with repeatable facts, which a scientific system or any system of thinking has to have, and by comparison with which no other kind of science is "true science". On the contrary, different kinds of argument have different kinds of fit, which means, in practice, that different kinds of fact have different kinds and degrees of repeatability. Often, indeed, as in the new cosmology, just where

the argumentation is most powerful and exact, the connection with experimentation is most tenuous - in fact very tenuous indeed.

So we get to a point of view, already presupposed by the arguments of §5, which admits that scientific methods represent an enormous advance on metaphysical ones, and which refuses to rope off, a priori, "non-scientific" kinds of subject matter as being unsusceptible to scientific investigation. Those who hold such a point of view, however, would admit without reserve that it is becoming more and more difficult in practice to decide when an investigation is fully scientific and when not; they would therefore not be inclined to condemn out of hand any claim that a category of fact, such as that of religious facts, while of the same nature as other scientific facts, is in the scientific sense of the word more fundamental. But if this view is right, the "theistic hypothesis" must constitute some extreme form of scientific paradox - "the root of all physical thinking is teleological" - some such fundamental guess as that. And the test of whether this new type of teleological world-view is (in the bad sense) sterile and metaphysical, or whether it is scientific but metaphysical, will be shown by whether, as scientific ways of thinking probe deeper and deeper, fundamental physicists begin to make teleological hypotheses, while theologians cease to postulate a religious "sphere". At present the whole of the scientific world is convinced that, whenever the facts as given by science contradict the facts as given by religion, theologians will try to remove the religious facts to another sphere; but that, whenever the facts as given by any science tend to confirm the facts as given by religion, as would occur, were a successful scientific investigation carried out on the lines given in §5, then, just so far, the theologians turn round and say that science is relevant, because the latest discovery in the scientific world is so-and-so. And of course this disingenuous shift of attitude won't do.

All that has been said, so far, in every section, comes back to this, that the growing-point of thought, in science-religion controversies, lies in finding out more about the nature and varieties of scientific argument rather than in finding out more about the nature and varieties of religious metaphysics. In so far as those who make the assertion that the facts given by religious intuition are somehow meta-physical cooperate with and contribute to this enterprise, their arguments must be taken very seriously. Personalist describers of I-thou encounters clearly do not fall into this category; but it may well be that some of the considerations now being advanced by the Karl Heim type of thinker (once these considerations have become disentangled from personalist philosophy) represent an attempt to pursue the train of thought described in §4 as that of making a match between scholasticism and physics.

If this is so, then those who say that religious facts are scientific but somehow meta-physical are disputing the reasons given in §4 for thinking that this kind of matching between scholasticism and physics proves sterile, - without bringing forward any suggestion as to where, intellectually or scientifically, it can lead. As has been said, no one person, in any one generation, can pronounce finally on whether any particular line of thought will prove sterile, since at any moment new reasons for embarking on it might arise. But, quite apart from the arguments given in §4, to insist on matching religious intuitionism with intuitionism in fundamental physics is both to match concepts which are very highly generalised (an awkward activity) and also to expose oneself to insidious intellectual dangers. The fact, for instance, that it might be possible, at some future time, to make some match between some form of teleological thinking and some form of thinking in physics should not be used as cover for the assertion that "physics has gone theist". Still less should it be used to cover the assertion that "Christian theology has proved right in the long run". And least of all should it be used to commend abuses, such as the fact that the basic concepts of the Christian dogmatic system come from a rather dubious variety of Semitic patriarchy, that the ecclesiastical system is based on that of the late imperial Roman judiciary, that the Catholic Church is committed to the Cartesian doctrine that animals are machines, and that Christian treatment of women is in part at least traceable to the Aristotelian doctrine that women and foreign slaves come in the organic hierarchy between the higher vertebrate mammals and man.

If religio-physical matching should not be used to cover abuses, neither should it be used to avoid exact and detailed work. Any highly generalised form of theologico-scientific thinking which tends to make the thinker avoid the strain involved in the control of detail, and the effort required to master any new intellectual discipline, must be regarded, in the first instance at least, as a temptation; one, indeed, which the detailed suggestions put forward in this paper are designed to correct. It would be possible, of course, for religious thinkers to explore this question of religio-physical matching, by learning, and making contributions to, fundamental physics; but, when they begin talking about how to compare different forms of thinking in different "spheres", that is not the programme which most theologians have in mind.

The general attitude, then, that the contemporary religious scientist must take up is one of "animal faith" combined with detailed inquiry. His "faith" - if faith is the right word for it - must be very deep-rooted indeed, since it can rest upon no affirmation and no habit, while yet remaining the mainspring of his life. Intellectually and spiritually, such a man must walk in the desert, - for this is the essential desert of contemporary life. No one, moreover, who has lived in this kind of desert will be tempted to underrate the intensity of

its effects; but, as was briefly indicated in §5, not enough account is ever taken of its fruits. The desert is the traditional place of ascetic mortification; and so the twentieth-century desert-dweller should not be without hope. For though the contemporary desert will, to all appearances, both intellectually overwhelm him and spiritually crush him, yet it may also, in the long run, mature him; and may even eventually give him that one thing which all contemplatives desire; the direct perception of eternal joy. To speak now, in purely religious language, those who hunger and thirst after righteousness shall be filled; those who seek God early (which means thoroughly) shall find Him. And those who, putting off the soft raiment of escape and consolation, and leaving the ease of the metaphysical palaces, subject themselves, in the barrenness and dust of the desert, to the stone-grinding of sustained intellectual effort (the effects of which they will not live to see), those who do this, the while enduring with what fortitude they can muster, successive and complete upheavals of mind, heart, soul and body, the whole in a spiritual darkness almost inconceivable in its intensity, these also shall not be disappointed of their hope and of their joy.

3. By R.H. Thouless

The Psychology of Mysticism

I do not feel well qualified to contribute to this subject. I used to write about it thirty years ago, but I am less willing to write now on a subject of which I have no personal experience so that I can only be reflecting on the reports of others. I am writing this only because I was told to do so, and in the confidence that its imperfections will not much matter since it is intended only as an introduction to a discussion which I hope will clarify the points I have not made clear and correct the errors of what I say.

Mysticism seems to be a phase of the spiritual life which follows the practice of asceticism (that is, the systematic renunciation of normal behaviour based on the instincts and socially approved habit systems). It is characterised by a heightened sense of the reality of God and the close contact of the soul with Him. It also has secondary accompaniments: emotional experiences often pleasurable connected with this sense of contact with God, and religious visions with the development of what are commonly described as miraculous powers. These latter are perhaps intensifications of the psi phenomena we are beginning to study in parapsychology and include clairvoyance, precognition,

sometimes effects on material objects without contact, and powers of spiritual healing. Those responsible for the spiritual advising of mystics warn them that these secondary effects are to be regarded as incidents in the path of spiritual progress, and not as themselves ends; that to aim directly at attaining them or over-value them when attained are diversions from the path of spiritual progress.

There are many problems that one might discuss:

- (1) The relationship of Christian mysticism to parallel experiences in other religions.
- (2) Its relationship to non-mystical religious experience.
- (3) Are the mystical states natural psychological consequences of the preceding ascetic practices?
- (4) Is the mystic merely imagining the reality with which he feels himself to be in contact?
- (5) If not, what can it mean to say that the soul is in contact with God?

I feel more confidence in suggesting these questions than in suggesting answers to them, but I will briefly indicate the sort of answer I should give now which is not quite the same as I gave thirty years ago.

(1) My own feeling is that men can come to God by many roads and not only through the symbols of the Christian faith. Here with regret I find myself parting company with St Paul and perhaps the teaching of the Catholic Church. I have no doubt that the saint of Islam or Hinduism is also in contact with God. So I cannot believe in the Roman theologians' distinction between true mysticism as found in the orthodox Catholic saint and the false mysticism of other religions, of quietists and illuminati. I do not think that this has the commonly supposed practical implication that we can best find God by adopting a faith which is a jumble of selected elements of Christianity with Yoga, Sufism, and Zen-Buddhism, or by having no faith at all. That different charts enable men to steer to the same harbour does not imply that they would get there equally well with a jumble of all the charts or with no chart at all.

(2) The tradition of St Teresa and the Jesuits would make mystical experience different in kind from ordinary religious experience. There is another view (I think Benedictine) which would rather make them different in degree. It would be absurd to feel strong conviction

about this but I am inclined to think that we have accepted the first view too easily and that it is more profitable to think of the mystical experience as continuous with normal religious experience.

(3) I think it is extremely likely that the secondary accompaniments of mysticism - trances and heightened psi capacities, may be natural consequences of systematic frustration of behaviour drives. Their deliberate induction by these means has not been done experimentally (i.e. in a psychological laboratory), but it is part of the tradition of magic. It is then divorced from its spiritual aim and may well be called false mysticism. In all religions in which the contemplative life is developed (Hinduism and Islam as well as Christianity), the contemplative is under the authority of a spiritual director whose business it is to canalise the process along the way of spiritual progress and away from the path of magic or mere mental gymnastics.

(4) The question of whether the mystic is merely imagining what he feels to be a reality with which he is in contact is obviously the same as the question of whether the ordinary Christian is imagining his religious experiences. Of course, he may be. Neither the mystical experience nor the experience of the ordinary praying Christian can provide a coercive argument for there being any reality in the spiritual world he believes himself to be in contact with. Whether it is so or not is decided by an act of judgment which is the basis of his faith. His judgment should be a reasonable one, considering all the facts. But the psychological process involved is of the same kind as that made by a jury when they pronounce a verdict after hearing the evidence, and not of the same kind as that made when writing Q.E.D. after a proposition in geometry.

(5) What sort of sense it makes to say that "the soul is in contact with God" is the kind of question that has already been discussed during the last two days. I assume that it makes sense to say something of this kind, but obviously, as in all religious propositions that are not purely historical, one is not using language in the literal sense. Obviously neither the soul nor God is an object and 'contact' cannot be literally the relationship between them. One is using analogies and metaphors to try to express facts with which we have not the resources of language to deal adequately.

I am a poor philosopher; I can't express this point clearly but if it is on the right lines, the real philosophers present may understand what I am trying to say. The main point is that any such statement as "the soul is in contact with God" may stand for a real situation in the spiritual world, although no form of words in which we try to express that fact is defensible against logical criticism.

VIII. THE PSYCHO-BIOLOGY OF RITUAL

1. By E.A. Armstrong

The psycho-biological basis of ritual

In the last fifteen years there has come into prominence a new school of students of animal behaviour, the leader being Konrad Lorenz of Vienna, a medical man who had from boyhood a passion for keeping animals of all kinds in as natural a state as possible. This school endeavours to study ethology objectively. Its disciples query or deny the validity of animal psychology as a science, since, they say, comparative psychologists have in the past illegitimately attributed to animals qualities of mind known subjectively in man. They assert that the subjective approach is not possible so far as animals are concerned, and that we have no right to attribute to animals feelings, emotions, images and so forth, such as we experience.

Ethology therefore is the science of the study of observed behaviour, and if the ethologists are consistent they regard the psychological states which form the basis of such behaviour as beyond their province. Ethology is at present a technique, and differs from behaviourism in disregarding philosophical considerations, except in so far as ethologists criticise others. This technique, which is simple and effective, consists in breaking up animal behaviour into classes of components. It is rapidly altering the attitudes of biologists and naturalists to their fields of study, and will certainly enable considerable advances to be made. It has been found, for example, that behaviour-patterns such as those involved in display are usually inherited in as fixed a form as the organs involved, and this discovery equips the systematist with a new instrument for the study of the relationships between organisms.

My own position is that I think the ethological technique very useful, and legitimate in so far as any scientific discipline is entitled to limit its terms of reference. But I think the strict ethological position unsatisfactory. The psychologist believes that he can explore to some extent the mental states of, for example, young children, and the insane, and I see no reason why the judicious use of analogy and comparison should not be legitimate in the animal field also. Indeed I think that those ethologists are most successful who have an innate sympathy with animals which enables them by a kind of unwitting intuition to gain insight into their behaviour.

I mention this development in order to make clear the angle from which I approach my subject and in order to stress my conviction that

a development of major importance is taking place which deserves the attention of psychologists and biologists, and which will enable a bridge to be built between those disciplines.

As one example of the findings achieved by ethological techniques which is relevant to our discussion I would mention the problem of the relationship between 'higher' and 'lower' as biological concepts. It is often rather too readily assumed that if the higher, in the sense of the more complex and the better able to apprehend a wider environment, is evolved from the lower it is therefore determined by the lower. Marxist theory, for example, holds that the nature of society is determined by economic forces, and that philosophy, theology and art are but rationalisations of the situations determined by economic factors.

Ethology does not support the view that the higher is determined by the lower. It might be thought, for example, that the insects which pollinate flowers have been forced to adapt themselves to the shapes and structure of the flowers they visit. This is true only to a minor degree. The flowers have become adapted owing to the preferences of the insects, even to the extent, as with the fly orchid, of achieving a remarkable similarity to the insect to be attracted. Moreover it has been found that among animals movement often determines adornment rather than vice versa. Thus, to express the situation rather crudely, we may say that a bird does not wag its head in a certain way in displaying to the female in order to show off the plumes on its crown, but rather, having evolved the behaviour of wagging its head in a particular way, it then evolved the plumes. Thus even in the elementary aspects of behaviour we find that the higher determines and controls the lower. This process is, of course, most manifest in man's relation to his environment; he has achieved emancipation from it and control of it far beyond that of any other organism.

From the psychological point of view comparison between the higher and the lower organisms reveals forms of behaviour becoming increasingly controlled by the higher centres in the higher organisms. Thus it has been shown that while sexual behaviour in the rodents is very largely under the dominance of the endocrine organs, in the primates and in man there is a much greater degree of cortical control and consequently less stereotypy of behaviour. The evolution of sexual function shows increased control by will or choice, or, expressed in less anthropomorphic terms, a much wider field of apprehension relative to behaviour.

The importance of routine or stereotypy in animal behaviour is evident even to the casual observer, and recent study increasingly shows the extent to which this is valid. It can be shown, for

instance, that much of an animal's daily behaviour consists of inter-related or superimposed rhythms, most of them quite evidently determined physiologically. As a simple example I might mention the fact that a bird's incubation rhythm shows a correlation with change in environmental temperature so that it spends a smaller percentage of time on the eggs as the temperature rises. Stereotypy of behaviour is also due to 'psychological' factors. For example it is noticeable that a bird building its nest may, after a very few journeys, follow a precise, stereotyped way through the branches and twigs, which routine entry may continue all through the nesting period. Indeed quite frequently, when the young have been destroyed, a bird will continue to bring food to the nest and even endeavour to give it to non-existent nestlings.

Stereotypy in the behaviour of higher animals seems to be due to the principle of economy, which is an important factor in their lives. As much as possible is ruled by routine so that the animal is able, in those situations which demand variability of behaviour, to deal with them adequately. It seems to be a fairly general principle that behaviour is most efficient when this kind of economy of effort holds good. Society, with its patterns of routine actions, achieves smooth functioning by this externalisation of rhythm. One of the problems of human society to-day is that so much behaviour which in the past was regulated by convention, etiquette and routine is now a matter of choice, so that an instability is introduced into social relationships and the whole social fabric. The feeling of being 'at home' in society or the world is based, to some extent, on the satisfaction of the craving for a familiar routine. Where this is lacking we may find, curiously enough, an exaggeration of private and individual routines, since one can only afford to be 'queer' in a stable society. Dominance orders, status systems and the like are obvious ways in which such a pattern of reliable actions may be obtained in society.

The basis of stereotypy in animal behaviour is, of course, the correlation between function and structure without which no species could survive in the evolutionary struggle.

When we consider those organisms high enough to have evolved distance receptors we find that one of the simplest and most potent of the ways in which they influence each other is by means of what I have suggested should be called 'mimesis' - behaviour in which like stimulates like. Among nearly all social animals of this type mimesis is important in behaviour, and it is one of the basic aspects of herd behaviour. It has been shown, for example, that a sluggish ant accelerates its working tempo if placed among more active companions, and that there is a decrease in the activity of a vigorous ant placed among slower work-mates. Organisms as various as fish, birds and men

eat more when in company. A satiated hen will begin to eat if placed among hungry poultry, and, more remarkable, a hungry bird may behave as if satiated when placed with crop-full birds.

It is unnecessary to give further examples, but it seems that in endeavouring to understand such behaviour we must go beyond what is observed in such instances to the quality on which the behaviour is based, which we may without undue anthropomorphism call suggestibility, or mimetic susceptibility. Once we take this step we pass from ethology to psychology. At all events it is certain that mimesis occurs in man, and is the foundation of much that he does. In this respect our animal heritage is evident. It has been refined and overlaid, but is still important, to the extent that disaster threatens society when the mimetic impulses do not find adequate expression. Disaster threatens, too, when there is regression to a too animal level and a capitulation of control by the higher levels of behaviour, which are equally part of man's heritage.

The most obvious and elementary example of mimesis in man is yawning, which as we all know can be infectious. But on man's present level of development mimetic behaviour has evolved into imitative, involving insight learning, which is very rare among other organisms.

I need not stress the high importance of man's suggestibility in his behaviour, except to give examples to illustrate how the physiological and the psychological are linked in the behaviour both of animals and man. It has been shown by injecting hormone preparations into valley quail that precocious pairing-up can be induced, not only in the birds treated but also in other members of the bevy. Thus behaviour is induced physiologically in some members of the bevy and psychologically in others. Furthermore, experiments show that geese kept for years in captivity without attempting to breed may be induced to nest if they are placed where they can see a pair engaged in breeding activities. Comparable phenomena occur in human behaviour, illustrating the persistence of the animal substratum; for example the tarantellism of the late Middle Ages, the compulsive neurotic behaviour characteristic of Siberian tribes and Malays, and various aspects of mob and crowd behaviour, both normal and pathological. At the present time one finds practically an entire generation unmarried on some islands of Shetland. Apparently the social stimulus has been insufficient to cause these people to venture on matrimony. This state of affairs is evidently due to the decay of the culture-pattern; the old way of life had been discarded or outgrown and the new is only now being introduced. On these islands, with Scandinavian traditions institutions such as the ceilidhe, social gatherings characteristic of the Celtic islands of our coasts, apparently had not been established and had certainly not persisted.

It would be easy to give other examples of the degeneration of society when the culture-pattern disintegrates, but this illustration will suffice to show that social stimulation, in which mimetic elements are basic, is essential to the health and even the survival of any society.

From this standpoint it is easier to understand the importance of ritual in society. Ritual involves certain two elements, a set of movements, usually accompanied by words, which are stereotyped and comparable as an element in behaviour to the stereotypy of instinctive activities and an associated ideology which the anthropologist calls the myth. The ritual expresses, interprets and perpetuates the ideology. Inevitably the movements, objects and persons concerned acquire symbolic significance and this may increase as selection, criticism and interpretation are brought to bear on the ritual. The psychology of symbolism is of great importance. Man in using symbols¹ has translated to a higher level that which is common to, and characteristic of, the more social animals. For man the ritual is associated with an idea or concept, but a symbol may be regarded, from the evolutionary point of view, as a projected image, and it seems that symbols have therefore been of the greatest value in aiding the development of thought by giving, as it were, a definite outline to the inchoate. The origin of symbols appears to be traceable to what the ethologist calls releasers, that is, structures and movements which elicit specific correlated behaviour from a companion. For example, the red breast of the robin releases bellicose behaviour on the part of another robin. Many birds in courtship hold or play with nesting material. Some naturalists have described the material or movements as having 'symbolic' significance. This is too anthropomorphic, but suggests the inference that out of such actions arose man's use of symbols. The distinction between the releaser and the symbol lies in the introduction of an intellectualist element in place of automatic interpretation. Man's intellectual and spiritual pre-eminence is built upon the increasing refinement of the releasers into symbols, and of the symbols into concepts, and also the use of ritual as a means of social integration.

- (1) Although man's use of symbols has been frequently misunderstood and misrepresented, we should remember that, as the late Dr Marett wrote, it is all too easy to slip into the "fallacy of deeming all religion more or less fraudulent because it employs a symbolism which, if taken literally, would be contrary to common sense. But this is to confuse the imaginative with the imaginary, the ideal with the merely unreal. Prefiguration is the only possible language of hope and faith, so that every true visionary, civilised or savage, takes liberties with the actual in order to provide the soul of his dream with some sort of picturable body."

It will be seen that we have to recognise fully that our addiction to ritual is part of our animal nature. To some people the idea is rather repellent, but it should not be so; the reaction of such people is probably based on the impulse to attack or avoid an object like but also unlike oneself, which is felt by many animals. Similarly the mingled fascination and repulsion felt by many human beings for monkeys and apes, as quasi-human, was in the background of the Darwinian controversy. Such primitive reactions still hinder a sane realisation of man's place among other organisms. Reasoning influenced by them rests on a confusion of the biologically lower with the morally disreputable.

Man's advance is bound up with an acceptance, appreciation and utilisation of his animal heritage, which is advantageous to him as long as it is not allowed to become perverted or distorted, or a mere atavism. Further, ritual behaviour, man being constituted as he is, is essential to the continuance and health of society. That being so, it is also essential that ritual should, on the one hand, not diverge too greatly from its lower levels, its animal foundation of impulse and emotion, and should, on the other hand, be correlated with myth or doctrine which is progressively refined by the intellectual activities of comparison and criticism. Ritual in society is therefore procedure which enables equilibrium to be attained and maintained between basic animal impulses and intellectualism, and also between individualistic and social impulses.

Study of various ideologies or mythologies, whether we select those of societies where witchcraft or Kremlinism is dominant, reveals that a community may be founded on false ideological premises and yet achieve a large measure of stability and coherence. But such a society is always liable to be undermined by another ideology based on sounder premises - that is, with a wider range of adaptation and apprehension. We may compare the remarkably static character of the structure of certain invertebrates such as some ants, and presumably also of their social behaviour, throughout considerable spans of geological time, with the wider range of apprehension and potential variability in the behaviour of man. Extreme social efficiency can be achieved at the cost of limitation of apprehension. In this connection one might reflect that it is unwise to assume that the highest qualities of reality are only perceptible by technological methods, that is, by the employment of the senses on lines similar to those by which the animal adapts itself to the environment, and thereby restricts its environment by the limitation of its apprehension. Thus the efficient concealment of leaf insects, by its very efficiency, was a blind alley inconsistent with high social development.

Religion has always claimed contact with a realm not definable in material terms. Materialism has retorted that this is based on a delusion, due to projection and rationalisation - making a god in the image of man. The philosophical aspects of this conflict cannot be discussed here, but I would point out that man's evolutionary development suggests that 'projection' is one of the means by which higher truth has been reached, if by projection we mean the formulation of a concept or symbol believed to approximate to reality. But this is only valid so long as the projections, images, symbols, concepts, theories, or whatever we call them, are submitted to criticism, comparison and analysis. From another point of view a 'symbol', which may be regarded as the co-ordination of projected concepts, is apparently, not merely a useful integrative device, but is essential to rational thought. From the biological standpoint I have tried to show that, as organisms have evolved more highly organised means of behaviour, wider apprehensions and more efficient adaptation to the progressively wider reality apprehended, the higher has attained mastery of the lower. Now man can choose to live in a closed circle analogous to an ant community, deifying society in order to stereotype it, and stereotyping it in order to deify it; using ritual merely to buttress the ideology. This is a retrogression, biologically, socially and spiritually, though its attractions are obvious, for it panders to man's spiritual childishness and lethargy, giving him, as the price of surrendering his soul, a sense of security as a member of a highly integrated group.

Another aspect of our problem may be expressed in the question: Does the ritual generate the myth, or the myth inspire the ritual? From the anthropological point of view a fairly strong prima facie case may be made out for the former alternative, though there is undoubtedly some reciprocal action between myth and ritual. I do not wish to discuss this at length, and will only mention that studies of the kingship pattern do support the view of the priority of ritual to a considerable extent. Undoubtedly there is a tendency for men to act and to find reasons for their action later. But to describe ideology, whether theology, philosophy or science, as ultimately a mere rationalisation of ritual is unsound on the basis of biological analogy. We have seen that movement may and often does determine adornment, and when we pass to the human realm, in which behaviour is less stereotyped, it is clear that imagination can determine activity, and hence ritual.

The differentiation of ritual in human society follows a clearly discernible course, comparable in many ways to the evolutionary development of organisms and their behaviour. There is a branching out and increasing differentiation of elements towards greater complexity and wider function. The eye, developing from the pineal gland

has opened out a wider range of experience; so too with the fore-legs of reptiles evolving into avian wings. Although as yet proof is perhaps not quite complete that there is a direct phylogenetic relationship between the ancestors of present day lizards and birds, there is a high degree of probability that this is so. It is therefore not improbable that the gaping display which is characteristic of modern lizards and birds may be derived in both cases from the display of proto-lizards. Among birds it has received wide differentiation, and has been accompanied by the evolution of colours in great variety in birds' mouths, and in some bird species gaping is an aggressive display, in others a courtship display. It was probably in its origins an excitement display without specific reference.

The evolutionary differentiation of ritual is beautifully illustrated in the dissemination and development of the Kingship pattern. It was originally a series of ritual acts performed at the coronation of the Divine King. It is still clearly recognisable in our own rites and ceremonies. In Christian marriage, baptism, ordination and other ceremonies, can be discerned elements indicating their derivation from an early "coronation" pattern. In many wedding ceremonies throughout the world the bride is crowned. This is a survival and differentiation of the crowning of the Divine King, for his marriage was originally part of the coronation and enthronement. The original ritual of the Divine King's coronation has given rise to many offshoots in the ceremonial of peoples throughout the world.

Thus again we find on a high level the evolutionary process of divergence, differentiation and the attainment of a wider field of reference characteristic of evolutionary development on organic levels.

One of these lines of development culminates in the highest formulations of sacramental worship. It is a commonplace that ordered sacraments, or at least the sacramental outlook, is in some sense characteristic of most human societies, primitive and civilised. Concomitant with the differentiation and refinement of ritual into its various streams or branches we find the refinement of sacramentalism and associated symbolisms. The sacrament functions as a unifying power in society, linking it corporately, and its members individually, with the transcendent through a symbolic use of material objects. Through it the differentiated Many finds unity in the One; the community finds co-ordination and the individual tranquillity - the peace of God. By its means society avoids that mechanical, authoritarian, rigid co-ordination which fetters the individual and fossilises society, and the individual is enabled to be spiritually adventurous and autonomous while also feeling happily integrated with society. The enjoyment of this harmonious independence permits the finest flowering of creative achievement. This ideal is most simply expressed in the concept of the 'Family of God', and most readily attained through conscious and devoted membership of it.

2. By David Russell

The Psychology of Ritual

In this paper I want to examine some aspects of ritual behaviour relevant to the assessment of a certain attitude to religious ritual. This attitude is, I believe, fairly typical of those people deeply influenced by modern scientific techniques and their accompanying convictions. It is not in itself necessarily inimical to religion, but it is often hostile to certain forms of religious worship, and the person in whom this attitude is strong is often held back from active participation in such worship, which seems to him incompatible with the scientific spirit with which he is so deeply indoctrinated.

Let me first put the case against religious ritual, by expressing this attitude as clearly and as strongly as I can. A good deal of modern psychology and anthropology would regard such ritual as "non-rational" or "irrational" activity designed to effect changes in nature. (Here ritual may include ceremony.) Primitive man performs his rain dance, or prays for recovery from disease. The vestiges of these practices remain with us, although we now know about, and can use, dry ice and penicillin.

From this it would seem that ritual recedes as knowledge widens, and no modern man, committed to the search for knowledge, can follow such practices without in some sense betraying the scientific tradition in its widest form, that is to say, including the moral or ethical attitudes which underlie it and which unite all scientists and all rational men in the sustained co-operative effort which is the especial glory and achievement of our age. That science rests on certain virtues seems to me indubitable; intellectual integrity, courage and humility; even the capacity for sacrificing one's dearest brain-child if the facts doom it to death. To fake one's results, to deceive one's colleagues about the facts - here is the unforgivable sin, and to avoid it is a constant struggle, since one so easily deceives oneself.

It is these virtues which seem to be betrayed by a whole-hearted belief and participation in ritual, which seems to many a shameful lapse into infantile and irrational behaviour, a failure of moral courage. The realisation that many such rituals have been abandoned as a superior procedure has been discovered by science so cuts the nerve of faith in any ritual that to practice it seems to require a special effort of self deception, a welcoming of the lie into the soul, and this is felt as a degradation in itself and a threat to the achievement of rationality in other spheres.

Moreover, it is felt that ritualistic religion has a painfully close affinity to certain phenomena in psychopathology. The numinous awe felt by the worshipper may be compared with the powerful irruptive and constraining emotions which arise in the dark unconscious mind of people who are mentally sick, and who remain sick until these emotions are brought into the light of rational consciousness and their power broken. Ritual phrases and actions are held to be the social manifestations of the same forces which produce compulsive neuroses and phobias in the individual. Taboo, a blank unreasoning fear, seems common to both pathological and religious states; it cripples action and narrows the range of experience, besides involving an infantile dependence on the unknown, together with a shrinking from making it known.

This deliberate neurosis, it may be held, is more powerful because social and respectable. Magical power is ascribed to the priestly function, and a profession grows up whose vocation it is to love darkness rather than light. The worshippers, conditioned by their regular mental grovelling, build up unhealthy attitudes of subservience and dependence which spread to other segments of their personalities and issue in social arrangements of a rigid authoritarian nature which further reinforce the ritual situation. The intricate inhibitions and social inertia of many societies of this type seem to illustrate and underline these arguments.

Such, briefly, is the attitude towards ritual which is widely held. It will not be unfamiliar to most of us. And I think a great deal of the charge must be admitted of rituals as often practised in our churches, though not perhaps as often as is sometimes asserted.

On the other hand, if we reflect, we cannot deny, either, that we know people whose characters are refined and strengthened by regular ritual observances; whose minds are clear and incisive in those very realms where they feel most strongly. If there are those for whom ritual has gone wrong, there are others for whom it has gone right, and our account must take cognisance of the latter as well as the former. Hence we cannot take the simple and sweeping view that all ritual is pathological. We must ask, what is the nature of ritual as a normal activity, before we ask how it may become abnormal.

Perhaps a parallel may be drawn with sex. We need no detailed reminder of the depth and extent of sexual maladjustment in our society. Inhibition, compulsion, taboo, perversion, obsession - these are as evident in sex as in religion. But in both spheres such terms imply a background of normality, and certainly we do not renounce normal sexuality because so much of it is abnormal.

Let us then consider ritual as a normal activity. In doing so we

must begin with non-religious ritual, for this activity is found to be an integral feature of all kinds of societies, giving stability and coherence to group functioning, as many have remarked. But I should like to enquire a little more closely into the precise function of ritual in group behaviour.

Now all specifically human behaviour, it has been rightly said, is learned behaviour, and is learned in a social context. The emphasis on the social nature of man may, indeed, have gone too far nowadays in the direction of making the individual a mere 'named segment of a culture-pattern'. Still, we may take it as incontestable, in view of the evidence from anthropology, that human behaviour is socially patterned, and that each society, with its characteristic emphases and omissions, produces in its members a corresponding structure of motives. We may leave aside the question of individual variations; here we are concerned with the general picture. A given society may be seen as a pattern of recurring activities of the sort which form the subject matter of economics and general sociology, and which are essentially the embodiment in cyclic action of the social norms, or values. These latter are effective in so far as they are internalised in the members of that society, and as internalised they become motive forces constraining to certain actions, and giving society its momentum. The process of the socialisation of individuals has been treated at length in social psychology, and we need not go into it here. It is a process whereby the set of emotional priorities of one generation are transmitted to the next, forming its springs of action. Participation in educational and work groups, also, forms some of the motives of individuals.

In passing we may notice that it is the element of constraint in social motivation that has been treated, for instance by James, as 'social habit'. This it is which keeps men at dirty and dangerous jobs, and makes the more comfortable alternative of the dole a tragedy and an infliction; and it is the decay of these constraining motives that produces the 'unemployable'.

Ideally the performance of these 'productive rhythms' is accompanied by a sense of significance. Suzanne Langer laments that in the modern world work has become 'deritualised' through the absence of felt significance in the daily routine of action, and there are grounds for regarding these productive rhythms as 'productive rituals', declining like other rituals into mere routine as they become dead automatic procedures. But this may be held to stretch the term ritual unduly far, and certainly it is not this kind of action which is objected to, and regarded as irrational.

Now we find in society other kinds of collective actions besides

those obviously related to practical ends. We find, in small groups for instance, the club dinner, the harvest home, the regimental reunion, the university congregation, and the College 'rag'. These have been discussed by Huizinga in Homo Ludens as a form of play, but we find them occurring in groups formed for the purposes of play, like chess or cricket clubs, and separate from the play activities of those groups.

I should like to call these activities 'celebrative rituals'. They have a definite function in social life, and arise spontaneously in connection with co-operative activities. This function seems twofold. In the first place they reinforce the unity of the group, making the members of it conscious of their mutual belonging, usually through some kind of ceremonial action, as in the regimental dinner or parade, the family Sunday or Christmas dinner. In the second place they focus and bring to awareness the meanings which are embodied in the productive rhythms of the group. These meanings tend to be lost sight of amid the pressures of repetitive action, which so easily becomes routine. Some routine is necessary, no doubt, since we cannot endure the burden of too much insight, yet some insight there must be, obviously, if routine is to be flexible and efficient.

Instances may be found in industry. A certain firm making components for agricultural machinery found output lower than it should have been. The machines were assembled elsewhere, and the workers in this factory had little insight into the purposes of their work. Both insight and output rose when a complete machine was put through its paces in the component factory (in the firm's time). This was a celebrative act in the sense indicated above; if repeated it would have become a celebrative ritual. Probably the best example in industry is the launching of a ship; the flags and champagne are the formal ceremonial aspects of an established ritual focussing the meaning of the months of detailed effort in the productive rhythms of the shipyard. And no one who is aware, for instance, of the relations between the old Mauretania and the town of Wallsend where she was built, will doubt the emotional force of this kind of ritual. In this instance it was revealed clearly when the ship went down the river for the last time, to the breaker's yard. The town, of course, knew this, and another ceremony, spontaneous and unorganised, took place, - crowds, as for a funeral, along the banks, and tears from the tough workers who had built her long ago.

Here we are coming nearer to religious ritual. This also has its emotional aspect, indeed in the crises of life, marriage, death, etc., they serve, even for people not normally religious, as formalised public expressions of emotion. This is a large topic; here we need only suggest that such rituals enable the control of otherwise over-

whelming emotions, especially in the ceremonies surrounding bereavement, where they also provide stable patterns of behaviour for the numbed and bewildered individual. In addition they tend to evoke felt emotion, by encouraging the actions which express it, and thus prevent the evils of "The grief that does not speak" but "whispers the o'erwrought heart, and bids it break".

Perhaps the embarrassment and hostility of many scientific people in such ritual situations, religious or social, arises from a generalised attitude of fear and suspicion towards emotion as such. This may be due, as Jung suggests, to a thwarting of the emotional life as such. Certainly many intellectuals are emotionally undeveloped and liable to emotional infantilism, and certainly much of the training of the intellectual is through arid disciplines divorced from the subtle skills of social adaptation.

This hostility to emotion is an aspect of what is usually spoken of as the clash between the heart and the head. It may be diminished in proportion as we assimilate the lessons of recent neurophysiology which shows that the cerebrum itself, and especially the frontal lobes, are involved in emotional reactions. The old antithesis between the brain and the viscera, so often equated with the distinction between reason and emotion, must be abandoned. Those very parts of the brain which mark us off from the lower animals, that is, the frontal lobes, are primarily concerned with the refinement of emotion, and we can no longer regard our renunciation of emotion as the measure of our rationality.

But scientists' attitudes are more resistant to change than are scientists' theories, and emotion as such is still suspect, for many. Let us return to the social considerations concerning ritual.

The relation between productive rhythms and celebrative rituals is complicated by the fact that the same activity may have both functions simultaneously to different participants, or to the same participant at different times. The nightly bathing of the baby is for the mother a practical activity, designed to produce a clean child. But for the child, who cares little for cleanliness the bath is rather a family ceremony, meaning love and enjoyment, something to be celebrated. Children are often keenly aware of the celebrative aspect of practical actions, they relate domestic details to the ethos of the home, to the family pattern of living which clothes those details with significance. And we ourselves, returning home after a long absence may feel this significance afresh in the small familiar things. So it may be with any activity long sustained, and returned to after an absence. At the end of the novel London Belongs to Me (Collins) the retired clerk returns to his old job at the outbreak of war with the

same surge of affection for the old office routine, which on this occasion takes on some of the features of a ritual with its felt awareness of significance.

Now social rituals of this kind do not seem liable to be superseded by scientific procedures. We may discern a normal, natural and to that extent justifiable function for at least this kind of ritual. Moreover, inasmuch as science is itself a human and social activity, it has its own productive rhythms, of research and experiment motivated like any other human behaviour. Some of the collective activities of scientists in conference and congress are not strictly part of these productive rhythms, but are rather like celebrative rituals. In them the elements of significance which constrain action are abstracted, scrutinised and to some extent celebrated or rejoiced in, through non-productive symbolic action; while the sense of belonging to the scientific enterprise as a social institution is thereby strengthened. Scientists depend on other scientists, and on symbolic social activities, in the same way as do the members of other social groups.

Perhaps if we had an adequate psychology of science instead of an inadequate science of psychology the importance of social rituals would be recognised, and the distrust of such non-cognitive activities abated, since the very achievements of science might be seen to depend upon the fostering of the underlying motives by these devices. The ceremonies of learned societies have a real part to play in encouraging the virtues which, as I suggested at the beginning, are the essential basis of the scientific enterprise.

There is another aspect of the matter which also deserves mention. The regularities of human behaviour are specified within a range of possibilities. The animal lives in a world unambiguously patterned which commands his energies simply and directly. Man lives in a world which may be experienced in many different ways; it might be said that he lives in many worlds, since many patterns of significant experience are open to him. But the necessities of action require that situations shall be structured regularly so that motivational energy may flow with assurance into accustomed channels. Thus action, if regular and prolonged, tends to stereotype action and to close alternative courses, by preventing awareness of other ways of structuring the situation. Flexibility is encouraged by the performance of actions which are yet not fully actions, but a form of play; which do not influence or change the environment directly but which consist in the envisaging of alternatives through the medium of symbolism. Social rituals provide this kind of action which is 'Zwecklos aber doch sinnvoll' (Guardini); it is important but not serious, important because it is not serious, because it does not involve one with the world as previously

structured, and may therefore enable one to re-structure it.

This withdrawal, this stepping back to get a fresh point of view, is clearly essential in science. The non-practical aspects of the social contacts of scientists fill this need also, besides reinforcing their sense of solidarity. Indeed it is more important that these rituals of alternatives should be available in science than in many other group activities, since science is, like a famous French academy, committed to the encouragement of heresy.

But we are still not dealing with religious ritual, though we have, I trust, made out a case for ritual in other spheres. Let me first try to deal with the charge that religious ritual has a morbid effect on the personality. Here much may be conceded; such evils as were mentioned in the charge at the beginning of this paper do occur, and we need a pathology of ritual, deeper than that provided by Pfister, to understand such morbidities.

But to proceed from the admission of the existence of religious mania to the view that all religion is a mild form of mania is another matter. A prejudice of the scientific age is to be detected here. People who display morbid religious consciousness are classified under the heading of religious mania. But their neighbours in the same institutions who have wild schemes of explanation and control of the world through cosmic rays, universal clocks and the like are not, curiously enough, classified in a parallel manner as victims of scientific mania, though the two cases are clearly alike.

Religion may, indeed, have a morbid effect. But this is only to say that religion is a dangerous business, as indeed it is. Perhaps we overstress the 'comfortable words' of religion nowadays. In other ages it was not so. At any rate, we would contend that the drastic evils which arise from ritual going wrong is a measure of the importance of having it go right.

We find, in almost all societies, besides the rhythms of production and the social rituals described above, this third type of behaviour, religious ritual. It usually includes items drawn from social rituals, but gives a different significance to these items in terms of an ideal going beyond the particular group. They claim to transcend the social pattern; Talcott Parsons has described them as actions within a society which do not fall within the role system of that society. He ascribes to them the function of drainage; they enable the relief of tensions inevitable in the disciplines and renunciations of social action. Indeed they may do so, but we cannot justify them in those terms merely without destroying their capacity to function in that way. One cannot wholeheartedly believe in an

ultimate value for utilitarian reasons.

If we are to justify them it must be in their own terms of transcendence, not as a therapeutic device, a fiction embraced and not examined, but as a fact continuous and coherent with the other facts about human action.

Can this be done? I think it can, if we adopt the views implicit or explicit in certain recent developments in psychology, and combine them with others from various sources.

Let us then picture the human being as acting in a social context which is itself a selection from a wider social context. In the case of the child this is clear; the family is a group which actualises certain possibilities made available in the wider group of the social class, in that neighbourhood; and the class is what it is as part of the national group. The process of growing up is a process of transcending the family group with its limitations, first in the wider and different (but not entirely different) context of school, then, in adolescence, in the world of work, sex and friendship (children have playmates not friends).

At each stage there are regularities of behaviour, 'habits', which are appropriate to that stage, and which lead on to the next, and also appropriate rituals, most evident in childhood and adolescence, sometimes marking the transition points.

Have we reached the widest context when we reach the end of adolescence? Surely not, we are still within a given society, which is itself a selection from among the vast possibilities of human behaviour, and has inevitably partial emphases, with corresponding blind spots and omissions. We are still within the concentric horizons of experience; society itself has a context.

There is an interesting indication of this in the changes which are often found in the human personality in middle age, when the resources of society have been explored and when problems arise which are not problems of adjustment, simply, but which are solved only by, once more, transcending the society to which one is adjusted, by seeking wider horizons. Jung says that the problems of all his patients over forty are religious problems.

Now in all this the personality has two needs. It may be, as Simone Weil says, that the soul must satisfy opposed needs alternately. In any case we find here two such linked but antithetical requirements. Allport calls them differentiation and integration. They have to do with the conditions of growth and of learning (which are, psychologically, identical). There must be change, contrast, but there must also

be stability, continuity. A mere succession of states is not growth or development.

The processes of time provide the means of differentiation, of change. I suggest that ritual provides the element of continuity. In the case of social ritual I think it is fairly evident that stability and coherence are produced, in many ways, and especially is this evident in the initiation and graduation ceremonies. The very term 'graduation' implies continuity, and transcendence.

Each ritual is an activity arising in a context which gives it significance. What is the context which could give significance to religious ritual? The simple and correct answer is, of course, God. But this will not satisfy our objector. Perhaps we may do better by suggesting that the ritual which claims to transcend the group has reference to the unrealised possibilities of action and experience. The type of symbolism is appropriate to this; it is non-discursive, one cannot point to anything actual and say, this is what it means. It refers beyond the horizon, to the unstructured experience, and is itself always in a 'boundary situation'. In its highest form it refers to the widest context, carries the most meaning. Unlike social celebrative rituals, which derive their meaning from social achievement, from what has been done, religious ritual refers always to what has been left out, to what has not been done.

This is, I am afraid, too brief to be very plausible. But it may serve to indicate a direction in which argument might go. From some such point of view, moreover, we might attempt a pathology of ritual. For clearly a great deal depends on the attitude of the worshipper towards the ritual. He may see it as an end in itself, in which case it becomes stereotyped, rigid, and, because this attitude is the result of a failure to grow, it becomes infantile. He may see it as related to the group, in which case it becomes tribal. (But the elements of ritual must be historical and therefore to some extent tribal.)

No ritual can itself guarantee that it will not be thus mistaken. No set form of action can release the mind from the constraint of set forms of action. Ritual must be evaluated, and the evaluation must always be made by reference to an experience itself unritualised, and an experience characterised by a sense of horizon, of what lies beyond, and by a sense of release.

This is true of all rituals; the difference between the others and religious ritual is in the breadth of the horizon, and the depth of the experience of reality thus opened out. This sense of what is beyond, of context, is the guarantor of rationality at all levels; and it is surely not irrational to perform those actions which refer to the context of all human actions.

IX. IMMORTALITY

1. By R.H. Thouless

We may create unnecessary difficulties if we start consideration of this problem by asking whether man has a soul or spirit which survives bodily death. This question combines two problems; that of the facts to be explained and the explanation which may be given of them. Survival involves empirical questions: "Do I survive death?" and "Does he survive death?" which are, in principle at least, answerable by empirical evidence. If these questions are answered in the affirmative, they lead on to the question of whether we must postulate a 'soul' or 'spirit' as what survives.

The question "Do I survive bodily death?" is plainly verifiable in principle. Verification would be that my body dies and I find myself going on experiencing; perhaps having among other experiences the perception of my body lying on the bed as an object separate from myself. Having such experiences after death would be undeniable evidence for me that I had survived the death of my body, but it is not until my bodily death that this verification can take place.

So also is the proposition "He survives bodily death" in principle verifiable in the same way as it is verifiable that a living person we meet to-day is the same individual as we knew yesterday. In practice it is not so easy, but if verifiable in principle, the proposition is meaningful even if we have not yet obtained conclusive evidence as to whether it is true or false.

The position of the doctrine of immortality at the present time is: (1) It is not widely believed popularly and it is held rather half-heartedly by many whose religious opinions would make them give verbal assent to it. (2) On somewhat different but closely related grounds it is rejected both by leading philosophers and psychologists.

As to the prevalence of belief in survival (in the sense of verbal assent to the proposition that "The spirits of human beings continue to exist after the death of their bodies"), I made an enquiry about fifteen years ago into the frequency of acceptance of various religious propositions. I found that 62% of the people among whom my enquiry was made accepted this proposition with some degree of conviction, 27% rejected it, while 11% had no opinion one way or the other. This is a rather higher proportion of acceptances than I should have expected; not much lower than for other religious propositions. For example, for the assertion that there is a personal God, there were about the same number of rejections as for survival, but about 6%

more positive acceptances and 6% fewer with no opinion at all.¹

I have no empirical evidence for my suggestion that the doctrine of survival is held rather half-heartedly by many who do give verbal assent to it but I think that this is true. What I mean is that this tends to be one of the opinions that people feel to be in place in the pulpit on Sundays but which would embarrass them if they were met with in the market place on a weekday. Symptomatic of this half-hearted acceptance is, for example, the fact that those who verbally assent to the doctrine of survival habitually refer to the departed as if they no longer existed. They are inclined to say "X would have liked the money he left to be used in this way", not "X will like ...".

To some extent this absence of full belief is characteristic of the holding of all religious beliefs but there are particular reasons for it in the case of survival. Most important I think is the general abandonment at the Reformation of the practice of praying for the dead, of offering the Eucharist on their behalf, and of invoking the prayers of the Saints. The reason for this abandonment was not, I think, primarily a theological objection to the theory underlying these practices; it was more a practical objection to abuses in connection with them that had developed. The Reformation got rid of the abuses but at the cost of making belief in survival somewhat tenuous and unrelated to practical life. It became like belief in the recession of the extra-galactic nebulae, something one was prepared to say was true but about which one had not to do anything. It ceased to be a belief of the same order as that in the depressions predicted in weather forecasts. These may actually determine behaviour, making one decide, for example, not to go for a picnic tomorrow.

This tenuousness is not a necessary character of belief in survival since it is not found amongst the spiritualists. They do something about the departed; communicate with them through mediums. The activity itself is, I think, of no religious value and can be psychologically harmful, but it gives a solidity and reality status to belief in survival which it is otherwise liable not to have. It is a curious fact that at the present day if you tell anyone that you believe that men survive their bodily death, they are inclined to comment: "Oh, you are a spiritualist then." If you reply: "No, just a Christian," they are surprised, although on reflection they are able to remember that this is also part of the Christian creed.

The general tendency to scepticism about survival is backed by more definite arguments against it by philosophers and psychologists. Ayer in 1936 said that the assertion that there is a soul which survives bodily death is a metaphysical proposition void of factual content; he gave no detailed reason for this opinion that survival was

(1) Thouless, R.H., 'The Tendency to Certainty in Religious Belief', *British Journal of Psychology*, XXVI, pp.16-32, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1935.

unverifiable and therefore metaphysical¹. Obviously one could have post-mortem experiences which would verify the proposition "I survive bodily death", and in principle one could also verify the proposition "He survives bodily death". I discussed this question for a few minutes with Ayer in October 1951 and I gathered that he had changed his mind on this point. It appeared that he then thought that propositions asserting survival were meaningful and false.

If one starts with the proposition that "the soul (or spirit) survives bodily death", the argument both of philosophers of the logical positivist tradition and of psychologists is that there is no reason for believing in any such entity as soul or spirit. The argument is not quite the same in the two cases. The logical positivist philosopher finds no philosophical grounds for the linguistic use of the word 'soul', and regards the usage as the result of a muddle in logical categories. The psychologist, on the other hand, has dropped the term and the concept for the practical reason that he does not find them necessary in his general theory. In both cases, the upshot is the same; if there is no soul, there is nothing to survive and therefore no grounds for believing that survival is possible.

Both positions raise the same general question as to the relationship between linguistic usage and expectations as to fact. It seems to me that such arguments are fallacious since they assume that one can find out what is the fact by a method of linguistic analysis. On the contrary, I think linguistic analysis can only tell us whether our language is adequate for the facts. If it is not, we must change our language; this is what is done in scientific theorising. One could not have discovered the theory of relativity or the quantum theory by a process of linguistic analysis. One could only have discovered that the language of nineteenth century science implied that these theories were false. Of course, linguistic analysis played a part in the thought of Einstein, but only the part of seeing where the accepted language required changing. The formulation of the new theories was the adoption of a new language which did imply the facts that had been discovered, e.g. that the velocity of light was independent of the velocity of the body from which the measurement took place, and the observed relation of temperature with the amount of black body radiation.

(1) Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic, Gollancz, London, 1936.

In the same way, we cannot decide on the nature of psychological fact by linguistic study of psychological language. If there is no survival, perhaps we can get on in psychology without the concept of soul. If we do survive then we must make the linguistic modifications in our psychological theory which will allow for that fact. Most psychologists will be surprised if they find themselves surviving their bodily death, but they will have no reason for being greatly surprised if they realise the linguistic basis of their expectation of extinction. They should then say: "So our language was inadequate after all." They will be in the same position as were the theoretical physicists when Einstein showed the necessity for changing over from the language of Newtonian mechanics to that of relativity.

It is not particularly difficult to specify what would be adequate verification of the proposition: "He has survived bodily death." It is, however, by no means easy to obtain such adequate verification in practice. It may indeed be difficult in practice to obtain adequate evidence for survival when one is dealing with the alleged survival of an individual in this world after he has disappeared for a time. This difficulty is illustrated by the uncertainties as to identity which were dealt with in the trial of the Tichborne claimant.

The difficulties are unavoidably greater when the problem is to establish survival beyond bodily death. There are two main lines of evidence which some have found satisfactory. First, there are apparitions of the departed in which the visible forms of those who have departed are seen by one or more people after their death. Even when these are seen by more than one person and cannot, therefore, well be explained as mere hallucinations, it has been argued by Tyrrell that they are of doubtful value as evidence for survival.¹ There is the obvious consideration that there seems to be no reason for supposing that if the spirit of a departed person were present this would in itself produce any visual experience. Furthermore, apparitions have also been reported of living people and of inanimate objects, and these cannot easily be explained as due to the presence of their 'spirits' where the apparition was seen. In addition, it has been pointed out that such apparitions do not have the characteristics of persons; they show no spontaneity of speech or behaviour. The most closely observed ghost, the Morton ghost, for example, did not speak but merely carried out a series of stereotyped activities which suggested not a living disembodied personality but something more resembling a strip of cinema film run again and again through the projector.²

(1) Tyrrell, G.N.M., Apparitions, Society for Psychical Research, London, 1942.

(2) Morton, Miss R.C., 'Record of a Haunted House', Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, VIII, pp.311-332, London, 1892

A second possible source of evidence of survival is provided by mediumistic communication. Those who have attended seances are often convinced that they have been in touch with the spirits of their departed friends for either or both of two reasons: because they have a strong sense of the actual personality of their friend expressing itself in the communications they receive or because they receive information which they are convinced could come from no other source. The first of these may be a strong ground for conviction to the person experiencing it but it is obviously impossible to subject it to any objective test. The second reason, that information is given which could only be known to the departed person can be subjected to test but with much more difficulty than is commonly supposed. Parsons has shown, for example, that evidence accepted as convincing by those by whom it is received may also be accepted by other people for whom it is not intended.¹ Exact statistical testing of the appropriateness of communications for those for whom they are intended is a difficult matter and it is only recently that satisfactory methods have been devised.²

Attempts at experimental proof of survival by an attempt to communicate after death something determined on before death have generally taken the form of the 'sealed package' test, in which a message or object is left during the experimenter's life in a sealed package the contents of which he intends to communicate through a medium after his death. The latest experiment of this type was made by Sir Oliver Lodge; none have, so far as I know, given satisfactory results. In practice this form of test suffers from the grave defect that the envelope can only be opened once so there can be no repeated attempts at verifying the correctness of any communications received. I have suggested an improved form of it in which what is to be communicated is the key to a cipher; this has the advantage that an indefinite number of wrong keys may be tried without spoiling the test.³ This experiment also may give no positive result; there may be an insuperable barrier to that kind of communication from the next world. Nor is it important for religion that there should be empirical confirmation of survival; the doctrine of life everlasting may be accepted on faith. What is important for religious thought is that survival should be in principle verifiable. The religious thinker must be able to defend the doctrine against the charge of

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- (1) Parsons, D., 'On the Need for Caution in Assessing Mediumistic Material', Proc.S.P.R., XLVIII, pp.344-351, London, 1949.
 - (2) Pratt, J.G. and Birge, W.R., 'Appraising verbal test material in Parapsychology', Journal of Parapsychology, XII, pp.236-256, Durham N.C., 1948.
 - (3) Thouless, R.H., 'A test of survival' and 'Additional note on a test of survival', Proc.S.P.R., XLVIII, pp.253-263 and 342-343, London, 1949.

being meaningless; it is not necessary that he should be able to provide empirical evidence that it is true.

This is not to suggest that belief in personal immortality is unimportant to religion. What was said by Jesus Christ in opposition to the doctrine of the Sadducees makes it clear that he regarded the denial of immortality as an important error. The assertion of immortality is also central in the teaching of St Paul. Religious thought at the present time cannot hold the doctrine as of minor importance. Some of its importance lies in the part that it plays in a total structure of belief in which spiritual factors are central. Perhaps the general decline in liveliness of conviction of immortality at the present time is due to the prevalence of a general naturalistic attitude. Ideas of God and of the spiritual world may be tacked on to a general world outlook that is fundamentally naturalistic, and they seem then to be not easy to believe in. This difficulty of belief disappears if the outlook is reversed and the spiritual world is regarded as primary and important, and it is considered that the world of nature may have been created in order to serve spiritual ends. If we think of the evolutionary process as a blind selection of the organic forms best fitted to survive, it would seem incredible that immortal soul should have emerged as a by-product of this process. There is, however, nothing incredible in the idea that the evolutionary process had the purpose of preparing an organism which could be a vehicle of the spirit and a means by which it became an instrument in the service of God.

Modern thinkers who accept immortality often find difficulty in the traditional doctrine of 'the resurrection of the body'. Sir Henry Self, for example, said in his presidential address at the Conference of Modern Churchmen in Cambridge in 1950, that the modern man "knows perfectly well that the disposal of molecules, atoms, protons, electrons, etc., must be such that a purely physical body could never be re-collected even if the enterprise were worth while."¹ The assumption behind this objection seems to be that a doctrine must be taken to mean what it suggests to the modern man, and be rejected if this meaning is unacceptable to him even if it is not the meaning which the doctrine had for those who originally stated it. Plainly the doctrine of the resurrection of the body was not meant to make any assertion about protons or electrons since these were terms unknown in the early centuries of the Church. Nor is it likely to have meant the re-collection of the material particles of the body since the difficulties of such a process were as well known in the early centuries of

(1) Self, H., 'Presidential address: Towards Christian Reformation', The Modern Churchman, XL, pp.184-197, Oxford, 1950.

Church history as they are to the modern man. This interpretation of the doctrine is indeed ruled out by the consideration that the doctrine was asserted by men who knew and accepted as authoritative St Paul's account of resurrection in the First Epistle to the Corinthians in which the idea of physical reconstruction is definitely rejected.

To answer the question as to what the doctrine of the resurrection of the body does mean one must consider what is the theory that it is intended to deny. It seems to me that the doctrine is intended to deny that our future existence is a shadowy survival of a mere 'psychic factor' in a kind of dream world. I think that such theories were current in the early centuries of the Church; they are from time to time revived by thinkers at the present day. They are a possible account of a future life which is intended to be excluded by the assertion of the resurrection of the body.

At the same time, there is a real objection to a verbal formulation of a doctrine which suggests to the modern reader something quite different from the meaning which it had for those who originally formulated it. I do not know what is the solution of this difficulty. The alternative phrase 'the resurrection of the flesh' is open to the same objection, that it is likely to suggest to the modern reader a meaning very different from that intended.

2. Summary of discussion

- David Russell Referred to Tyrrell and his new line of evidence for survival applied soon after the death of F.W.H. Myers.
- Michael Argyle Couldn't the Tyrrell procedure be telepathic?
- Margaret Masterman In discussing questions of survival there is besides the problem of linguistic inadequacy also that of linguistic redundancy to be considered, i.e. of language that says more than you mean it to.
- R.B. Braithwaite The proposition that A survives bodily death is a verifiable proposition and the statement is meaningful. A might wake up as from an anaesthetic.
- M.M. What would it mean to wake up? Doesn't waking up require a body?

- M.T. Hoskyns Gave examples from catacombs contrasting Christian and Jewish catacombs and the general difference of symbolism.
- D.M. Emmet This catacomb resurrection-symbolism is related to a new kind of preaching; and also of a new point of view towards life and death.
- Victor Ranford The doctrine of the Church is not one of natural immortality but of the "resurrection of the body". "We are raised because Christ was raised."
- M.A. There is an analogous question about reincarnation.
- M.M. No evidence for reincarnation from Tibet is more startling than that of a child prodigy such as Mozart. This does not cause any western thinker to postulate reincarnation.
- R.H. Thouless The new Dalai Lama was chosen by presenting four control objects and four genuine Lamaic objects to a number of babies. If the number were large, the probability of one baby picking the four right objects by chance would be quite high.
- E.A. Armstrong What alteration does precognition make in our use of the concept of time? He quoted the case of two spontaneous precognitions by dreams.
- R.H.T. Belief in precognitive value of dreams was universal till about the seventeenth century. Mediumistic remarks about time in "another universe" present inconsistencies.
- D.R. The relevance of precognition is that it tends to refute Boring's definition: "man is a mass of protoplasm".
- R.B.B. That would be refuted by cognition - let alone precognition. Materialists who are converted by spiritualistic phenomena are highly unreasonable.
- M.T.H. Do mediums prove to be telepathic subjects of exceptional sensitivity?
- R.H.T. Yes, on the whole. They would probably say they communicated with spirits telepathically. But there's the case of Eileen Garrett who said she

did the whole thing by clairvoyance, and that she didn't need the spirits at all.

R.B.B. Can the resurrection narratives be counted as cases of apparitions?

R.H.T. No. Resurrection narratives show quite different characteristics from apparition narratives which sound like somebody showing and re-showing the same small section of a cinematograph film. Ghosts are transitory phenomena. They do not last long.

R.B.B. I see an apparition once a week or so; but does it matter?

R.H.T. No apparitions count unless more than one person sees them.

David C. Mayer Was the Morton ghost ever photographed?

R.H.T. No, but I don't think anything would have come out.

M.M. Did several people see it at once?

R.H.T. Four people on one night and two dogs. When investigating ghosts always take a dog or a Siamese cat.

M.M. There is a Christian (or rather Roman Catholic) prohibition of mediums, spiritualism, witchcraft. Do you support this? Do you for example suggest that Kelham should start a department of parapsychology?

R.H.T. The Roman Catholic prohibition allows resort to mediums for the purposes of scientific research.

M.M. Disliked the connection of parapsychology with religion. This tends to promote euphoria; and to prevent people learning to accept death.

M.T.H. Quoted the case of Mrs S. where there was a difference in behaviour (i.e. cheering up, etc.) after alleged communication had been received.

R.B.B. Why is it worse to get consolation from mediums than from the Church?

- R.H.T. Because it takes up more time and energy.
- M.M. Is that so? What about Chantries?
- R.H.T. Gave as another example that of twelve nuns praying continually for William the Conqueror. Taking to mediums is like taking to drink.
- M.M. So are sacraments, or can be.
- R.H.T. Mentioned churchyard frequenters - a woman who had tea on her husband's grave.
- Everyone Why shouldn't she?
- M.M. Do you think the total evidence for survival good?
- R.H.T. Yes, in the aggregate, counting on the authority of the Church, St Paul (in Ronald Knox's translation) comes out strong for survival.
- M.M. What St Paul was talking about is not the kind of thing which can possibly be supported by mediumistic evidence.
- R.H.T. I disagree tentatively, but Margaret Masterman may be right about St Paul.
- R.B.B. St Paul saw an apparition on the road to Damascus and had a highly complicated mystical experience: he wrote II Corinthians XV in consequence. "Resurrection" for him meant "existing as I saw Christ exist at that minute", not what anybody ordinarily means by resurrection of the body.
- R.H.T. There is general ignorance as to the provenance of the phrase "resurrection of the body".
- R.B.B. Isn't the provenance obvious? Read Thessalonians II. What do Armstrong and Ranford think?
- E.A.A. The concepts of belief in an after-life and of belief in God are inseparable.
- R.B.B. There is a connection between theism and immortality, but is there any connection between theism and survival?

- E. A. A. A loving God would not discard his creation.
- R. B. B. Is death a discarding?
- V. R. It is regrettable that the Greek notion of immortality with division of body and soul got so far into Christian tradition. St Paul uses soma to mean reality as opposed to shadow (the word was derived from the Stoics). The object of death is to bear fruit (St Paul) and death is necessary for life, so resurrection of the body means that of the whole personality and of the whole man as it should be in Christ. For St Paul death does not occur only at the end of life, death has begun now, and so has new life. You can experience eternity. We are always passing from past to future, and experience more than we experience as intellectual beings. What the mystics do is to abandon this breaking up of personal life. This is more than Spinoza meant. Christians are always apt to be pantheists because there is a deep truth in pantheism which appeals to us.
- M. M. Is the experience of eternity continuous or occasional?
- D. R. There are certain elements in our experience to which time is irrelevant.
- V. R. Can the experience of eternity be empirically examined?
- V. R. There is a world-wide belief in immortality and death ceremonies.
- M. M. Yes, but there is a world-wide drive to try to survive.
- D. C. M. When eternity is experienced can the experiencer think or talk?
- M. M. No. But he doesn't want to. In the beatific vision one doesn't think or talk. The experiencer has realized this and that it is the beatific vision. The same occurs in the Buddhist nirvana.
- V. R. Parapsychological evidence for survival is always seen against a background of the experience of eternity. Look at Tyrrell's will to believe.

- R.B.B. There is a case for saying the whole thing is a matter of will to believe, and a case against it.
- V.R. What I am saying is that it is a significant fact that evidence of survival can and always is seen against a background of the experience of eternity. Things you discuss and think about have to be put in the context of your whole personal experience.
- E.A.A. Has experience of eternity a moral element?
- R.B.B. No, rather a change of attitude. Fiat voluntas tua. This is different from a moral decision; it is spiritual and integral but not moral.
- M.M. Except in its effects. There is a difference between true and false mysticism.

(The absolute nature of this difference was questioned.)
- R.B.B. Alleged he experienced eternity for an hour one night.
- M.A. I had the impression of flying also.
- M.M. There is a glibness in Braithwaite and Argyle which ill fits in with the reticence of true mystics.
- M.A. No, it's just that we are not inhibited. That's all.
- D.R. Can we now close the meeting?
- R.H.T. Yes. (Sleepily.)

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